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Documents citing Vasudeva Mudaliar vs K.S. Srinivasa Pillai on 22 July, 1907

Sheoram Singh And Ors. vs Babu Singh And Ors. on 1 December, 1925

2. We are asked, on the other hand, to hold that Article 147 applies on the ground that this was not really a mortgage by conditional sale, and (although not an English mortgage), a mortgage in respect of which the mortgagee might sue for foreclosure or sale, and we were asked to apply Article 147 to such a document in spite of the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai (1907) 30 Mad 426. We are unable to do so. We regard the judgment of the Privy Council in that matter as peremptory and binding upon us. Whether or not their Lordships' observations wore necessary for the disposal of the case, they were considered observations delivered for the express purpose of setting at rest a question which was much controverted at the time in India, and they held that Article 147 was applicable only to the class of mortgage generally known and defined by the Transfer of Property Act as an English mortgage. They give what they described as preponderating reasons for adopting this view. The second was that there was a presumption that the Legislature, when it repeated in a later Act an expression which had obtained a settled meaning by judicial construction, intended the words to mean what they meant before. That reason applies with even greater force to their Lordships' view at the present day than it did then. The judgment was delivered in 1907. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were re-enacted so far as they apply to remedies in respect of mortgages in the first schedule to the Civil Procedure Code of 1905, and Art 147, Lim. Act, has been re-enacted in the Limitation Act of 1908 without change, and therefore bearing the narrower interpretation given to it by the judgment of the Privy Council to which we have referred.
Allahabad High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Vyapuri And Anr. vs Sonamma Boi Ammani on 31 August, 1915

It is admitted that Article 132 of the Act of 1871 was applicable to suits by a simple mortgagee instituted against the mortgagors or persons claiming under them to enforce the charge by sale of the mortgaged property, and the Privy Council in Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai (1907) I.L.R. 30 Mad. 426 at p. 438 (P.C.) say that it was perfectly settled that such suits were governed by that article. The Privy Council in the above case make no distinction whatever between suits against mortgagors and against strangers in possession of the mortgaged property and the language of the article does not warrant any such distinction.
Madras High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 22 - Full Document

Viyapuri And Anr. vs Sonamma Boi Ammani on 31 August, 1915

A suit by a simple mortgagee to enforce payment of the mortgage-money by a sale of the property is governed by Article 132 of the Limitation Act, and he is entitled to bring such a suit within 12 years after the mortgage-money had become due, See Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai 30 M. 426 : 17 M.L.J. 444 : 4 A.L.J. 625 : 9 Bom. L.R. 1104 : 6 C.L.J. 379 : 11 C.W.N. 1005 : 34 I.A. 187 (P.C.) : 2 M.L.T. 333. His right cannot be extinguished under Section 28 of the Limitation Act, though the bar of the remedy in the case of a real right may have the same effect as the extinction of the right itself. As he is not entitled to possession of any sort or kind of the mortgaged property, there can be no adverse possession against him. Can then his rights be affected by a trespasser taking possession of the mortgaged property ousting the mortgagor in possession? If they are, he must have a cause of action against the trespasser. Abdur Rahim, J., thinks he has.
Madras High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Fozmal Bhutaji vs Shridhar Vithal on 6 September, 1945

The Privy Council case in Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai [1942] 1 Cal. 326, which I have referred to earlier, was referred to by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in arriving at this decision of theirs. This decision of the Calcutta High Court is on all fours with the present case and I would be justified in following it and in coming to the conclusion as contended by Mr. S. M. Shah, I may, however, deal with the argument which was advanced by Mr. Desai in this connection, and which was based on the provisions of the next amending Act, viz. Act XXI of 1929 which was an Act called The Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929. Mr. Desai pointed out that Section 9 of this Supplementary Act XXI of 1929 added "the advances secured by mortgage by deposit of title deeds" within the provisions of Article 132 of the 2nd schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. He further pointed out Section 15 of the, same Act, Sub-section (1) whereof is in identical terms with the terms of Section 63 of Act IXX of 1929, which, however, did not merely rest with this saving clause therein contained but went on to provide in Sub-section (2) that a suit by a mortgagee for foreclosure or sale on a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds may be instituted within two years from the date of the commencement of the Act (Act XXI of 1929) or within sixty years from the date when the money secured by the mortgage became due, whichever period expires first. Mr. Desai therefore contended that there being no such provision in the case of the English mortgagee whose right to foreclose was brought to an end by the amendment of Section 67 enacted in Act XX of 1929, the Court should come to the conclusion that the period of limitation which was prescribed under Article 132 was operative even in the case of an English mortgagee, enough time having been given to the English mortgagees, viz. six. months, if they wanted to file their suits on their mortgages. This argument of Mr. Desai, however, is not sound for the reason that it completely ignores the saving clause which has been enacted in Section 63 of Act XX of 1929 and misreads the provisions of Section 15(2) of Act XXI of 1929. Section 15(2) of the latter Act was considered necessary to be enacted because in spite of the provisions of Section 15(7) of that Act which in terms did not affect the terms or incidents of any transfer made or effected before April 1, 1930, or any remedy or proceeding in respect of such right, title, obligation or liability, etc. it did in fact curtail the rights which equitable mortgagees by deposit of title deeds had by virtue of this saving clause to file suits within sixty years for payment of the dues under their mortgages. Section 15(2) was thus necessary because it curtailed the rights which otherwise would have been vested in the equitable mortgagees by deposit of title deeds. No such provision was considered necessary in the case of an English mortgagee whose right to foreclose was taken away by the enactment of Section 31(c) of the Act 'XX of 1929.
Bombay High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Vijaykumar Motilal Hirakhanwala vs Ramprasad Dagduram on 17 November, 1959

In Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai (1907) L.R. 34 I.A. 186 : S.C. 9 Bom. L.R. 1104 it was held that Article 147 of the Indian Limitation Act was restricted to suits on mortgages when the mortgagee is entitled to either of the two remedies of foreclosure or sale in the alternative. Therefore, the article would apply only to an English, mortgage (as denned in the Transfer of Property Act before its amendment of 1929) in which alone "the suit can be, and always is brought for 'foreclosure or sale' ". In the present case the mortgagee is not entitled to either of the two remedies of foreclosure or sale in the alternative and the suit is instituted only for foreclosure. It is, therefore, clear that Article 147 of the Limitation Act of 1908 does not apply to the present suit. Mr. Kotwal, however, says that it is Article 133 of the Hyderabad Limitation Act which referred to a suit for foreclosure only (and not to a suit for foreclosure or sale in the alternative) and which was in force at the time when the cause of action arose that is applicable to the present suit, and that the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council which construed the words of the first column of Article 147 cannot be relied upon in construing the words of the first column of Article 133 of the Hyderabad Limitation Act which are materially different from those of Article 147 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The Hyderabad Limitation Act was repealed and the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, was extended to the State of Hyderabad by the Part B States (Laws) Act, (III of 1951) and it is not disputed that it was the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which was in force on the day on which the present suit was filed. But Mr. Kotwal says that in view of the proviso to Section 6 of the Part B States (Laws) Act (III of 1951) the repeal of Hyderabad Limitation Act shall not affect any right acquired under that Act and any legal proceeding in respect of any such right may be instituted as if Part B States (Laws) Act (III of 1951) had not been passed. in other words, the contention is that the present suit, though instituted after the Part B States (Laws) Act (III of 1951) came into force, is still governed, for the purpose of limitation by the former Hyderabad Limitation Act. Proviso to Section 6 of the Part B States (Laws) Act (III of 1951) says Provided that the repeal shall not affect-...
Bombay High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Rolla Subbadu, Minor, By Next Friend ... vs Somisetti Seshayya Chetti And Ors. on 26 April, 1929

2. Section 19 of the Limitation Act requires that the acknowledgment to be effective should have been made before the expiration of the period prescribed for the suit. It is argued by Mr. Varadachariar for the respondents that the "period prescribed" in Section 19 of the Limitation Act should be limited to the period prescribed in the first schedule of the Act and should not be extended to apply to the special period of two years mentioned in Section 31 of the Act which has been allowed only as a matter of grace by the legislature to relieve cases of hardship caused by the decision of the Privy Council in Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai (1907) L.R. 34 I.A. 186: I.L.R. 30 M. 426: 17 M.L.J. 444 (P.C.).
Madras High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Saradindu Mukherjee vs Jahar Lall Agarwalla on 17 June, 1941

11. In support of the present appeal by Saradindu Mr. Atul Chandra Gupta urged four points before us on behalf of his client. The first was on the question of limitation, but it was not seriously pressed till the end. In the trial Court; it seems to have been assumed that the 12 years' rule of limitation applied (Art. 132 of Schedule I, Limitation Act). The suit was instituted on 17th July 1983, which was more than 12 years from the due date of payment under the two mortgages, namely, 20th May 1920, but limitation was sought to be saved by setting up payment of a sum of Rs. 500 as interest on each mortgage on 11th October 1921, which the Court below found in favour of the plaintiff. As to this, Mr. Gupta said that the appellant's answer was two-fold; first, that the alleged payment was not a fact, and secondly, that in any case it was not such a payment as would be sufficient in law to save limitation. Fairly and frankly, however, Mr. Gupta himself suggested that in view of the fact that the mortgages sued upon were English mortgages, the article to be considered was Article 147, which provides a period of 60 years for a suit "by a mortgagee for foreclosure or Sale." It was pointed out that in Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai ('07) 30 Mad. 426 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had authoritatively Laid down, on a true construction of this article, not only that it was applicable to English mortgages, but that it was limited in its application only to this class of mortgages, in which alone the suit could be, and always was, "for foreclosure of sale."
Calcutta High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Katragadda Ramayya And Anr. vs Kolli Nageswararao And Ors. on 25 September, 1967

But though we have carefully gone through the Judgment in Suryanarayana Rao's case 68 Mad LJ 12 = (AIR 1935 Mad 64 FB) (Supra), was not dealing with the applicability of Section 31 of the Limitation Act (now repealed) which was enacted to remove the hardship caused by a decision of Privy Council in Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai, 1907, ILR 30 mad 426 (PC), to persons who had therefore acted on the basis of the applicability of the 60 years' rule even to suits on simple mortgages, while in fact the 12 years rule was held to be applicable by the above decision. In that case, the plaintiff sued on a mortgage bond ext A of 1905 and the principal contesting defendant, the 11th defendant, had a mortgage in the favour of 1902, Ext I. To get over the prima facie priority of Ext. I, the plaintiff relied on the fact that his mortgage Ext. A was practically a renewal of Ext B dated 24th May 1892, i.e., long anterior to Ext. I. The subordinate Judge in appeal , Jackson, J. reversed that decision holding that on the date of Ext. A the claim under Ext B had become barred by Limitation and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to priority as against the 11th defendant. Against this judgment, an L .P . A. was filed, which was referred to the Full Bench. It was pointed out that the renewal under Ext.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 42 - Cited by 6 - P J Reddy - Full Document
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