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Chinnaswami Padayachi vs Darmalinga Padayachi on 21 March, 1932

But the discussion and opinions were not limited to the facts and in fact the judgment of Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., is mostly devoted to a criticism of the observations in Venkatagiri v. Sadagopachariar (1911) 22 M.L.J. 129 and the cases relied on in it. That case Venkatagiri v. Sadagopachariar (1911) 22 M.L.J. 129 however was not between mortgagees or between a mortgagee and a purchaser but like the present case a claim for undisturbed possession by an earlier first mortgagee-purchaser who had got possession against a later second mortgagee-purchaser. It was held that the plaintiff as earlier purchaser who had been put into possession could not be disturbed by the later second mortgagee-purchaser whose only right was to redeem the prior mortgage and then to sell the property for the amount of both first and second mortgages. Though the language employed in these three decisions and the criticism of the earlier by the later was perhaps unavoidably more general than the facts of each case necessarily demanded, each case is authority only for what it actually decides.
Madras High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

Chinnu Pillai And Ors. vs Venkatasamy Chettiar And Ors. on 21 December, 1915

The learned pleader for the appellants however contends that those propositions are really obiter and therefore not binding on us ; that they were so treated in Venkatagiri v. Sadagopachariar (1911) 22 M.L.J. 129; that the present case is in all fours with Venkataramana Iyer v. Gompertz (1908) I.L.R. 31 M. 425 which is referred to and not dissented from in the Full Bench case. I may say at once that; I do not consider that the propositions of law deduced by the Full Bench from a review of the previous authorities are merely dicta; they are the principles on which the actual decision in the case depended and are binding on us. Further as I think (if I may say so without presumption) that those propositions correctly lay down the law, I do not think it necessary to discuss the authorities cited therein.
Madras High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Subramania Ayyar And Six Ors. vs Raja Rajeswara Dorai Alias ... on 22 December, 1916

Reliance was placed on certain observations in Venkatagiri Iyer v. Sadagopachariar (1904) 14 M.L.J. 359. We do not think that is an authority for the proposition now advanced. As we had occasion to remark on more than one occasion recently, the principle of constructive res judicata should be very cautiously applied to execution applications. In the first place, the legislature has not enacted specifically that the rule of res judicata applies to execution proceedings. The reason is obvious. It is open to a decree-holder to proceed piecemeal with his execution. He is not bound to proceed against all the properties comprised in the decree at once, and consequently the principle underlying the general rule of res judicata is not in terms applicable to execution proceedings. At the same time, as pointed out by the Judicial Committee, parties should not be allowed to agitate the same, question after it has been once decided; and this dictum of their Lordships has been extended to cases where the parties had an opportunity to object to the decision, but did not avail themselves of that opportunity. One principle seems to be clear, and that is, that the party who if sought to be affected by the bar of res judicata should have notice of the point which is likely to be decided against him and should have an opportunity of putting forward his contentions against such a decision. In the present case, notice went to the respondents to show cause why they should not be brought on the record as the legal representatives of the deceased judgment debtor for the purpose of execution. They had no notice that any particular property was going to be attached. When they came to know that an order was passed to attach the properties, they immediately filed a petition praying for the cancellation of that order. We are satisfied that the respondents are not estopped from raising their contention. We must therefore overrule this plea.
Madras High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 15 - Full Document

Annavi Pillai vs Machammal And Ors. on 3 February, 1933

2. The appellant relies on Venkatagiri v. Sadagopachariar (1912) 14 IC 449, Muhammad Elsman Rowthen v. Abdulla (1901) 24 Mad 171, Chinnaswami Padayachi v. Darmalinga Padayachi AIR 1932 Mad 566 and Ram Narain Sahoo v. Bandi Pershad (1904) 31 Cal 737, and also on a recent Full Bench case in Nagendra Chettiar v. Lakshmi Ammal AIR 1933 Mad 583, but I consider that they are not relevant to this case. All these cases are clearly distinguishable from the present for two reasons. In all these cases one of the mortgagees was not made a party in at least one of the suits, and secondly the purchase relied on for possession was one in Court auction. Here we have purely a private sale by the mortgagor to the mortgagee and no authority whatever has been quoted to show that the possession which the mortgagee obtained stands on a different footing from the possession of the mortgagor. The appellant is really driven to rely entirely on para. 2 of the decree in the plaintiff's suit "subject to defendant 3's prior lien" and to argue that the defendant is entitled on this to remain in possession till his mortgage is redeemed. 19 Halsbury, p. 2. para. 1, is relied on for the general meaning of the word "lien" where it is said that lien in its primary sense is a right in one man to retain that which is in his possession belonging to another until certain demands of the person in possession are satisfied. But "lien" may be either possessory or non-possessory: vide Fisher on Mortgages, p. 392. See also 19 Halsbury, p. 4, para. 4.
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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