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Mrs Tara Karatha vs Prime Minister Office on 15 November, 2016

Once appointed, a Government servant acquires a status and thereafter his position is not one governed by the contract of appointment. Public law governing service conditions steps in to regulate the relationship between the employer and employee. His emoluments and other service conditions are thereafter regulated by the appropriate statutory authority empowered to do so. Such regulation is permissible in law unilaterally without reciprocal 80 OA No.3963/2014 consent. This Court made this clear in two Judgments rendered by two Constitution Benches for this Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, (1968) 1 SCR 185 : (AIR 1967 SC 1889) and in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCR 771 : (AIR 1974 SC 1).
Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi Cites 62 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Indore Development Authority ... vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Anr. on 6 March, 2006

In Dinesh Chandra Sangama v. State of Assam, the Supreme Court, after quoting the aforesaid observations in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, has held that the conditions of service are regulated by statute made under Article 309 of the Constitution. In the present case, officers and servants appointed by the Indore Development Authority under the Act are not Government servants and therefore the provisions of Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution do not apply, but the legal position remains the same that once the officers and servants are appointed, the terms and conditions of their employment are not governed by contract and consent of the parties but regulated by the statute under which they are appointed and such statute can be amended unilaterally by the legislature.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Sunil Kumar Singh & Ors vs Union Of India & Anr. on 20 February, 2017

"7. We also do not understand the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the interpretation placed by the High Court and accepted by us now on this part of the case would mean infraction of Article 16 of the Constitution. We do not agree that the decision of this Court in Roshan Lal v. Union, lays down any such principle. Professors and Additional Professors in teaching institutions do not stand in the same position as General Duty Officers. The argument that it would lead to discrimination in W.P. (C) 4810/2015 Page 29 of 32 the matter of promotion of specialist is also without substance. To say that to be appointed a Professor in Orthopaedics a person must have a post- graduate degree in Orthopaedics is not to make a classification without reference to the objectives sought to be achieved and there can be no question of discrimination."
Delhi High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - V K Rao - Full Document

State Of Himachal Pradesh vs Raj Kumar on 20 May, 2022

(b) The rights and obligations of persons serving the Union and the States are to be sourced from the rules governing the services. Application of the principle to the facts of the present case: 38.1 Returning to the facts of the present case, we have noticed that the High Court has proceeded on the premise that the vacancies occurring before the amendment of the Rules on 25.11.2006 must be governed by the 1966 Rules. The decision of the High Court took within its sweep even the 7 new posts of Labour Officers that were sanctioned by an inter-departmental letter dated 20.07.2006, which included even the 3 posts allocated for direct recruitment. The direction of the High Court to encompass even the 3 posts allocated for direct recruitment was on the ground that the posts were sanctioned on 20.07.2006, which is prior to the amendment of the Rules on 25.11.2006. 38.2 We have already held that there is no right for an employee outside the rules governing the services. We have also followed and applied the Constitution Bench decisions in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (supra) and more particularly the decision in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India (supra) that the services under the State are in the nature of a status, a hallmark of 59 which is the need of the State to unilaterally alter the rules to subserve the public interest. The 2006 rules, governing the services of the Respondents came into force immediately after they were notified. There is no provision in the said rules to enable the Respondents to be considered as per the 1966 Rules. The matter must end here. There is no other right that Respondents no. 1 to 3 can claim for such consideration.
Supreme Court of India Cites 51 - Cited by 121 - P S Narasimha - Full Document

Union Of India vs A.Mohandas on 3 March, 2025

50. As discernable from the pleadings on record, in the instant case as well both sides proceeded under the assumption 48 OP(CAT)No.108 of 2017 2025:KER:17421 that an overreaching principle had been laid down in Y.V. Rangaiah [(1983) 3 SCC 284] that posts which fell vacant prior to the amendment of Rules would be governed by old Rules and not by new Rules. In Annexure A7 judgment of this Court dated 23.12.2009 in W.P.(C)No.32491 of 2009, another decision relied on by the applicants, this Court rejected the contention raised by the Department that the vacancies under clause (ii) in column (ii) of the Schedule to the Recruitment Rules, 2002 remaining unfilled in a particular year would vanish by the end of the year. The said decision is one rendered prior to the coming into force of the Recruitment Rules, 2010. Annexure A8 order dated 25.08.2013 of the Tribunal in O.A.No.536 of 2012, an order relied on by the applicants, is one rendered following an earlier order of the Tribunal in O.A.No.551 of 2011, which is one rendered following the decision in Y.V. Rangaiah [(1983) 3 SCC 284]. In view of the law laid down by the Three-Judge Bench in Rajkumar [(2023) 3 SCC 773] the applicants cannot contend that, in view of Annexure A8 order, the petitioners herein are bound to fill up the vacancies in Group D, which existed prior to 20.12.2010, the date of coming into force of the Recruitment Rules, 2010, as per the Recruitment Rules, 2002.
Kerala High Court Cites 30 - Cited by 0 - A Narendran - Full Document

