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Documents citing Rajeshwar Prasad Singh vs Ambika Prasad Singh And Ors. on 13 May, 1955

Ram Chander And Ors. vs Jamna Shankar And Ors. on 23 September, 1960

15. On behalf of the applicants Roshanlal v. Firm Bridhi Chan, AIR 1924 Pat 603, Rajeshwar Prasad Singh v. Ambika Prasad, AIR 1956 Pat 28 and Ganeshmal Bhawarlal v. Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd., AIR 1952 Cal 10 were relied upon. It was held in these cases that a decree passed under Section 17 in arbitration proceedings cannot be regarded as an ex parte decree even though the defendants are not present on the date on which it is passed. In a suit if the plaintiff does not appear no decree can be passed and if the defendant does not appear the plaintiff must prove his case. Either party to an award is entitled to ask the court to pronounce judgment according to the award. Under Section 17 a judgment must be pronounced and a decree must follow if the conditions of Sections 14 and 17 are complied with. Such a decree even if pronounced in the absence of the parties cannot be said to be passed ex parte.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 21 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Sahagir Ahmad And Ors. vs Israil Mian And Ors. on 26 November, 1977

In the case of Mahavir Prasad Bhagat (supra) also the defendant had shown no cause against the drawing up of the decree on the basis of the award and as such judgment was pronounced and decree passed, In the case of Rajeshwar Prasad Singh (supra) also, judgment was pronounced and decree drawn up in the absence of the defendant and subsequently a petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code was filed. Thus, on facts these cases were different, the question of application of the provision of this Code having arisen with regard to a later stage in an arbitration proceeding. In the instant case, I am not called upon to decide as to what would have happened or should have been done if the defendant were absent and the judgment were pronounced in his absence. What I am called upon to decide is whether before the pronouncement of judgment and making of a decree if the defendant is present and the defendant has made an objection by an application to set aside the award, it is obligatory for the plaintiff to be present in court and if his absence entitles the court to dismiss his application under the pronounce of Order IX or Order XVII of the Code? These decisions, therefore, are not applicable directly to the present case.
Patna High Court Cites 36 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

M.L. Mahajan vs Delhi Development Authority And Anr. on 1 April, 1992

The Court agreed with the following observations made by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court reported in Roshan Lal v. Firm Budhichand, followed in later decisions reported in Rajeshwar v. Ambika Prasad, and Ram Chander v. Jamnasankar : "The second point is equally clear. It is asserted by the appellants that as they had no opportunity to place their case before the court the decree must be regarded as exparte; but it is nothing of the sort. An exparte decree is a decree passed by the court in the absence of the defendants where the plaintiff has proved his case, but here the presence of the parties was not necessary to enable the court to pronounce judgment according to the award."
Delhi High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

J.S. Sood vs Johny Bakshi on 12 December, 2000

It affirmed and followed the previous decisions of Division Benches in Roshan Lal Marwari and Ors. v. Firm of Bridhi Chan Sri Lal, AIR 1924 Patna 603 and Rajashwar Prasad Singh v. Ambika Prasad Singh and Ors., . In Ram Chander y. Jamna Shankar, it was observed that when a decree was passed under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act 1940, it could not be regarded as an ex parte decree even though it was passed in the absence of the Defendants. The Learned Judge held that if service had not been properly effected, the decree could be set aside "on a summary application".
Delhi High Court Cites 43 - Cited by 1 - V Sen - Full Document

Ms.Vasanthi vs Mrs.Sulochana on 26 November, 2018

2. The Court below had come to the conclusion that the appeal itself is not maintainable and the remedy available to the petitioner is only in preferring Civil Miscellaneous Appeal or reviewing the Order passed in I.A.3 of 2018 in O.S.No.75 of 2007. While holding so, the Court below had relied upon the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in AIR 1956 Patna 28 [Rajeshwar Prasad Singh Vs. Ambika Prasad Singh].
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - M S Ramesh - Full Document

Collector vs Gourisankar Bag And Ors. on 19 September, 1994

16. The appellate Court has quoted Clauses 23 and, 24 of the Gountia Patta issued in 1922-23 settlements found in a book containing the final report of the land revenue settlement in Kalahandi district of the year 1946-56 prepared by the Settlement Officer. This book was not made available to this Court at the hearing. Clause 23 as quoted provided that Gauntia will keep all tanks and katas in proper repair and in case the water is required for irrigation of fields, he will distribute it among the raiyats free of tax. Clause 24 provided that the Gountia can make tanks in his bhogra and Khudkast lands and royats can make tanks in their own holdings without permission. But for the construction of a , tank on land forming part of the village waste the permission of the State authorities is required. It is observed by the learned District Judge that Khudkast Iands is mostly the characteristic of rayati land which was assessed to land revenue and if the tanks are excavated Khudkast lands of the Gountia, certainly the State would not have any right over the same casting the onus on the State, the learned District Judge observed that the State has not shown that the suit tanks had been excavated on bhogra lands. Ultimately, the learned District Judge observed that it might have so happened that the tanks had been excavated in 'Khudkast' lands and reversed the decision of the trial Court, Ramadhyani's report has not used the word 'khudkast' in respect of any land. The meaning of the word 'Khudkast' as stated by the Apex Court in Hari Prasad Singh v. Deontraia Prasad, AIR 1956 SC 306 is personal cultivation, and that is a natural expression, which might include both private lands and rayati lands which had come into the possession of the proprietor by surrender, abandonment or otherwise. In the case at hand, it is admitted by counsel for both the parties that the Gountia had no private land. Therefore, khudkast land in the hand of Gountia must be taken as meaning raiyati lands, which have come into his possession as proprietor, by surrender, abandonment or otherwise. In fact, it is stated in Ramadhayani's report that the lands abandoned or surrendered are at the disposal of the Gountia. It seems such lands are khudkast lands in the hand of the Gountia and he had only power of disposal over the same. Therefore it cannot be said that such lands were the private property of the Gountia. Moreover, it is stated in the report that the surrendered holdings if belonging to an aboriginal or certain low caste person must be re-allotted only to a person of that class, otherwise it should remain fallow and Gountia cannot cultivate himself or give it to his relations unless be belongs to that class. In other words, if the holdings belonging to aboriginal or certain low castes are surrendered, they can only be re-allotted to a person of that class and if holding belonged to any other class is surrendered, it will remain fallow unless the Gountia belonged to the same class as the person surrendering, in which case, he can cultivate them. Thus, in respect of some surrendered holdings the Gountia had only the right to cultivate. This cannot mean that thereby these holdings became the private land of the Gountia. In other words khudkast lands are not private lands of the Gountia. Even it there were evidence to come to a finding that the suit tanks were dug on khudkast lands, it cannot be held that they are the private lands of the Gountia family. Before concluding, it may be stated that PW 1 Minaketan Bag, who is none else but plaintiff No. 13 himself was constrained to admit in cross-examination that his rights are extinguished in respect of the suit tanks. He obviously means extinguishment by operation of provisions in Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951.
Orissa High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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