Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 23 (1.11 seconds)
Documents citing B. Viswanathiah And Company And Ors vs State Of Karnataka And Ors on 11 February, 1991

I.T.C. Limited vs Agricultural Produce Market Committee ... on 24 January, 2002

The validity of certain other acts such as the Cardomom Act, 1965, The Central Silk Board Act, 1958, The Coffee Act, 1942, The Rubber Act, 1947, The Tea Act, 1953, The Coir Industry Act, 1953 and the Coconut Development Board Act, 1979 reference whereof was made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan need not be examined for purposes of considering the legislative competence of the impugned State legislations. The legislative competence of Parliament to legislate these statutes is not in issue before this Court and, therefore, we do not think it necessary to examine the question of legislative competence only from academic view point insofar as these legislations are concerned. However, prima facie, there is no substance in the apprehension expressed by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that narrow approach of the concept of 'industry' would make these acts beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament and make them ultra vires. As, when and it these acts are challenged, the question of legislative competence would be examined. Further, it may be noted that two out of the aforesaid legislations, namely, the Coffee Act, 1942 and The Rubber Act, 1947 are pre-Constitution enactments made under the Government of India Act, 1935 where the entries were different. Item 29 of List II of the said Act has already been reproduced above. In respect of the Coir Industry Act, on examination of the provisions contained therein, it may be possible to urge that the statute deals with the process of manufacturing and does not seek to control plantation and preservation of the coconut trees or the production of the coconut. The Central Silk Board Act has been dealt with by this Court in the case of B. Vishwanathiah & Co. and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. and I fail to appreciate how upholding the validity of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Acts would effect the validity of this enactment. In respect of Cardomom Act, it appears that the said Act is being applied for export purposes and it does not cover soil preparation of seed-lings. Regarding Coconut Development Act, it does not envisage setting up of auction platform and controlling marketing as in the present case. That enactment primarily deals with the field pertaining to recommendation for improving marketing, providing financial assistance for adoption of modern technology and for assisting growers to get incentive prices. This Court, however, need not examine in detail the aspect of legislative competence in regard to these enactments since, as already said, that is not the matter in issue here and it would suffice to indicate, as above, only the prima facie view to dispel the apprehension expressed by Mr. Shanti Bhushan.
Supreme Court of India Cites 131 - Cited by 218 - Full Document

Samrat Chemical Industries vs The State Of Bihar & Ors on 27 October, 2016

6) of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India. Submission was also made to the effect that there is every possibility of replacing liquor and its use with the medicines containing light proportions of alcohol, as an intoxicants, and will be injurious to human health, thus, the State Government has adopted a holistic approach to fight Patna High Court CWJC No.6415 of 2016 12 the scourge of alcoholism and to achieve its avowed objective of total prohibition of alchohol. The State,s in support of its submission, has referred to some provisions of the Excise Act as well as judgments in case of (i) State of Bihar & Ors vs. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Private Ltd. & Ors, reported in A.I.R. 2005 SC 932; (ii) Southern Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals, Trichur & Ors vs. State of Kerala & Ors, reported in A.I.R. 1981 SC 1863; (iii) B. Viswanathiah & Co. & Ors. Vs. The State of Karnataka & Ors, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 358; (iv) Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. Vs State of U.P. (supra), (v) Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd. & Ors vs. State of U.P. & Ors, reported in (2004)1 SCC 225 and (vi) Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors Vs State of U.P. & Ors, reported in A.I.R. 1956 SC 676.
Patna High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 3 - S P Singh - Full Document

Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Pvt. ... vs The State Of Bihar & Ors on 27 October, 2016

6) of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India. Submission was also made to the effect that there is every possibility of replacing liquor and its use with the medicines containing light proportions of alcohol, as an intoxicants, and will be injurious to human health, thus, the State Government has adopted a holistic approach to fight Patna High Court CWJC No.6415 of 2016 12 the scourge of alcoholism and to achieve its avowed objective of total prohibition of alchohol. The State,s in support of its submission, has referred to some provisions of the Excise Act as well as judgments in case of (i) State of Bihar & Ors vs. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Private Ltd. & Ors, reported in A.I.R. 2005 SC 932; (ii) Southern Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals, Trichur & Ors vs. State of Kerala & Ors, reported in A.I.R. 1981 SC 1863; (iii) B. Viswanathiah & Co. & Ors. Vs. The State of Karnataka & Ors, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 358; (iv) Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. Vs State of U.P. (supra), (v) Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd. & Ors vs. State of U.P. & Ors, reported in (2004)1 SCC 225 and (vi) Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors Vs State of U.P. & Ors, reported in A.I.R. 1956 SC 676.
Patna High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 0 - S P Singh - Full Document

