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Documents citing State Of Maharashtra vs Champalal Punjaji Shah on 12 August, 1981

Reserved On: 05.09.2025 vs Satnam Singh & Others on 22 September, 2025

(b)Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the r accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610]."
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

State Of U.P. vs Balram Singh And Anr. on 6 August, 2022

b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. ChampalalPunjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675] [Source : Durga Das Basu - "The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973" Sixth Edition Vol.II Chapter XXIX]"
Allahabad High Court Cites 42 - Cited by 0 - V K Birla - Full Document

Shri I.P. Shankaran vs Deputy Superintendent Of Police C.B.I. ... on 31 March, 1999

17. The fact that the Apex Court has been adopting a different approach in cases involving economic offences is further illustrated by its observations in State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah, . The respondent Champalal was punished for offences punishable under section 135 of the Customs Act by the trial Magistrate. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for various terms, ranging from two to four years, and to pay different amounts of fine. On appeal, however, this Court had acquitted the accused. The State appealed to the Apex Court. Allowing the appeal, the Apex Court ordered conviction of the accused. When it came to the question of sentence, a contention was raised that & long time had elapsed since the commission of offence on 30th May 1965. The Apex Court decided the matter on 12th August, 1981. It was contended that this long lapse of time should be considered and the Court should refuse to interfere with the order of acquittal and in any case, not send the accused back to prison, particularly because the accused had also suffered preventive detention for over two years. In para 6 of the judgment, at pages 1679-80 the Court rejected the aforesaid contention and observed that the offence was one which jeopardised the economy of the country and it was impossible to take a casual or a light view of such offence. If the offences were of a trivial nature such as simple assault or theft, the Apex Court may, perhaps, have held otherwise. Since the offence related to violation of the provisions of the Customs Act, the accused was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
Bombay High Court Cites 41 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

State Of U.P. vs Sukhai @ Bhagwan Das on 11 August, 2022

b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. ChampalalPunjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675] [Source : Durga Das Basu - "The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973" Sixth Edition Vol.II Chapter XXIX]"
Allahabad High Court Cites 50 - Cited by 0 - V K Birla - Full Document

Dalam Chand Baid vs Union Of India And Ors. on 1 December, 1981

(13) Although, this discussion is sufficient to decide this case, we must point out that a serious lacuna now exists in cases arising under the Customs Act or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on another judgment of the Supreme Court, State, of Maharcnhtra v. Mainmal Punjaji Shah and another, , to contend that in that case a remand had been ordered on practically the same facts as in this case. We have been unable to find the provision of law under which the accused person was arrested in that case. But, assuming that it was under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, it must be emphasised that the said case arose when the Criminal Procedure Code of 1908 was in force and at that time there was no doubt that during investigation a Magistrate could order remand for fifteen days under Section 344 of that Code. The position has only changed after the Code of 1973 was enacted restricting the Power of the Magistrate to remand the accused only after he had taken cognizance. The lacuna has, therefore, arisen because of the repeal of Section 344 of the Old Code and its replacement by Section 309 of the New Code.
Delhi High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 17 - Full Document

Reserved On: 03.07.2024 vs Jaram Singh on 10 July, 2024

(b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to rthe conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610]"
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Dalam Chand Baid vs Union Of India And Others on 18 December, 1981

13. Although, this discussion is sufficient to decide this case, we must point out that a serious lacuna now exists in cases arising under the Customs Act or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on another judgment of the Supreme Court, State of Maharashtra v. Nainmal Punjaji Shah, , to contend that in that case a remand had been ordered on practically the same facts as in this case. We have been unable to find the provision of law under which the accused person was arrested in that case. But, assuming that it was under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, it must be emphasised that the said case arose when the Cr.P.C. of 1898 was in force and at that time there was no doubt that during investigation a Magistrate could order remand for fifteen days under Section 344 of that Code. The position has only changed after the Code of 1973 was enacted restricting the power of the Magistrate to remand the accused only after he had taken cognizance. The lacuna has therefore, arisen because of the repeal of Section 344 of the old Code and its replacement by Section 309 of the new Code.
Delhi High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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