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Documents citing Sm. Kanak Lata Ghose vs Amal Kumar Ghose on 9 September, 1969

Smt. Padmabati Debi vs Chittaranjan Dasgupta And Anr. on 14 July, 2005

19. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Certificate having been given by the postal authorities in the ordinary course of business must be presumed to be genuine unless presumption is rebutted by cogent proof. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that the contents of the certificate must be presumed to be true unless they are proved to be false. Here in the instant case, no evidence has been given by the defendant challenging the genuinity of the certificate. According to Mr. Mukherjee, in the absence of such challenge with regard to the genuinity of the said certificate of posting, the Court below ought to have presumed that such service was duly effected upon the respondent No. 1 by following the illustration (f) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act. To support the said contention, Mr. Mukherjee strongly relied upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Kanak Lata v. Amal Kumar (supra).
Calcutta High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 1 - J Bhattacharya - Full Document

Sri Anukul Kumar Ghose vs Smt. Chhanda Ghose on 5 January, 2000

4. Sub-section (1-A) of section 13 of the Act was substituted by the amendment Act No. 44 of 1964. Prior to the aforesaid amendment, Clauses viii and ix of section 13(1), provided for making of an application for obtaining a decree of divorce on the ground of non-restitution of conjugal rights after a decree to that effect had been passed by the court. In these two Clauses the expression used was to the effect that either party against when the decree has been made had failed to comply with such a decree. The judgment of this court In the case of Sm. Kanak Lata Ghosh v. Amal Kumar Ghosh (supra) is not applicable to the facts of our case because that Judgment was based upon the law as it stood prior to the amendment of section 13 by the Amendment Act No. 44 of 1964. As far as our case is concerned, it is equarely covered by sub-section 1A of section 13 of the Act. A bare perusal of clause (ii) of section 13(1-A) suggests that a decree for divorce can be obtained only on the ground that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after a decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed by a court. Undoubtedly, in our case the decree for restitution of conjugal rights was passed on 26th November, 1982 and the suit for divorce was filed much after the expiry of one year. Clause (il) (supra) does not suggest that the appellant-husband either was required to take any steps after he had obtained the decree for restitution of conjugal rights or that he could be deemed to be guilty of any not of omission. The learned court below therefore was not correct in taking the view that since the husband-appellant' did not try to bring back the wife to the matrimonial fold or that he lacked any sincerity in re-arranging the resumption of cohabitation with the respondent and therefore was not entitled to obtain the Decree for divorce. Plain meaning which has to be given to Clause (II) is that once the decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed and alter the passing of such decree there has not been any restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties for a period of one year and upwards, either parly to the marriage may present a petition for obtaining divorce on that ground. It is not the case of the respondent that she was not award of the passing of the decree for restitution of Conjugal rights on 26lh November, 1982. On the other hand, it is the own case of the respondent that she was aware of the passing of such decree and In fact had made an application for grant of permanent alimony and maintenance In terms of section 25 of the Act in the same suit in which the aforesaid ex-parte decree was passed. The learned court below therefore unnecessarily Imported into the concept of the passing of the decree under section 13(1A)(ii), the element of some act of omission or commission on the part of the respondent and therefore wrongly dismissed the suit on that ground.
Calcutta High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Nirmal Kunawat vs Rajesh Suhalka on 10 December, 2021

Mr. Calla referring to Smt. Kanak Lata Ghose v. Amal Kumar Ghose, AIR 1970 Cal 328; Meghji Malsee Ltd. v. P.C. Commen of Pulivelli Kizhakkethil House, AIR 1963 Ker 306 and Commissioner of (Downloaded on 14/12/2021 at 08:42:38 PM) (4 of 6) [CW-2569/2009] Hazari Bagh Municipality v. Fulchand Agarwala, AIR 1966 Pat 434 urged that it may be presumed under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that a letter once posted would reach the addressee and, therefore, in these circumstances it is urged that it should be taken that the letter sent under certificate of posting reached the addressee and therefore the certificate of posting obtained from the postal authorities must be regarded as the acknowledgement received from the addressee himself. I regret I cannot accept this contention of Mr. Calla. The obvious reason for rejecting this argument is that the provision of Clause (8) of Schedule I is couched in a language which introduces some rigidity with which the obligation cast under that provision should be discharged in order to maintain the standard of the profession. If the instructions issued by the Council are ignored then it becomes necessary under the law to see that the incoming auditor, before accepting the new assignment, should in some manner establish contact with the outgoing auditor and get at least the acknowledgement from him for the receipt of his communication addressed to his counter-part. This provision has been enacted by the legislature with a view to maintain certain standard in the profession. It is true that the council did experience certain practical difficulty in the compliance of this provision of the law and therefore by issuing instructions the rigidity of the law was diluted by providing that the incoming auditor in order to ascertain that the communication reached the addressee must obtain some kind of acknowledgement from him and it is only then that he should take up his new job. Mere obtaining a certificate of posting in my opinion does not fulfil the requirements of Clause (8) of Schedule I as the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that the letter in due course reach-led the addressee cannot replace that positive degree of proof of the delivery of the letter to the addressee which the letters of the law in this case require. The expression 'in communication with' when read in the light of the instructions contained in the booklet 'Code of Conduct' cannot be interpreted in any other manner but to mean that there should be positive evidence of the fact that the communication addressed to the outgoing auditor by the incoming auditor reached his hands. Certificate of posting of a letter cannot, in the circumstances, be taken as positive evidence of its delivery to the addressee.
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - P S Bhati - Full Document

