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Documents citing T.R.M. Arunachellam Chetti vs V.R.R.M.A.R. Arunachellam Chetti And ... on 29 September, 1891

Tadiboyina Peda Punnayya vs Dabbakuti Kattamma Minor By Maternal ... on 5 March, 1914

21. What then is the rule of succession applicable to property which must be taken to have been the absolute property under the entire control of a woman governed by the Hindu law--property with reference to the succession to which it was conceded before us that the woman must be taken to be the stock of descent? It seems to me that for the reasons indicated in Subramaniam Chetti v. Arunachellam Chetti (1904) I.L.R. 28 M. 1 in the case of property found to be the absolute property of a woman under her entire and unfettered control there ought to be only one rule of succession recognised in Madras, namely, the rule of succession with reference to Stridhanam property. The learned pleader for the appellant had very great difficulty in suggesting any other rule as being applicable. It was impossible for him not to concede that Subbamma must be taken to be the stock of descent; and his argument could therefore, be only treated on the basis that Subbamma's heirs must be taken to be her sons either in preference to, or jointly with her daughter.
Madras High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Magunta Veeraraghava Reddi And Anr. vs Magunta Kota Reddi on 26 January, 1916

9. The next question is as to the nature of the interest possessed by Akkamma in that property. It is reasonably clear that the acquisition was made out of the income of the one-third, allotted to her originally on account of her maintenance and in which she had a life-interest. She was entitled to the beneficial enjoyment of the income during her life. That one-third share was not given to her on account of the share of her husband and was not inherited by her, as the separate property of her husband. The income from the one-third share was absolutely hers and any purchase made out of that fund would also be absolutely at her disposal. It would be her stridhanam and descend as such on her death. That position is conclusively established by the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Subramaniam Chetti v. Arunachellum Chetti (1904) I.L.R. 28 M. 1 (F.B.)
Madras High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Magunta Veeraraghava Reddi And Anr. vs Magunta Veeraraghava Reddi on 26 January, 1916

10. The next question is as to the nature of the interest possessed by Akkamma in that property. It is reasonably clear that that acquisition was made out of the income of the one-third, allotted to her originally on account of her maintenance, in which she had a life-interest. She was entitled to the beneficial enjoyment of the income during her life. That one-third share was not given to her on account of the share of her husband and was not inherited by her as the separate property of her husband. The income from the one-third share was absolutely hers and any purchase made out of that fund would also be absolutely at her disposal. It would be her stridhanam and descend as such on her death. That position is conclusively established by the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Subramanian Chetti v. Arunachelam Chetti 28 M. 1 and the same result follows from the decision of the Privy Council in the case reported as Musammat Bhagbutti Daee v. Chowdry Bholanath Thakoor 2 I.A. 256 : 1 C. 104 : 24 W.R. 168 : 3 gar. P.C.J. 528 : 3 Suth. P.C.J. 186. Assuming then that when acquired it was the stridhanam property of Akkamma, the further question is whether, she did anything with reference to that property so as to make it devolve not on her own heirs after her death as stridhanam property, but pass along with the one-third share in which she had only a life-estate. It was argued that by some conduct of hers, this property which was her stridhanam was incorporated with the one-third in which she had only a life-estate, i e., that by some conduct of hers her absolute interest in this property was cut down to a life-interest. Assuming that is possible without a transfer inter vivos or devise by Will, in this case there is really no evidence to show that she did anything to convert her absolute interest into a life-estate. The only evidence to which our attention was drawn is a statement in Exhibit XXI, the Will executed by Akkamma. In that, she says that the original one-third and the subsequently acquired one third were enjoyed as joint family property by Subba Reddi, his brother and his sons, and after the death of the two brothers the son of the last brother Kota Reddi became entitled to it and is enjoying it. That statement, however, is not true, and that incorrect recital could not in any way convert her absolute interest into a life-estate. Assuming that she was under a misapprehension and that is the utmost that we can read into that language as to the nature of the interest possessed by her at the time of the acquisition, that cannot cut down her absolute interest into a life-estate. I, therefore, think that nothing was done by her to convert this property into a life-estate so as to make it devolve on her death on the persons who would be entitled to the one-third allotted for her maintenance.
Madras High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Surno Moyee Debi vs Dakhina Ranjan Sanyal And Anr. on 7 September, 1896

