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Documents citing J.H. Irani And Ors. vs T.S. Pl. P. Chidambaran Chettiar And ... on 27 July, 1951

A. Geetha vs G. Sankaran And Anr. on 7 December, 2000

In Rajeshwari Devi v. S.M. Rabi and Ors. (1982)2 M.L.J. 263, a learned single Judge of this Court, after considering the decision reported in Thangakani Ammal v. A.K.A. Kaja Mohideen Sahib (1978)2 M.L.J. 377, wherein a learned single Judge of this Court has held that a property consisting of a wall with certain windows and a door without a roofing is not a building as defined under the Act, and again relying on the decision reported in J.H. Irani and Ors. v. T.S.P.J.P. Chidambaram Chettiar and Ors. , has held as follows:
Madras High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Suryakumar Govindjee vs Krishnammal And Ors on 26 April, 1990

650. He pointed out that, in that case there was a vast vacant land with only some stalls in one corner and a com- pound wall but it was nevertheless held to be a case of lease of a building. According to him, this case was not disapproved, but indeed indirectly approved, by this Court in Salay Md. Sait v.J.M.S. Charity, [1969] 1 MLJ--SC 16 though certain other cases (where leases of vacant sites with only the lessees' buildings thereon were held to be leases of buildings) were overruled in that decision. This case, according to him, decides that, once there is a build- ing on the land, however insignificant, and it is let out, the case will be governed by the Rent Control Act. We do not think this case is an authority for such an extreme posi- tion. It rather seems that the case was one decided on its own special facts. At the time of the original lease by the landlord there was only a vacant site and a few small stalls. But, by the time the relevant lease deed (which came up for consideration) was executed, it had become the site of a theatre. No doubt the theatre did not belong to the lessor; nevertheless for several years the leased property had been sued as a theatre and the purpose of the parties was clearly that the leased premises should continue be used as a cinema theatre. It was in this special situation that the Court came to the conclusion that it was plausible to hold the lease to be one of a building though if the struc- tures not belonging to the landlord were left out of ac- count, there was only a vacant site and a few stalls. We think it would not be correct to draw support from this decision for the extreme proposition contended for on behalf of the respondent. In our opinion, we have to travel beyond this solitary fact, go further to look at the, terms of the lease and the surrounding circumstances to find out what it is that the parties really intended.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 13 - A M Ahmadi - Full Document

Silambani Sri Chidambara Vinayagar ... vs Duraisamy Nadar And Anr. on 24 December, 1965

14. In my view, the definition of building under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and the case law with reference to that definition cannot be imported while considering the context of the word building under Section 18 of the Abolition Act. As observed by Raghava Rao, J., in Irani V. Chidambaram Chettiar (1952) 2 M..L.J. 221, in the absence of a statutory definition the expression building has to be construed with reference to the context of the particular enactment. The case law in regard to what is conveyed by the word building the subject of examination in the said decision cannot be of much assistance in the present case. I will be echoing only what has been repeatedly laid down when I state that no real help can be gained as to the meaning of a word in one statute by reference to its meaning in other statutes, particularly if they are all special statutes.
Madras High Court Cites 33 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

N.H.M. Pandian And Anr. vs The Board Of Revenue (S.E.) By ... on 5 April, 1960

In view of what has been stated above that the expression ' building ', in the absence of a statutory definition, has t o be construed with reference to the context of the particular enactment, I do not consider it necessary to embark again upon an examination of the case law considered in Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar (1952) 2 M.L.J. 221 or upon an examination of the cases referred to at pages 204-205 in Volume III of Halsbury's Laws of England, Second Edition (Hailsham's).
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Andhra ... vs Zaibunnisa Begum on 17 March, 1984

15. We may notice the judgment of the Madras High Court in Irani v. Chidambaran Chettiar, . The matter arose under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946. The question in that case was whether the 1st defendant was a "tenant in possession of building" within the meaning of the Act. He would be a tenant of a building if what was leased to him was within the definition contained in the Act. The word "building" is defined in the Madras Act as meaning "any building or hut or part of a building or hut let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes : (a) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building, or hut and let or to be let along with such building or hut, (b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut". After considering the legal and popular meaning of the expression "appurtenant", Satyanarayana Rao J. observed at page 655 of the report as under :
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 17 - Cited by 24 - B P Reddy - Full Document

Gobind Sahai vs Narain Dass And Ors. on 7 September, 1971

The authority of f. H. Irani's case has, therefore, not been shaken by the decision of the Supreme Court. The facts in the case before the Supreme Court were that the landlord had let out only the vacant land while the tenant erected some structures which had to be removed by the tenant for they would become the property of the landlord at the end of the term, but the structures really belonged to the tenant. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that what the landlord had let out was not any building within the meaning of the Rent Act. In this connection, the Supreme Court laid down the following test, namely :- "In order to determine whether the lease is of a vacant land or of a building within the meaning of the Act of 1960 we must take into account both the form and the substance of the transaction. In form the transactions in suit were leases of vacant land. The substance of the transactions points to the same conclusion."
Delhi High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Moraji Goculdas Deoji Trust And Ors. vs Madhav Vithal Kudwa on 23 November, 1982

10. In the Madras ruling J. High. Irani v. Chidambaran Chettiar, , the plaintiff ahd obtained a lease of the suit land excluding the theatre thereon known as Gaiety Theatre which was owned by defendant No. 1. The land lease in favour of the plaintiff was to come into effect after termination of the subsisting lease in favour of defendant No. 1. As defendant No. 1 did not remove the theatre structure and did not give vacant possession of the land, the plaintiff filed suit to recover vacant possession after removal of the theatre structure. Defendant No. 1 contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to evict him because what was leased to him (defendant No. 1) viz.. the suit land, was a "building" within the meaning of S. 2(1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946 and he (defendant No. 1) was, therefore, protected by the said Act and not liable to be evicted by way of such a suit. In that case, the definition of "building" in S. 2 (1) of the aforesaid Act meant not only any building as such' but also included the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appurtenant thereto. Thus, ground or land appurtenant to a building was also itself a building under the Act. The learned trial Judge dismissed the suit holding (at p. 652):
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 7 - S V Manohar - Full Document

Kumaravelu vs Kanakarathnam Chetty on 22 April, 1994

AIR 1353 Saurashtra 113 (7) J.H. IRANI v. T.S.PI.P. CHIDAMBARAM CHETTIAR 14. . The cases relied on by the appellants under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, (15 of 1960) and the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (16 of 1959) contain the definition of 'building' which does not contain the clause "fittings fixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment there of" as found in the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 or the UP, (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (3 of 1947). A comparative statement of definitions of 'building' found under the four enactments as furnished by the learned Counsel for the appellants is as under:-
Karnataka High Court Cites 37 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

M.P.S. Palauiappa Chettiar And Ors. vs V.E. St. Vairavan Chettiar on 20 July, 1962

From this it is clear that although ordinarily the word "building" would include not merely the superstructure but also the ground on which it stands, the ground on which the building stands could also be regarded as part of the building. While considering this case the learned Judges who decided the Irani case (1952) 2 M.L.J. 221, observed at page 227 thus:
Madras High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 13 - Full Document
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