"386. Article 122(1) thus must be found to contemplate the
twin test of legality and constitutionality for any proceedings
within the four walls of Parliament. The fact that U.P. Assembly
case (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964) [AIR 1965 SC 745 : (1965)
1 SCR 413 sub nom Keshav Singh, In re] dealt with the exercise of
the power of the House beyond its four walls does not affect this
view which explicitly interpreted a constitutional provision dealing
specifically with the extent of judicial review of the internal
proceedings of the legislative body. In this view, Article 122(1)
displaces the English doctrine of exclusive cognizance of internal
proceedings of the House rendering irrelevant the case-law that
emanated from courts in that jurisdiction. Any attempt to read a
limitation into Article 122 so as to restrict the court's jurisdiction to
examination of the Parliament's procedure in case of
unconstitutionality, as opposed to illegality would amount to doing
violence to the constitutional text. Applying the principle of
"expressio unius est exclusio alteriu" (whatever has not been
included has by implication been excluded), it is plain and clear
that prohibition against examination on the touchstone of
"irregularity of procedure" does not make taboo judicial review on
findings of illegality or unconstitutionality."
26. We have been appraised at the Bar that the respondents had
harboured hope when the resolution was passed. Their hope, as the
learned counsel for the respondents would submit, was not
unfounded, inasmuch as the revisions in pension were earlier made by
21
issue of certain circulars issued by the Chairman in exercise of power
conferred under Rule 55 of the 1995 Rules. Whether the hope was
reasonable or not need not be commented upon, but the fact remains
that certain respondents are septuagenarians and they have to fight
another round of litigation in the High Court. We feel the pain while
remanding the matter, but we have no option as the pleadings are not
adequate as it should have been while assailing a constitutional
validity of a provision. It is well settled in law that he who assails the
constitutional validity of a statutory provision or a rule, has to
specially assert the grounds for such challenge. [See State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Kartar Singh11, State of Andhra Pradesh and another
v. K. Jayaraman and others12, Union of India v. E.I.D. Parry
(India) Ltd.13, State of Haryana v. State of Punjab & another 14].
The purpose of saying all this is as the learned counsel for the
respondents would agonizingly contend that the amount of pension
the respondents are getting is a paltry sum and it is difficult to sustain
in the present day. That apart, the Corporation should have been
gracious enough to recognize the services rendered by them and the
Union of India should have come with an affirmative response when
the resolution was passed by the Corporation. We have already
11 AIR 1964 SC 1135
12 (1974) 2 SCC 738
13 (2000) 2 SCC 223
14 (2004) 12 SCC 673
22
adjudicated the said facet, but as we are remanding the matter to the
High Court on a different count. In such a situation, we are of the
convinced opinion that the respondents should get certain amount as
an interim measure. We had already directed by the order dated 7 th
May, 2015 that the Corporation shall pay 20% amount to the
individual employees. Mr. Kaul, learned Additional Solicitor General
would submit that the Corporation has already deposited the entire
amount without the pay revision before the High Courts of Rajasthan
and Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh are concerned regard being had
to the order of this Court. As far as the High Court of Delhi is
concerned, employees have been paid 20%, as directed by this Court.
The said fact is disputed by learned counsel for the respondents after
obtaining instructions. The said aspect shall not detain us, for what
we are going to direct in praesenti.
Further in State of A.P. Vs. K. Jayaraman,
reported in 1974 (2) SCC 738, it is held that High Court
cannot decide constitutional validity of an act or rule suo-
motu. In paragraph no.3 its observations are as follows:
In support of validation of the notification dated January 23, 2004 (Annexure R-1), Shri Dwivedi has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Jayaraman and Ors., 1974 (2) SCC 738, to say that in the absence of an averment on behalf of the petitioners that the aforementioned notification is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, this Court suo motu cannot go into its validity.