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Documents citing Malik Harikishan Singh vs Malik Partap Singh on 2 May, 1938

Girdhari Lal Batra vs Krishan Lal Batra & Ors. on 12 November, 2018

(i) Malik Harkishan Singh Vs. Malik Partap Singh AIR 1938 PC 189 where, though not in the context of Section 4 of the Partition Act but otherwise in the context of partition, it was held that (i) it is by no means a rare thing that a person makes a statement that he is a member of a joint family with his relative, but has reasons of his own for making that statement;
Delhi High Court Cites 20 - Cited by 2 - R S Endlaw - Full Document

Naramsetti Venkatappala Narasimhulu ... vs Naramsetti Someswara Rao And Anr. on 3 April, 1947

and Harikishan Singh v. Partap Singh (1938) 2 M.L.J. 234 (P.C.) and each brother thus became entitled to a separated half share in all the family properties. When the properties were subsequently divided by metes and bounds under the award of arbitrators, the allotment of the entire item now in question, in which Ramasami had one half-share, exclusively to the first defendant as his Jyeshtabagam in excess of what was legitimately due to him operated as a gift of Ramasami's half share in the item, and such share must, therefore be regarded as his separate property in which his sons can claim no interest. The argument proceeds, in our opinion, on a misconception of the true nature of a partition arrangement under which each co-owner gets a specific property in lieu of his rights in all the joint properties; that is to say each co-sharer renounces his rights in the other common properties in consideration of his getting exclusive right to and possession of specific properties in which the other co-owners renounce their rights. It is thus a renunciation of mutual rights and does not involve any transfer by one cosharer of his interest in the properties to the others. That is why it has been held that a partition can be effected orally and without any registered instrument though it may affect immoveable properties of the value of one hundred rupees or more.
Madras High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

The Commissioner Of Wealth-Tax vs N.R.Srinivasan on 12 August, 2002

11. As far as the facts of the case are concerned, we have to see the position as it existed in the year 1943 when the partition took place. There were two properties belonging to the joint family, one at Coimbatore and another at Ooty and so far as the property at Coimbatore is concerned, it was not capable of physical division as tenant was in occupation of the property and the property at Ooty was also in occupation of a hostile tenant, and therefore physical division of the properties was impossible. In such circumstances, the division of the properties to the extent possible would be to divide the income from the joint family properties and to declare the share of the divided members in the joint family properties and further to declare that the properties of the joint family have been partitioned and the joint family ceased to exist, which had been done on the facts of the case. It is not a case where the members agreed to share income from the property, though the property was capable of physical division. It is also not a case where the members agreed to divide the income keeping the corpus intact. On the other hand, the clear and manifest intention of the members was to divide the properties and to disrupt the joint family by partition as evident from the letters exchanged between themselves in 1943 and since the properties were not capable of physical division, the three brothers have divided the properties by the method possible, viz., to divide the income and to disrupt the joint family. The decisions of the Privy Council in MALIK HARKISHAN SINGH v. MALIK PARTAP SINGH (42 C.W.N. 1021) and MUSAMMAT INDER KUER v. MUSAMMAT PIRTHIPAL KUER AND ANOTHER (49 C.W.N. 689) are authorities for the proposition that separation of the family can be proved by the conduct of the members in the attendant circumstances. The Privy Council also held that once shares are defined, there is severance of joint status and the parties may then make a physical division of the property or they may decide to live together and enjoy the property in common, but the property ceases to be joint immediately the shares are defined and their subsequent living together and joint enjoyment can be regarded as tenants in common. Though under the Wealth-tax Act, the mere severance of status is not sufficient and there must be a division by metes and bounds, on the facts of the case, we find that in 1943, the only method of dividing the properties by metes and bounds would be to divide the income from the properties which has been done and we hold that it would amount to partition by metes and bounds.
Madras High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - V S Sirpurkar - Full Document

