45. It has been found by the Tribunal in this case that the advances made by the assessee were for the purpose of securing raw materials and that the same were advanced wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the assessee's business. The Tribunal has found further that there was nothing unusual in the assessee making such advances when the entire output of Rohtas Quarries Ltd. was being supplied to the assessee. These findings have not been challenged. Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that the said amounts were a debt due to the assessee from Rohtas Quarries Ltd., and the same arose out of and as an incident of the business of the assessee. On the authority of Abdullabhai Abdulkadar's case , it must be held that the loss of this sum was not a capital loss.
Learned Counsel for the assessee has submitted before us that the same principle should govern the present case and the limitation of time laid down in the proviso to Sub-section (6) of Section 10 should apply to the power of review given under Sub-section (4) of Section 20.
22., Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Sheikh Abdul Kadir Maraktyar & Co. (1928) 54 M.L.J. 298and of the Privy Council is Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Khemchand Ramdas [1938] 6 I.T.R. 414. We do not propose to discuss the facts of thsse cases or refer to the observations in them as regards the proper construction of Section 34 of the Income-tax Act because in our opinion there is no real analogy between Rule 17(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules and the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Income-tax Act. The scheme of the two enactments is wholly different. The language employed in Section 34 of the Income-tax Act which has undergone serious changes from time to time is not identical with that in Rule 17 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules and the mere fact that both these provisions are designed to achieve a somewhat similar purpose is too slender a foundation for the application of the cases construing one provision for determining the scope of the other. We therefore propose to confine our attention to the language used in the two Rules 14(2) and 17(1) and gather the intention of the rule-making authority as expressed by words employed.
16. Relying upon the decision reported in CIT vs. Abudullabhai Abdul Kadar, [(1961) 41 ITR 545 SC], the Assessing Officer held that as the debt due was not an incident to the business, it cannot be termed as a debt and no deduction can be made on account of bad debt and that it should be construed as a capital loss. It would be appropriate to quote the relevant portion of the said Judgment and the same reads as under: