52. When a provision of law relates to the performance of a public
duty, and the invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision
causes serious prejudice to those for whose benefit it is enacted, and at the
same time who have no control over the performance of the duty, such a
provision should be treated as directory (Sharif-ud-Din49). Although a
public duty is imposed, and the manner of performance is also indicated in
imperative language, the provision is usually regarded as merely directory
when general injustice or inconvenience results to others and they have no
control over those exercising the duty. (State of Punjab v. Satyapal58).
Even if a statute is directory, the State cannot say that the requirements
contained therein do not envisage compliance thereof.
As far as question no. 5
3
(1994) 4 SCC 391
4
(1999) 1 SCC 396
5
(2008) 5 SCC 1
6
AIR (1979) SC 898
7
AIR (1983) SC 1019
14
is concerned, the High Court referred to the scheme of Articles 198
and 199, referred to the authorities in State of Punjab v. Satyapal8
and Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd v. Union of India 9 and negatived the
assail.
In a Division Bench decision rendered in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Satyapal Virmani, AIR 1956 Punjab 118 the principles of Banker's lien under Section 171 of the Contract Act are very well highlighted. It is held that on the facts and circumstances of the case the Bank could claim a general lien on the surplus amount left with it and could retain it for payment of other debts due from the same party in the absence of any contract to the contrary. Section 171 of the Contract Act provides for a general banker's lien. According to the law merchant, the banker can look to his general lien as a protection against loss on account, or loss on loan or verdraft. And money has been held to be a species of goods over which lien may be exercised. Where a banker has advance money to another, he has, obviously a lien on all securities which come into his hands for the amount of his general balance, unless there is an express contract or circumstances to the contrary, which is not the factual scenario in the present case.
9. This being the position in law, there is no question of the bank exercising the 'lien' for the purpose of retaining the money in fixed deposit. With the views expressed by the learned Judges in Jai Kishan Dass v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1955 Punjab 250, Punjab National Bank v. Satyapal Virmani, AIR 1956 Punjab 118 and in Devendrakumar v. Gulabsingh, AIR 1946 Nagpur 114 (relied on by the counsel for the bank in support of the above argument) to the contra with respect, I cannot agree. The ratio discernible from these decisions, in my view, is only this : "when moneys are held by the bank in one account and the payer in respect of these moneys owes the bank on another account, the banker's lien gives the bank a charge on all the monies of the payer in its hands, so that they may be transferred to whatever account the bank chooses, to set off or liquidate the debt".
In support (Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Satyapal Virmani) was cited to establish that the word "goods" in Section 171 of the Contract Act includes money. My attention was invited to para 8 of the judgment where it was held :--
They were only handed over. If at all it could be held that
there was a bailment in respect of the second loan, the same is hit by
Section 64 C.P.C. as the transaction was subsequent to this attachment
taken out by the plaintiff of the property before judgment. This
reasoning of the first appellate Court is now challenged as untenable.
Reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant on a
decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
LTD. v. SATYAPAL VIRMANI, . The learned Judges of the Division Bench
of that High Court observed that where a banker has advanced, money to
another, he has a Lien on all securities which come into his hands for
the amount of his general balance, unless there is an express contract
or circumstances to the contrary. Referring to various authorities
cited before it the High Court said at para 12 of the Report that a
review of these authorities shows that where a banker has advanced
money to another, he has a lien on all securities which come into his
hands for the amount of his general balance, unless there is an
express contract or circumstances to the contrary. In that case, as in
the present case, argument was raised that there was a specific
contract which circumscribed the lien to the advance of call loan
only. Although this allegation was made there is no evidence in
support of it and therefore the High Court was unable to accept this
special contract which was inconsistent with the general lien. In that
case one V had with the bank at Lahore a call-loan account and by way
of security he had deposited Government securities of the value of Rs.
5,00,000/-. On 31-12-1948 Rs. 4,86,148-1-0 was due to the bank on this
account. With the consent of the debtor the securities were sold and
after adjustment of the debt due from V a sum of Rs. 13,311-6-6 was a
surplus amount in the hands of the bank. V called upon the bank to pay
this surplus amount with interest but bank refused to pay the amount
claiming a general banker's lien on that amount in respect of certain
dues from another bank for whom V and another person had given a
guarantee under which each one of them had taken an individual and
personal liability to pay any amounts which were due to the bank. It
was argued before that High Court that the bankers have no lien on the
deposit of a partner on his separate account for a balance due to the
bank from the firm referring to Grant's Law of Banking, Seventh
Edition.
2. Mr. Thangamani, in his affidavit says that the exercise of the power under Article 174 in the instant case was vitiated by lack of good faith and abuse of power as it had been admittedly done on the advice of the Ministry in Office against whom a motion of no-confidence was pending at the time. He goes on to say that when the Speaker in exercise of his undoubted power and privilege had adjourned the House for the Chief Minister to take a concerted decision on the question of having re-elections in view of the situation prevailing in the State, the Governor had really enabled the Ministry to side-step the ruling of the Speaker for its own political purpose and convenience and expediency. In doing so the Governor, says Mr. Thangamani, had abdicated his personal responsibility to objectively assess the situation and act in a manner most consonant with Democracy, but had merely reflected the subjective reaction of the Ministry whose popular support was challenged, and the Governor had, therefore, failed to discharge his functions under Article 174 in good faith. This, Mr. Thangamani submits brought the present case squarely within the dicta in State of Punjab v. Satyapal, . Mr. Thangamani would further say that the Governor when acting under Article 174 was not discharging a purely executive function nor was such an order by him strictly speaking, an act of the Executive issued in his name. Both prorogation and dissolution of the House are acts of far-reaching effects and consequences and affected both the Executive as well as the Legislative limits is the State. By necessary implication and a constitutional historical interpretation, the Governor acts in his own right and responsibility when taking a decision under Article 174, and cannot merely voice the views of his Council of Ministers. Any contrary interpretation will not only make the Governor a futile and purposeless functionary, but lead to all possible abuses by the Council of Ministers whose interest might not necessarily or conceivably always be that of the general public, or of whose interests the Governor, as Head of the State was sole guardian. There was no pending business on 13-11-1972, which could not wait till 5-12-1972. The procedure generally followed before the prorogation involved the participation of the Secretariat of the Legislature the Speaker, the Council Chairman, the Leader of the House and the Chief Minister. But Mr. Thangamani, as he goes on to state, understood that in the instant case the usual procedure was not followed and the Speaker was not even informed, much less consulted, and this departure from the usual procedure also pointed to bad faith. Under the Rules the Speaker could advance or postpone the date of any session. If indeed there was any emergent business that could not wait till December 5, and there was a bona fide need to have the session earlier, the Speaker could have been requested to advance this date. Unless he had been so requested and he refused to yield if reasonable, there is no point in rushing to act under Article 174. The short adjournment for three weeks to consider a serious and important issue posed before the Government could not be reasonably construed as leading to a Constitutional crisis or administrative stalemate to justify resort to Article 174. These are the circumstances and some of the reasons with reference to which Mr. Thangamani has approached this court with the prayer mentioned earlier. In his petition he has not only impleaded the Governor, but also the Chief Secretary and the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, as respondents.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court in
1999 AP 367(supra) relied on the decisions of the Madras High
Court and held that the law regarding to general lien is laid down
inSection 171 of the Indian Contract Act and the Bankers have
such a lien on things bailed with them, unless there is a contract to
the contrary. It was also held that the banker's lien contemplated
under Section 171 has an overriding effect on general provisions
of Section 174 of the Contract Act. In AIR 1996 Allahabad 165, it
was held as follows: