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Documents citing Ramrameshwari Devi & Ors vs Nirmala Devi & Ors on 4 July, 2011

New Delhi Municipal Council vs M/S Prominent Hotels Limited on 11 September, 2015

30.35. The Trial Court failed in the duty and obligation to maintain purity of standards and preserve full faith and credibility in the judicial system. The impugned judgment, on the face of it, is shown to be based upon a proposition of law which is unsound and findings recorded are absurd, unreasonable and irrational. 30.36. This case warrants imposition of costs on the petitioners in terms of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi (supra) and Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (supra), Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India (supra) and of this Court in Harish Relan v. Kaushal Kumari Relan & Ors. in RFA(OS) 162/2014 decided on 03rd August, 2015, Punjab National Bank v. Virender Prakash, 2012 V AD (Delhi) 373 and Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh (supra). 30.37. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the appeal is allowed. The Licensee's suit was not maintainable. The Trial Court had no jurisdiction in this matter. The impugned judgment and decree are non-est and therefore set aside. The Licensee's suit is dismissed with costs of Rs.5,00,000/- to be paid by the Licensee to NDMC within two months. All pending applications are disposed of. 30.38. This Court is constrained to hold that the Licensee made a false claim, dragged the case for years by filing one application after the other and misled the Court on law as well as facts. The Licensee did RFA 78-2014 Page 152 of 156 not pursue the proceedings honestly before the Trial Court. 30.39. The next question that arises is as to what action should be taken against the Licensee who has abused the process of the Court and has indulged in frivolous litigation which is clear from the fact that before this Court, the Licensee could not support prayer (i) of the plaint and declaration granted by the Trial Court declaring clause 3 of the licence deed as void. On 03rd August, 2015, the Licensee made a statement to give up prayer (i) of the decree granted by the Trial Court, meaning thereby, that the Licensee admitted that the impugned judgment relating to prayer (i) was not sustainable in law. It further implies that the Licensee had misled the Trial Court to pass an illegal decree. The further implication is that the dropping of prayer (i), which was the sole ground for avoiding the bar of Section 15 of the Public Premise Act, would result in the remaining suit being clearly barred by Section 15 of the Public Premises Act. 30.40. This Court strongly deprecates the manner in which the successive applications were filed just to delay the hearing of the suit. By filing one application after the other before the Trial Court, the Licensee succeeded in enjoying the possession of the premises for the last more than 18 years after the termination of the licence without paying the licence fee in terms of the licence deed. About 170 hearings took place in the suit filed by the Licensee. 30.41. The Licensee has no respect for truth and has polluted the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands. The Licensee has played tricks by delaying the proceedings before the Trial Court for more than 18 years. The Licensee has interfered with the administration of justice.
Delhi High Court Cites 142 - Cited by 11 - J R Midha - Full Document

Sky Land International Pvt. Ltd. vs Kavita P Lalwani on 25 May, 2012

27.12 This case, therefore, warrants imposition of costs on the appellant in terms of the judgments of the Supreme Court in RFA No.697/2010 Page 93 of 96 Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi (supra) and Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (supra) and of this Court in Punjab National Bank v. Virender Prakash (supra) and Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh (supra). The appellant is a dishonest litigant, who has raised the frivolous pleas with the hope that the appellant can, with the Court delays, drag the case for years and the other side would succumb to buy peace. If the other side does not so settle in the end, they are hardly compensated and remains a loser. The appellant‟s lease expired by efflux of time on 6th November, 2008 and the appellant was under statutory obligation under Section 108 (q) of the Transfer of Property Act to restore the possession of the suit property to the respondent on 6th November, 2008. However, the appellant failed in its statutory obligation and continued the possession, whereupon the respondent sent a notice of termination to the appellant on 20th June, 2009. The appellant again failed in his obligation to restore the possession upon termination of the tenancy and compelled the respondent to file the suit for possession. The summons of the suit were served on appellant on 17th December, 2009 but despite that the appellant did not think it proper to surrender the possession and raised all possible frivolous defences to contest the suit including the impermissible plea of denying the title of the landlord, which also amounts to forfeiture under Section 111(g)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act. The Trial Court passed the decree against the appellant on 17th August, 2010 but still the appellant was not ready to surrender and filed this appeal raising frivolous grounds. In this manner, the appellant has succeeded in illegally retaining the possession of the suit property for more than three-and-a-half years.
Delhi High Court Cites 71 - Cited by 195 - J R Midha - Full Document

M/S.Energo Engineering Projects Ltd vs ) Sri Aishwarya Constructions on 28 January, 2013

In one another judgment of the Apex Court in Ramrameshwari Devi and others Vs. Nirmala Devi and others, reported in 2011 (8) SCC 249, the Supreme Court has laid down parameters for grant of interim injunction. The relevant portion in paragraph 52 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder. E. The courts should be extremely careful and cautious in granting ex parte ad interim injunctions or stay orders. Ordinarily short notice should be issued to the defendants or respondents and only after hearing the parties concerned appropriate orders should be passed.
Madras High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - T Raja - Full Document

Jage Ram vs Naresh Kumar on 4 September, 2025

Suit No.607478/2016 Jage Ram Vs. Naresh Kumar Page-34/36 -35- in the Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi (supra) judgement qua imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs after observing that false claims and defences in real estate litigation are rampant due to escalating property values and delays in adjudication; unscrupulous litigants often prolong such cases to pressure the other side into costly settlements; and adopting a pragmatic approach can help curb this problem significantly.
Delhi District Court Cites 26 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Hs Bedi vs National Highway Authority Of India on 22 January, 2016

17. This Court hopes that the Courts below shall invoke Section 209 of the Indian Penal Code in appropriate cases to prevent the abuse of process of law, secure the ends of justice, keep the path of justice clear of obstructions and give effect to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (supra), S.P. Chengalvaraya Naida v. Jagannath (supra), Dalip Singh v. State of U.P.(supra), Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi (supra), Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (supra), Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) and Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India (supra).
Delhi High Court Cites 63 - Cited by 68 - J R Midha - Full Document

Vikram Kharbanda & Ors. vs K.C. Malhotra & Ors on 7 September, 2012

16. This case warrants imposition of costs on the petitioners in terms of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi (supra) and Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (supra) and of this Court in Punjab National Bank v. Virender Prakash, 2012 V AD (Delhi) 373 and Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh (supra). The petitioners have raised the frivolous pleas with the hope that the petitioners can, with the Court delays, drag the case for years and the other side would succumb to buy peace. If the other side does not so settle in the end, they are hardly compensated and remain a loser. The petitioners took the ground floor of the suit property on rent vide rent note dated 4th December, 1967 which specifically excluded the roof. On 4th August, 1968, the petitioners took additional two rooms on the first floor of the suit property on rent vide rent note dated 4th August, 1968 which again specifically excluded the roof. If the landlady would have given the roof to the petitioners in 1967, she would have documented or would have at least recorded in the second rent note dated 4 th August, 1968.
Delhi High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - J R Midha - Full Document
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