In Re: Cine & Supply Corporation (P.) ... vs Unknown on 15 November, 2001

10. That apart, according to the respondents due to labour unrest there was a lock-out declared and the cinema was lying closed between the period 1996 to April 1999 when the lock-out was called off. According to the petitioner during the lock-out period both the management as well as the employees had put their locks in the cinema premises. If this was the position how could the documents and records pertaining to the EOGM dated 24-3-1999 be kept in the cinema premises and could be taken away from there the respondents have failed to explain. It had been held in a catena of cases by different High Courts as well as by us that in case of despatch under postal certificates a general presumption of posting could be drawn, however, such presumption was rebuttable (see Kanak Lata Ghase v. Amal Kumar Chose AIR 1970 Cal.
Company Law Board Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Akbarali A. Kalvert And Anr. vs Konkan Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. And Ors. on 2 May, 1994

In that case, we had occasion to consider the decisions in Smt. Kanak Lata Ghose v. Amal Kumar Ghose, AIR 1970 Cal 328 and Mrs. Achamma Thomas v. E.R. Fairman, AIR 1970 Mys 77. In both these cases, it was held that in the case of despatch under postal certificates a general presumption of posting could be drawn. However, in both the cases, scope has been left to take the circumstances into account while drawing the presumption. Therefore, one will have to take into consideration the circumstances in determining the service of the letters sent under postal certificates. Even if it is presumed that the petitioners have suppressed the receipt of the notices in January, 1992, since they were anticipating the payments it could not be said of notice dated March 27, 1992, of the extraordinary general meeting for additional share issue at which time the dispute has assumed serious proportions. We have also noted that though the respondents have produced certificates of posting in respect of extraordinary general meetings, no such certificates were produced in respect of board meetings. In fact the respondents have admitted that at the board meetings of April and June, the petitioners were present though for a while. Thus, the grounds for vacation of office of directors have not also been conclusively established.
Company Law Board Cites 21 - Cited by 20 - Full Document

Rameshwari vs Kirpashanker on 23 March, 1974

In Smt. Kanak Lata Ghose v. Amal Kumar Ghose AIR 1970 Cal 328 it was found that the brother and sister's husband of the wife had made an honest endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the husband and the wife after passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights but they got no response either from the husband or his relations. It appears that in that case the husband's suit for restitution of conjugal rights was decreed by the High Court to the extent "that the wife do return to the plaintiff's house though not necessarily at Naihati, as mentioned in the plaint, and render him conjugal rights". It was found that in the special facts and circumstances of the case, the husband should have shifted to a separate house in order to make it possible for the wife to return to him as per direction given by the court. It was also found that the husband made no enquiry about his wife after the decree, whereas the wife sent three letters to the husband intimating her willingness to live with him, but the husband was not at all responsive. . The learned Judges further found that the relations of the wife approached the husband and his relations to bring about reconciliation between the two, but the husband did not show any inclination. The decision in that case, if I may say so with respect, turned on the special facts and circumstances of the case. It was observed that it was not the intention behind the decree for restitution of conjugal rights that the husband would merely stand by and watch the situation after obtaining the decree for restitution of conjugal rights and that the High Court intended that the intiative taken by the husband in filing the suit for restitution of conjugal rights on an offer to take her back should be maintained even after the passing of the decree. However, I wish to submit that I do not subscribe to the following observations made by the learned Judges:
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Mansoori Bros And Ors. vs Chhotu Khan And Ors. on 3 April, 2000

In Kanaklata Ghosh v. Amal Kumar Ghosh, AIR 1970 Calcutta 328, a similar view has been reiterated by the Calcutta High Court by observing that if a person makes a claim that the letter was sent under postal certificate, the other side may cross-examine it on the said issue and try to find out further information as to who had posted it, at what time it was posted etc.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 27 - Cited by 5 - B S Chauhan - Full Document

Jadabpore Tea Co. Ltd. vs Bengal Dooars National Tea Co. Ltd. on 27 January, 1982

It is also true that the said letter was posted under certificate of posting. In our opinion, on the totality of the facts which have been discussed by the learned judge, the learned judge was entitled to come to a finding of facts on this aspect of the matter. It is to be noted that the factual finding based on a totality of facts should not be looked at piece-meal or by either non-consideration of one single factor or the other. About the effect of service of the notice under certificate of posting, reliance was placed on the observations of the court in the case of Kanak Lata Ghose v. Amal Kumar Ghose, , in the case Achamma Thomas v. E. R. Fairman, AIR 1970 Mys 77, at pages 80-81, paras.
Calcutta High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 12 - S Mukharji - Full Document

J. Mc. Gaffin And Anr. vs Life Insurance Corporation Of India on 8 March, 1977

In Kanak Lata v. Amal Kumar the Court relied on the presumption of service of letters sent under certificate of posting under Section 114(f) of the Evidence Act. There could therefore be no dispute about the presumption arising out of service by certificate of posting in appropriate circumstances though presumption however has been held as rebuttable. In the case before us, the evidence about certificate of posting however is extremely unsatisfactory. It has not been established by the deponent the various steps that render service of such notice valid, viz., that the cover contained the notice to quit and that it was posted in the post office in such condition. There is in effect no evidence to support this aspect of the position about the enclosing of the notice in the letter and also posting the selfsame letter in the post office. In absence of such evidence it is hardly possible for the court to make presumption about service by certificate of posting.
Calcutta High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 10 - Full Document
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