Suneeta Singh vs State Of U.P. And 4 Others on 12 August, 2021

31. As we have already said that CUPGL even if taken to be a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of Constitution, this by itself would not mean that petitioner can claim status of a Government Servant or holding a post governed by 'status'. Nature of engagement/ appointment of petitioner is not to be governed by 'status' but by a 'contract of service' entered into between master and servant. A distinction between an appointment under a contract and status was noticed and explained by Supreme Court in Roshan Lal Tandon Vs. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1889. Court held that when a matter is governed by status, the employee has no vested contractual rights in regard to the terms of service but where employment is purely in the realm of a simple contract of employment, it is strictly governed by terms and conditions of employment settled between the parties. To remind the difference between 'status' and 'contractual appointment', we may take up case of a Government Servant. Origin of employment in a Government department is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case but once appointed to the post or office, the person appointed, i.e., Government Servant, acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both the parties but same are governed by Statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by employer, i.e., the Government. Legal position of a Government Servant, thus, is more one of 'status' than of a 'contract'. The hallmark of 'status' is that attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties must be by public law and not by mere agreement of parties. Relationship between Government (employer) and Government Servant (employee) is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. In the language of jurisprudence, 'status' is a condition of membership of a group, whereof powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. Thus, where appointment and conditions of service are governed by Statute, relationship of 'employer' and 'employee' is that of 'status' and not a mere contract. However, in other cases, it is purely a contract of service resulting in a relationship of ordinary master and servant.
Allahabad High Court Cites 41 - Cited by 7 - Y Varma - Full Document

Distt. Registrar Palghat & Ors vs M. B. Koyyakuti & Ors on 20 February, 1979

The case in point is Roshal Lal Tandon v. Union of India. In that case, before the impugned notification was issued, there was only one rule of promotion for both the departmental promotees and the direct recruits, and that rule was seniority-cum-suitability, and there was no rule of promotion separately made for application to direct recruits. As a result of the impugned notification, a discriminatory treatment was made in favour of the direct recruits, i.e. existing Apprentice Train Examiners who had already been absorbed in Grade 'D' by March 31, 1966, because the notification provided that this group of Apprentice Train Examiners should first be accommodated en bloc in Grade 'C' upto 80 per cent of vacancies reserved for them without undergoing any selection. Ramaswami J., speaking for a Bench of five learned Judges, held that the impugned notification violated the guarantee under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The reason was that once the direct recruits and promotees were absorbed in one cadre, they formed one class and they could not be discriminated against for the purpose of further promotion to the higher Grade 'C'. In that case, it was not disputed that before the impugned notification was issued there was only one rule of promotion for both the departmental promotees and the direct recruits and that rule was 'seniority-cum-suitability'. The impugned notification was discriminatory because in the case of that category who were appointed as Train Examiners by promotion the aforesaid test of 'seniority-cum-suitability' prescribed by the rule for further promotion to the higher Grade 'C' was abandoned and, instead, selection on merit only was adopted.
Supreme Court of India Cites 10 - Cited by 31 - R S Sarkaria - Full Document

Sh. Rajendra Singh vs Union Of India on 18 July, 2013

(2) In the seniority list dated 10.11.2004 the applicants of this O.A. were at Serial Nos. 327-320 respectively and respondents No. 4 to 8 were at Serial No. 339. 344, 343, 342 and 341 respectively i.e. junior to the applicants of this O.A. (3) Respondents No. 1 to 3 have applied different parameters for direct recruits and promotees in complete violation of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Lal Tandon & Ors. Vs UOI & Ors. They have thus discriminated against the promotees and have violated Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. This order has been obtained by misrepresentation of facts.
Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi Cites 24 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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