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Documents citing Peary Mohan Das vs D. Weston And Ors. on 7 August, 1911

Dakshina Ranjan Ghose vs Omar Chand Oswal on 26 June, 1923

12. It is desirable, however, in my judgment, to refer to the case which was mentioned by the learned Subordinate Judge. That was a decision of Mr. Justice Fletcher in the case of Peary Mohan Das v. Weston 13 Ind. Cas. 721 : 16 C.W.N. 145 : 13 Cr. L.J. 65. The passage which is relied upon by the Subordinate Judge is to be found at page 214 page of 16 C.W.N.--[Ed.], which runs as follows: "The third issue is whether the defendants were entitled to notice of this suit under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In my opinion they were not. A public officer sued in respect of an act done in bad faith is not entitled to notice under Section 80.
Calcutta High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 14 - Full Document

Pulin Behary Das And Ors. vs Emperor on 2 April, 1912

261. I shall now proceed to examine the merits of the appeal. The case for the prosecution is that the Dacca Anusilan Samity, of which many of the appellants were members, was a revolutionary society, the object of which was ultimately to deprive the King-Emperor of the sovereignty of British India, or at any rate of a part thereof. The theory of the prosecution is that the Partition of Bengal which came into force on the 16th October 1905, exasperated the Hindu inhabitants of the Province and specially of the newly constituted Province of Eastern Bengal. Political agitation was vigorously carried on in various parts of the country, and, to use the language of Mr. Justice Fletcher in Peary Mohan Das v. Weston 16 C.W.N. 145 at p. 152 : 13 Cr.L.J. 65 : 13 Ind. Cas. 721 speeches were delivered against the Partition, the swadeshi movement came into being, akhras or gymnasiums and Samities or societies were formed or extended, attempts were made to enforce the swadeshi movement by criminal intimidation, force and violence, volunteers originally enrolled for the purpose of keeping order at political meetings were subsequently employed for picketing the markets in order to enforce boycott, and finally literature including periodicals and books, which preached revolutionary doctrines and destruction of Europeans-, came into existence. On behalf of the Crown; it is asserted in substance that the Dacca Anushilan Samity was formed for purposes of revolution, though its ostensible object was to encourage physical exercise. The case for the defence, on the other hand, is that the ostensible was the real object of the Samity and that its founder and promoters entertained no secret or sinister purpose. In fact, it is asserted on behalf of the defence that the effect of the agitation which followed the Partition of Bengal was not merely to cause complete estrangement between Hindus and Mahomedans, but also to create a feeling of active hostility of the Mahomedans towards the Hindus which exhibited itself in what has been described as various acts of insult and oppression. The defence urge that the position of the Hindus became so insecure that Pulin Behary Das, who was himself an expert lathi player, at the instance of the leading people of the town of Dacca, started this Samity on the 6th March 1907 for the physical improvement and ultimate regeneration of the Bengali race. It is further asserted that the idea of the Samity was borrowed from the well known work "Anushilan" or "culture" by the celebrated Bengali novelist, Babu Bankim Chandra Chatterjee. The substantial question in controversy, consequently, is, what was the true character of the Dacca Anushilan Samity. Was it, as the prosecution alleges, a revolutionary society the funds of which were obtained by dacoity, and the object of which was to be attained by means of bombs and arms; or was it, as the accused assert, a society for not merely a harmless but also a praiseworthy purpose, namely, the physical and moral improvement of the Bengali race, but the object, whereof has been grievously misrepresented by untrustworthy Police officers and unscrupulous spies? In the Court below, a considerable mass of evidence was adduced to establish the precise time when the society was formed, and it appears to have been assumed that if the society was established towards the end of 1905, immediately after the Partition of Bengal, as the prosecution asserts, its object must have been revolutionary while if it was really founded on the 6th March 1907, immediately after and in view of the various disturbances at Comilla, Jamalpur, and in other places, its purpose must have been laudable. But it is manifest that neither of these assumptions may be well founded. The precise point of time when the Samity was instituted, if it can be ascertained, may possibly indicate the ostensible purpose of its establishment; but it is by no means conclusive as to its true character. It is obvious that a society of this description could hardly have been founded, much less successfully extended through various districts, unless the antecedent events and surrounding circumstances had prepared the way therefor. It is, therefore, not very material to consider whether the organization was started on the 6th March 1907 as the defence assert or more than a year earlier as the prosecution alleges. It is plain beyond controversy that at or about the time to which we are referring, considerable ill-feeling existed between Hindus and Mahomedans, and the evidence further points to the conclusion that in Jamalpur, and possibly in other places also, infuriated Mahomedan mobs had, to some extent, got beyond the effective control of the authorities entrusted with the duty of keeping the peace. There was thus a widespread panic among Hindus that they might be insulted or outraged by Mahomedans with impunity, and also a belief that the authorities were either unable or unwilling to afford them adequate protection. It is not necessary for the purposes of the present case to investigate whether and how far this panic was well founded; nor is it pertinent to the present inquiry to determine who were to blame for the highly strained feeling between the Hindus and the Mahomedans. I am concerned only with the fact, firmly established by the evidence, that there was widespread panic amongst the Hindus and that means of self-protection were deemed necessary by men of intelligence and respectability. Under such circumstances, the formation of a society avowedly for the development of physical culture and the rapid extension thereof in different districts is by no means a matter for surprise. That Pulin Behary Das was himself an expert lathi player is clear on the evidence, and he is said to have learnt the tricks of the art from a master named Murtaza and to have developed the system to a considerable extent. That lathi play by itself is perfectly harmless has not been disputed; and, as was pointed out by the learned Chief Justice in a recent case, lathi play standing alone cannot be treated as evidence of a conspiracy to wage war.
Calcutta High Court Cites 57 - Cited by 63 - Full Document