Om Dutt @ Om Prakash vs Ganpat Lal & Ors on 21 August, 2009

Seeking to question the order aforesaid, the learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that when the petitioner has clearly shown that the father of the parties made an oral partition during his life time and the brothers were given separate shares; and after the death of the father, all the brothers made an oral partition and put that in writing on 01.03.2001 with the signatures of all including that of the plaintiff-respondent No.1, he remains rather estopped from 4 challenging the same. The learned counsel submitted that the property in question being the ancestral property of the parties, no new rights were created by way of the deed in question that were only a family settlement duly signed by the brothers; and such family settlement cannot be said to be inadmissible in evidence. The learned counsel further submitted that even when unregistered partition deed may not be admissible in evidence as such, it could yet be looked into for collateral purposes so as to consider the nature of possession over the suit property but the learned Trial Court has acted wholly illegally in removing the document from consideration altogether. The learned counsel has referred to and relied upon the decisions in Mahadeo (dead) through LRs Vs. Vatsalabai: 2009 (1) Civil Court Cases 018 (Bombay); Ranganayakamma and another Vs. K.S.Prakash (D) by L.Rs. and others: 2008 (3) Apex Court Judgments 281 (SC); Maturi Pullaiah and another Vs. Maturi Narasimham and others: AIR 1966 SC 1836; Bakhtawar Singh Vs. Gurdev Singh and another: (1996) 9 SCC 370; and Malik Harikishan Singh Vs. Malik Partap Singh and others: AIR 1938 Privy Council 189.
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - D Maheshwari - Full Document

Jagarnath And Ors. vs Deputy Director Of Consolidation, U.P. ... on 11 May, 1976

11. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the property being ancestral it was coparcenery in the hands of the petitioners and Smt. Dulari and the share was undefined and consequently Smt. Dulari could not be iheld to be an independent tenant of 2/3rd share. In the first place, no female can be a co-parcener although a female can be a member of a joint Hindu family. See Article 214 of Mulla's 'Hindu Law', Fourteenth Edition. Secondly, the Kkewat entries clearly specify 2/3rd share of Smt. Dulari in different years and, therefore, there was a disruption in the jointness of the estate. Even where there is no proof of actual partition of the joint estate at any time, there can be a partition of the joint property without an actual division of the property by metes and bounds. According to the Mitakshara law, by which the parties are governed, partition consists in defining the shares of the coparceners in the joint property, and a physical division of the property is not necessary. Once the shares are defined, there is a severance of the joint status. See Malik Harkishan Singh v. Malik Partap Singh, 1938 All LJ 763 = (AIR 1938 PC 189). In these circumstances the objection that the shares remained undefined and. therefore; 2/3rd share could not be predicated of Smt. Dulari is untenable. The ultimate result of the acquisition of her rights by Smt. Dulari in her independent capacity was that even what might have originally been & joint tenancy was transformed into a tenancy in common. There is no manner of doubt that Smt. Dulari who is recorded as a Bhumidhar with respect to 2/3rd share has an absolute interest in the same and could alienate it by means of a gift and, therefore, the donees impleaded in this writ petition as respondents Noa 6 to 9 acquired a good title from the donor.
Allahabad High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Chandra Bhal Misra And Ors. vs Shankar Saran Misra And Ors. on 11 August, 2004

9. In support of the submissions. Sri Chaudhary relied upon the following judgments : Brahma Vart Sanatan Dharm Mahamandal v. Kanhayalal Bagla and Ors., 2001 (4) AWC 3161 (SC) : AIR 2001 SC 3799 ; Malik Harkishan Singh v. Malik Pratap Singh and Ors., AIR 1938 PC 189 ; Anurago Kuer v. Darshan Raut and Ors., AIR 1938 PC 65 ; State Bank of India v. Chandra Govindji (Km.), (2000) 8 SCC 532 ; Gangabai and Ors. v. Fakirgowda Somayapagowda Desai and Ors., AIR 1930 PC 93 ; Pirthi Pal Pandey v. Mst.
Allahabad High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - S K Singh - Full Document
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