Their Lordships cannot accede to that contention. The proceeding in this case was brought by the respondents under Section 311, which deals with material irregularity. The non-compliance with the provisions for posting was a material irregularity. But in the cases of Macnaghten v. Mahabir Pershad Singh, and Arunachellam Chetti v. Arunachellam Chetti it was held that in all cases of irregularity under Section 311 evidence must be given of substantial injury having resulted. In the present case, the decree-holder failed to comply with the full requirements of Section 290, but both on principle and authority their Lordships are of opinion that the case must be treated, as the respondents themselves treated it, as one of material irregularity to be redressed pursuant to the provisions of Section 311, and in the application of that section it was incumbent on the respondents to have proved that they sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity. They gave no such evidence, and it would be extremely improbable that injury could have happened from the non-compliance with the strict letter of Section 290. Their Lordships cannot accept the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, that loss is to be inferred from the mere fact that a sale was bad without full compliance with the provisions' of Section 290. The section clearly contemplates direct evidence on the subject.
Calcutta High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Gontla Venkata Pitchayya vs Sowdagar Mahomed Abdul Kareem Beg Saheb ... on 11 February, 1914

Visvanathan Chetti v. Arunachallam Chetti (1911) 21 M.L.J. 978. follows Sankaralinga Mudali v. Ratnasabapati Mudali (1897) I.L.R. 21 M. 324 in which it was held that if the absence of the defendant is for an indefinite period, service by affixture was sufficient. Whether the absence was for an indefinite period or not, has to be ascertained from the circumstances of the particular case. The learned vakil (Mr. P. Narayanamurti) for the petitioner contends that unless the process-server's return expressly shews that the person who gave the information to the process-server of the absence of the defendant from his usual place of residence is stated in the return itself to have added that the date of the return of the defendant to his usual place of residence is not known the court could not legally accept the service as due service. I am unable to accept this contention. The court might find the indefiniteness of the period of absence not only from the express words in the return (if there are such express words) but also from the other circumstances as appearing from the return.
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Marudanayagam Pillai vs Manickavasakam Chettiar on 18 December, 1944

8. The respondent based his case on waiver by the appellant, contending that the appellant must have known about the sales of his own property in the prior mortgage suit, and about the disposal of the purchase monies ; that accordingly when he waived his right to a fresh proclamation, he must be taken to have accepted the statements in the existing proclamation and to have waived his right to object to them, and reliance was placed upon the decisions of this Board in Girdhari Singh v. Hurdeo Narain Singh (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 230 and in T. Rule Arunachellam Chetti v. V.R.R.M.A.R Arunachellam Chetti (1888) L.R. 15 I.A. 171 : I.L.R. 12 Mad. 19.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 25 - Full Document

Smt. Tippamma And Others vs Annarao And Others on 13 August, 1998

16. The observation of the Court was with reference to the failure of a party to raise objection in spite of notice. The judgment-debtor has to establish that there was not only substantial injury caused as a result of low price fetched, but also to establish that such a result was on account of the material irregularities or fraud in publishing the auction sale. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 90, Order 21 of the CPC provided that no application to set aside a sale under this rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up. This provision clearly bars from setting aside of an auction sale where no application was made by the judgment-debtor on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up. The ruling of the Allahabad High Court was long prior to the amendment of Order 21, Rule 90, which was substituted by Act 104 of 1976, with effect from 1-2-1977. No doubt the Allahabad High Court had as well amended and enacted a proviso to original proviso to Rule 90 of Order 21 of the CPC. The rule aforesaid as mentioned in Uttar Pradesh by Allahabad High Court recognised and applied the doctrine of estoppel in specific terms, Where a notice was given to judgment-debtors to appear and show cause before the settlement of the proclamation of sale and he had full opportunity of pointing out the mistake to the Court. The judgment-debtor should not have kept quiet and allow the things to happen resulting in change of situation and creation of third party interest, and third party investing the money as well, he can be held to be debarred from raising such plea at this stage in view of doctrine of estoppel and res judicata. When I so opine as above, I find support from the decision mentioned hereinafter, namely, Girdhari Singh v Hurdeo Naran Singh , (observations at p. 240) : T.R, Arunachallam Chetty v V.R.R.M.A.R. Arunachalam Chetty and Another.
Karnataka High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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