State vs Fateh Bahadur And Ors. on 18 April, 1957

The learned Sessions Judge relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Peary Mohan Das v. D. Weston, 16 Cal WN 145 (D), in support of his view that the case diary could have been used by him in the manner that he has done. We have looked into this decision and We do not think that it goes that length. It only says that the object Of recording case-diaries under Section 172 Criminal P. C., is to enable Courts to check the methods of investigation by the police, and if this object is defeated in the case and if the recording of the matter in case-diaries from day to day is deliberately disobeyed by the police during the most important period of the investigation, it is a circumstance which is to be reckoned with.
Allahabad High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Bhagchand Dagdusa Gujrathi vs The Secretary Of State For India on 27 May, 1927

499; Peary Mohan Das v. D. Weston (1911) 16 C.W.N. 145 and Raghubans Sahai v. Phool Kumari (1905) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 1130.); and, secondly, is the fact that this protection takes the form of providing for a fixed and obligatory interval of two months between the required notice and the commencement of any suit in respect of the officials' action. It is only right to observe in this connection that, under Section 80(2) of the Bombay District Police Act, at any rate, and it may be under other similar provisions, damages would not be recoverable from a public servant, who gave effect in good faith to orders issued with apparent authority. It appears, therefore, to have been due to anxiety not to expose a plaintiff to the risk of the execution of an invalid order without practical redress, that they adopted a construction, which is not in accord with that accepted generally. The point has been put in this way. Section 80 is but a part of a Procedure Code, passed to provide the regulations and machinery, by means of which the Courts may do justice between the parties. A construction which may lead to injustice is one which ought not to be adopted, since it would be repugnant to the whole tenor and purpose of the Act, and the implication of a suitable exception or qualification is, therefore, justifiable and even necessary. In effect, however, their decisions are not altogether reconcilable with one another, either as to the extent to which they go, or as to the reasoning on which they are based. Whether the section should be read as if it ran "no suit other than a suit in which an injunction is claimed," or as if it ran "no suit shall be instituted except when serious or irreparable damage might be occasioned to the plaintiff, if not prevented by the previous grant of an injunction," does not appear to have been settled. In the one case all suits falling within the section could safely anticipate the prescribed delay by the simple device of adding a claim for an injunction at the end of the plaint. In the other it would depend on the view, which a Judge might take of the elastic and indefinite expression "serious or irreparable damage," whether the official should have or should lose the benefit of the statutory interval of two months, nor can this difficulty in the least depend on the intention, which may be speculatively attributed to the Legislature in prescribing any interval at all.
Bombay High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 80 - Full Document

Dakshina Ranjan Ghose vs Omar Chand Oswal on 26 June, 1923

12. It is desirable, however, in my judgment to refer to the case which was mentioned by the learned Subordinate Judge. That was a decision of Mr. Justice Fletcher, in the case of Peary Mohan Das v. D. Weston [1912] 16 C.W.N. 145. The passage which is relied upon by the learned Subordinate Judge is to be found at page 214 which runs as follows : The third issue is whether the defendants were entitled to notice of this suit under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In my opinion they were not. A public officer sued in respect of an act done in bad faith is not entitled to notice under Section 80.
Calcutta High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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