I.T.C. Limited vs Tchoemmaigtrtieceul&Tuorrasl.; ... on 24 January, 2002

In B. Viswanathiah & Co. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [(1991) 3 SCC 358] the challenge was to the validity of the provisions of Mysore Silkworm Seed and Cocoon (Regulation of Production, Suply and Distribution) Act, 1959 (Act 5 of 1960). The contention urged on behalf of the petitioners in that case was that any legislation in respect of silk industry can be enacted only by the Parliament and the State Legislature is incompetent to legislate on the matter because Section 2 of the Central Silk Board Act enacted a declaration in terms of Entry 52, List I. The effect of it was to remove the silk industry from the purview of the State Legislature powers thus, rendering the State Legislature incompetent to legislate on that topic. The High Court repelled the challenge relying upon the decision of this Court in Tika Ramji, Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd., Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia and Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company's cases. After noticing that the High Court on the basis of series of decisions of this Court regarding scope of Entry 52 of List I in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution had repelled the challenge, this Court expressed full agreement with the views of the High Court. It was held that the control of industry vested in Parliament was restricted to the aspect of production and manufacture of silk yarn or silk. It did not obviously take in the earlier stage of industry, namely, the supply of raw materials. For instance, even in regard to the silk industry, the reeling, production, development and distribution of silkworm seeds and cocoons was regulated by the State Act. These items can be perhaps legitimately described as raw materials of the silk industry. The control being vested in Parliament under Entry 52 of silk industry did not affect the control over these raw materials. It was held that the control, supply and distribution of the goods produced by the industry was the third aspect of industry which falls outside the purview of the control postulated under Entry 52. In other words, though the production and manufacture of raw silk cannot be legislated upon by the State Legislature in view of the provisions of the Central Act and the declaration in Section 2 thereof, that declaration does not in any way limit the powers of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of goods produced by the silk industry. This Court said that "To interpret Entry 52 otherwise would render Entry 33 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution otiose and meaningless". The same would be the position in the present case.
Supreme Court of India Cites 62 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Dr.P.N.Premachandran vs State Of Kerala on 17 August, 2010

In B. Viswanathiah and Company And Others v. State of Karnataka and Others ((1991) 3 SCC 358), the question arose whether the State Legislature had competence to legislate once there was a declaration as to expediency of union control made under Section 2 of the Central Silk Board Act in terms of Entry 51 of List I of the VIIth Schedule. Entry 52 provides power with the Parliament in respect of industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in public interest. The Apex Court took the view that an industry comprises three important aspects, namely, raw-materials, process of WPC.NOS.15987 & 16966/10 58 manufacture and distribution of products. The Court took the view that though production and manufacture of raw silk cannot be legislated upon by the State Legislature, in view of Entry 52 and the Central Act read with the declaration in Section 2, Entry 52 did not limit the power of the State Legislature in respect of the goods produced by the silk industry. The Court took note of various Entries in List II conferring legislative power on the State Legislature. The legislation in question by the State purported to control the supply and distribution of goods produced by the industry. It was accordingly found that it fell outside the purview of the control postulated under Entry 52.
Kerala High Court Cites 42 - Cited by 0 - K Joseph - Full Document

I.T.C. Limited vs Tchoemmaigtrtieceul&Tuorrasl. ... on 24 January, 2002

In B. Viswanathiah & Co. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [(1991) 3 SCC 358] the challenge was to the validity of the provisions of Mysore Silkworm Seed and Cocoon (Regulation of Production, Suply and Distribution) Act, 1959 (Act 5 of 1960). The contention urged on behalf of the petitioners in that case was that any legislation in respect of silk industry can be enacted only by the Parliament and the State Legislature is incompetent to legislate on the matter because Section 2 of the Central Silk Board Act enacted a declaration in terms of Entry 52, List I. The effect of it was to remove the silk industry from the purview of the State Legislature powers thus, rendering the State Legislature incompetent to legislate on that topic. The High Court repelled the challenge relying upon the decision of this Court in Tika Ramji, Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd., Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia and Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company's cases. After noticing that the High Court on the basis of series of decisions of this Court regarding scope of Entry 52 of List I in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution had repelled the challenge, this Court expressed full agreement with the views of the High Court. It was held that the control of industry vested in Parliament was restricted to the aspect of production and manufacture of silk yarn or silk. It did not obviously take in the earlier stage of industry, namely, the supply of raw materials. For instance, even in regard to the silk industry, the reeling, production, development and distribution of silkworm seeds and cocoons was regulated by the State Act. These items can be perhaps legitimately described as raw materials of the silk industry. The control being vested in Parliament under Entry 52 of silk industry did not affect the control over these raw materials. It was held that the control, supply and distribution of the goods produced by the industry was the third aspect of industry which falls outside the purview of the control postulated under Entry 52. In other words, though the production and manufacture of raw silk cannot be legislated upon by the State Legislature in view of the provisions of the Central Act and the declaration in Section 2 thereof, that declaration does not in any way limit the powers of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of goods produced by the silk industry. This Court said that "To interpret Entry 52 otherwise would render Entry 33 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution otiose and meaningless". The same would be the position in the present case.
Supreme Court of India Cites 62 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ismayil vs Deputy Tahsildar on 14 March, 2011

Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in B. Viswanathan & Co. vs. State of Karnataka (1991) 3 SCC 358 (paragraph 4 onwards and more particularly, sub paragraph 14 of paragraph 5). In response to the arguments made by the Addl. Advocate General with reference to W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases 17 Article 243G dealing with the power of the State to legislate on a subject relating to the functions of Local Authority, it is stated that the said power is always subject to the provisions of the Constitution and in turn, the said Article is controlled by Article 246, asserting that there cannot be any encroachment by the State into any entry in List 1.
Kerala High Court Cites 88 - Cited by 67 - P R Menon - Full Document

B N Gopinath S/O Narayana Rao vs State Of Karnataka on 16 April, 2013

In order to appreciate this contention, it may be necessary to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in B. VISWANATHIAH & COMPANY AND ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. In that decision, the Supreme Court was examining the validity of Karnataka Silkworm Seeds, Cocoons (Regulation of Production, Supply and Distribution) (Amendment) Act, 1979 (Act 33/79). In that context, considering the legislative competence of the State vis-a-vis Entry 52 of List I and Section 2 of the Central Silk Board Act, it was held therein that an industry comprises of three important aspects -
Karnataka High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
1   2 3 Next