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Documents citing Md.Shahabuddin vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 25 March, 2010

Ghaziabad Development Authority vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, Ghaziabad & ... on 25 July, 2011

19. The settled law, therefore, is that a Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the Courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. The other aspect, which is well established principle of statutory interpretation is that the legislature is specially precise and careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was concisely enacted in that manner. In such cases, it will be wrong to presume that such omission was inadvertent or that by incorporating the condition at one place in the provision the legislature also intended the condition to be applied at some other place in that provision. [(Mohd. Shahabuddin vs. State of Bihar and others (supra)].
Allahabad High Court Cites 33 - Cited by 56 - P Krishna - Full Document

P.Nallasivam vs Government Tamil Nadu on 19 March, 2019

It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute.” (xxx) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, http://www.judis.nic.in “179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in 22 law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute.
Madras High Court Cites 39 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

P. Pugalenthi vs Union Of India on 17 June, 2019

It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that the court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear.” (xxxii) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, “179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute.
Madras High Court Cites 77 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

R.Karthick vs The District Collector on 7 August, 2019

(ix) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653, the Supreme Court held that, “179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute.
Madras High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - S Manikumar - Full Document

Abdul Samad V.T vs Valanchery Municipality on 19 February, 2020

(xxxv) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute.
Kerala High Court Cites 53 - Cited by 0 - S Manikumar - Full Document

Muraleedharan T vs State Of Kerala on 16 June, 2020

"8. The aforesaid relevant provisions clearly indicate the legislative intention that healthy cows which are not fit to be slaughtered cannot be slaughtered at all. That is the thrust of S.4 of the Act. In other words there is total ban against slaughtering of healthy cows and other animals mentioned in the schedule under S.2 of the Act. This is the very essence of the Act and it is necessary to subserve the purpose of the Act i.e. to increase the supply of milk and avoid the wastage of animal power necessary for improvement of agriculture. Keeping in view these essential features of the Act, we have to construe S.12 which deals with power to grant exemption from the Act. As we have noted earlier the said section enables the State Government by general or special order and subject to such conditions as it may think fit to impose, to exempt from the operation of this Act slaughter of any animal for any religious, medicinal or research purpose. Now, it becomes clear that when there is a total ban under the Act so far as slaughtering of healthy cows which are not fit to be slaughtered as per S.4(1) is concerned, if that ban is to be lifted even for a day, it was to be shown that such lifting of ban is necessary for subserving any religious, medicinal or research purpose. The Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi's case (1959 SCR 629 : AIR 1958 SC 731) (supra) of the report speaking through Das C. J. referred to the observation in Hamilton's translation of Hedaya Book, XLIII at p. 592 that it is the duty of every free Mussulman arrived at W.P.(C).No.11142/2020 79 the age of maturity, to offer a sacrifice on the YD Kirban, or festival of the sacrifice, provided he be then possessed of Nisab and be not a traveller. The sacrifice established for one person is a goat and that for seven a cow or a camel. It is, therefore, optional for a Muslim to sacrifice a goat for one person or a cow or a camel for seven persons. It does not appear to be obligatory that a person must sacrifice a cow. Once the religious purpose of Muslims consists of making sacrifice of any animal which should be a healthy animal, on Bakri Idd, then slaughtering of cow is not the only way of carrying out that sacrifice. It is, therefore, obviously not an essential religious purpose but an optional one. In this connection Mr. Tarkunde for the appellants submitted that even optional purpose would be covered by the term 'any religious purpose' as employed by S.12 and should not be an essential religious purpose. We cannot accept this view for the simple reason that S.12 seeks to lift the ban in connection with slaughter of such animals on certain conditions. For lifting the ban it should be shown that it is essential or necessary for a Muslim to sacrifice a healthy cow on Bakri Idd day and if such is the requirement of religious purpose then it may enable the State in its wisdom to lift the ban at least on Bakri Idd day. But that is not the position. It is well settled that an exceptional provision which seeks to avoid the operation of main thrust of the Act has to be strictly construed.
Kerala High Court Cites 138 - Cited by 0 - S Manikumar - Full Document

Rajesh Sivasankara Pillai vs The Federal Bank Ltd on 7 February, 2020

(xxxv) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute.
Kerala High Court Cites 77 - Cited by 0 - S Manikumar - Full Document
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