Bhopal Stud And Agricultural Farm vs Income-Tax Officer on 13 August, 1985
Further, the Kerala High Court has applied this view in the case of T. V. Suresh Chandran (supra).
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1 - 10 of 18 (1.10 seconds)Joint Receivers In The Case Of United ... vs Income-Tax Officer on 29 May, 1986
He called in aid the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. T.V. Suresh Chandran [1980] 121 ITR 985 in order to explain the meaning of the words 'association of persons'. He held that when there is a combination of persons formed for the promotion of joint enterprise, those persons joined in a common purpose constitute an association. He further held that wherever an AOP is formed such an association can be brought to tax as a distinct assessable entity under the Act. In what manner they happened to come together is not of material consequence. The contention that after dissolution of the firm, there is no taxable entity and the income, if any, cannot be taxed anywhere is dismissed as not tenable. He held that if income, profits and gains arose in the hands of person it has to be subjected to tax if there is no express prohibition against such taxation. He further held that the income had arisen to the erstwhile partners as a group acting through the joint receivers and, hence, it has to be taxed in that form and capacity only. The dissolution of the firm, the learned Commissioner (Appeals) held, does not affect taxation of the income earned by the erstwhile members of the dissolved firm. He also held that after dissolution there is no ban, express or implied, in taxing such income. Therefore, he held that the income was brought to tax properly in the hands of joint receivers as they have derived the said income as a representative-assessees, representing the erstwhile partners.
Mathew M. Thomas vs Inspecting Assistant Commissioner on 20 June, 1996
In this respect, the transaction under consideration is different from the transaction in the case before the Kerala High Court in T. V. Suresh Chandran (supra) where identifiable parts of the transferred property were given to the different transferees. Hence this is only one transfer of one property purchased jointly by the six transferees. They have come together for the purpose of purchasing the property and, therefore, would form a single body, whether it be called association of persons or a body of individuals.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs A.P. Parukutty Mooppilamma And Ors. on 30 August, 1983
In CIT v. T. V. Suresh Chandran [1980] 121 JTR 985 (Ker) at p. 995, speaking for the Bench, Subramonian Poti J. (present C.J.) observed :
Canara Bank And Ors. vs State Of Kerala And Ors. on 1 June, 1981
20. These decisions make it clear that an association or company cannot be formed unless : (i) there are more persons than one; and (ii) there is an arrangement or agreement between them as regards the object of their associating with one another, say for example, entertainment (a club) or worship (a congregation) or carrying on of business which is the object mentioned in Section 3 (8) of the Travancore Act. Speaking of 'association of persons' in Section 2 (31) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, one of us (the learned Acting Chief Justice) pointed out in Commr. of Income-tax v. T. V. Suresh Chandran, (1979) 13 Cur Tax Rep 366 : (1980 Tax LR 328) (Ker) that in order that there may be an association of persons, the persons concerned should have combined or come together by a consensual act on their part, that is, on their own volition.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Geeta Ram Kali Ram And Suresh Chandra on 23 August, 1979
30. Coming to the individual cases, the position is that in I.T. Reference
No. 52 of 1976 (CIT v. Suresh Chandra) the ITO charged penal interest
under Section 139 as well as under Section 215 for the assessment year 1970-71. In
appeal, one of the points taken was against the chargeability of the afore
said penal interest. The AAC held that the return was filed late, and no
interest was chargeable under Section 139 but in relation to interest charged
under Section 215 the amount was reduced on the ground that the delay in
finalising the assessment was not due to the appellant's fault. Both these
grounds of objection related to the quantum of penal interest. On these
grounds the charge of penal interest was not appealable. The revenue's
objection that the AAC had no jurisdiction to interfere is valid. In this
case, the question referred to this court, namely :
Webster Industries Ltd. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 31 January, 1997
" CIT v. T.V. Suresh Chandran, [1980] 121 ITR 985 (Ker) was a case under Section 269C of the Income-tax Act. The transferors were co-owners having inherited the property from ancestors. They transferred the property to four persons with one deed. The competent authority initiated proceedings for acquisition of the property by treating the entire property as one. It was held that each one of the four transferees had absolute right to the property so transferred to him and in the property transferred to one, the other transferees had no right. The right of each of the transferees to the property was absolute. The fact that the transferees may make common use of the property purchased by them is a factor which would have no bearing on the purchase itself. Had the sale been effected by four instruments the case urged by the Revenue may not have arisen. It would make no difference merely because the four sales were covered by one instrument. Section 269C was held to be inapplicable."
Webster Industries Ltd. vs Union Of India & Ors. on 31 January, 1997
"CIT vs. T. V. Suresh Chandran (1980) 121 ITR 985 (Ker) 84 was a case under s. 269C of the IT Act. The transferors were co-owners having inherited the property from ancestors. They transferred the property to four persons with one deed. The competent authority initiated proceedings for acquisition of the property by treating the entire property as one. It was held that each one of the four transferees had absolute right to the property so transferred to him and in the property transferred to one, the other transferees had no right. The right of each of the transferees to the property was absolute. The fact that the transferees may make common use of the property purchased by them is a factor which would have no bearing on the purchase itself. Had the sale been effected by four instruments the case urged by the Revenue may not have arisen. It would make no difference merely because the four sales were covered by one instrument. Sec. 269C was held to be inapplicable."
Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Andhra ... vs Pabbati Shankaraiah And Ors. on 22 April, 1983
In CIT v. T. V. Suresh Chandran [1980] 121 ITR 985 (Ker), immovable property was transferred by a deed executed by the transferors in favour of four transfers. The competent authority initiated proceedings for acquisition of the property covered by the transfers, and the entire property was acquired under one proceeding on the ground that the transfers constituted an association of persons or at least a body of individuals because - (i) the four transfers were brothers; (ii) though the transfer was of distinct plots to the four transfers there was only one agreement preceding the transfer; (iii) one of the brothers alone paid the advance; (iv) only one deed of sale was executed; (v) after the purchase the entire property was levelled up and pile driving commenced before the purchase was completed; and (vi) such pile driving was only for the construction of one building.
Surinder Gupta vs Chief Commissioner Of Income Tax & Ors. on 31 August, 1995
CIT vs. T. V. Suresh Chandran (1980) 121 ITR 985 (Ker) was a case under s. 269C of the IT Act. The transferors were co-owners having inherited the property from ancestors. They transferred the property to four persons with one deed. The competent authority initiated proceedings for acquisition of the property by treating the entire property as one. It was held that each one of the four transferees had absolute right to the property so transferred to him and in the property transferred to one, the other transferees had no right. The right of each of the transferees to the property was absolute. The fact that the transferees may make common use of the property purchased by them is a factor which would have no bearing on the purchase itself. Had the sale been effected by four instruments the case urged by the Revenue may not have arisen. It would make no difference merely because the four sales were covered by one instrument. Sec. 269C was held to be inapplicable.