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Documents citing Raja Thakur Barmha vs Jiban Ram Marwari on 25 November, 1913

Raja Wazir Narain Singh vs Bhikhari Ram on 3 August, 1922

In that case the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Raja Thakur Barmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari 21 Ind. Cas. 936 : 41 C. 690 : 18 C. W. N. 313 : 15 M. L. T. 137: 12 A. L. J. 156 : 19 C. L. J. 161 : 26 M. L. T. 89 : 16 Bom. h. B. 156 : (1914) M. W. N. 118 : 411, A. 38 (P.C.), was relied upon in support of the decision but, as already stated, in my opinion, the decision of the Judicial Committee does not support the proposition there laid down.
Patna High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Sabapathi Pillay vs Thandavaroya Odayar on 14 August, 1919

6. The further question is whether these rulings are applicable to adjustment of rights dependent upon Court sales. The point was thrice argued, as we had doubts on the question and as it is res integra. The learned Vakils on both sides have placed all the available authorities before us, but none of them really touches the question we have to decide. There are some general principles on which alone we can rest our decision. (1) There is no warranty in a Court sale: see Raja Thakur Barmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari 21 Ind. Cas. 936 : 41 C. 590 : 19 C.L.J. 16 : 18 C.W.N. 31 : (1914) M.W.N. 118 : 15 M.L.T. 187 : 16 Bom. L.R. 156 : 12 A.L.J. 156 : 41 I.A. 38 : 26 M.L.J. 89 (P.C.). (2) There is no privity of contract between an auction purchaser and a judgment-debtor, Under the. old Code of Civil Procedure if the purchaser had reason to believe that there was no saleable interest at all in the property sold, he had a right of action against the decree-holder for refund of money. The new Code has taken away that remedy and limits the purchaser's right to an application for refund. There is no indication in the Code that the purchaser has any remedy against the judgment-debtor. (3) It must be remembered that it is the decree holder that brings the property to sale; he prepares the proclamation and to the best of his knowledge places before the public all the available information in respect of the property to he sold. Although the judgment-debtor is expected to assist the Court in settling the proclamation and although his failure to do so may entail some consequences, there is no provision of law which brings him into contact with the bidders at a sale. These persons are bound by the principle of caveat emptor. They take the risk of the property corresponding to the description given. If that fails, they can have no remedy against the judgment-debtor, because there was no act or representation by him which has contributed to the result.
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 14 - Full Document

Hafez Uzir Ali vs Nasimannessa Bibi And Ors. on 19 July, 1928

7. That being so the next thing is to enquire whether the Court can give any relief. It cannot be disputed that mistake is a good ground for relief in cases of sale inter vivos, and I do not see any principle why if mistake is proved relief cannot be given in the case of a sale held through the intervention of the Court, There are instances where sales have been set aside on the ground of mistake. One of these cases I have already cited, the case of Thakur Berhma v. Jiban Ram Marwari [1914] 41 I.A. 38. In my opinion therefore the Court should give relief to the decree holder on the ground of mistake.
Calcutta High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Sabapathi Pillai vs Thandavaraya Odayar on 5 August, 1919

5. The further question is whether these rulings are applicable to adjustment of rights dependent upon Court sales. The point was thrice argued, as we had doubts on the question and as it is res Integra. The learned Vakils on both sides have placed all the available authorities before us but none of them really touches the question we have to decide. There are some general principles on which alone we can rest our decision. (1) There is no warranty in a court-sale : bee Thakur Burmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari (1913) I.L.R. 41 Cal. 590 P.C. (2) There is no privity of contract between an auction purchaser and a judgment-debtor. Under the old Code of Civil Procedure if the purchaser had reason to believe that there was no saleable interest at all in the property sold, he had a right of action against the decree-holder for refund of money. The new Code has taken away that remedy and limits the purchaser's rights to an application for refund There is no indication in the Code that the purchaser has any remedy against the judgment-debtor. (3) It must be remembered that it is the decree-holder that brings the property to sale; he prepares the proclamation and to the best of his knowledge places before the public all the available information in respect of the property to be sold. Although the judgment-debtor is expected to assist the Court in settling the proclamation and although his failure to do so may entail some consequences, there is no provision of law which brings him into contact with the bidders at a sale. These persons are bound by the principle of caveat emptor. They take the risk of the property corresponding to the description given. If that fails, they can have no remedy against the judgment debtor, because there was no act, or representation by him which has contributed to the result.
Madras High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

T.S. Ramaswamy Ayyangar And Anr. vs M.L.M. Ramanathan Chettiar on 15 August, 1927

In these circumstances it is not clear that the decision in Thakur Barmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari [1913] 41 Cal. 590, has any application to this case. In that case the facts are that the judgment-debtor's property consisted of two parts: a 10-annas share subject to encumbrances and a 6-annas share not so subject. The decree-holder's petition attached the 6-annas share subject to encumbrances. It was afterwards suggested that there was a slip in the petition and that what was meant to be attached was the 6-annas share not subject to encumbrances. This suggestion was accepted by the High Court, but the Privy Council held that, whatever might; have been meant, the attachment made was only of 6-annas share subject to encumbrances and as this is less than 10-annas share which was subject to encumbrance, the petition on its face, referred only to 6-annas share subject to encumbrance and it must be taken that what was sold was only a 6-annas share subject to encumbrances and if it is attempted at a later stage to change this into a 6-annas share not subject to encumbrances it will amount to a case of changing the identity of the property sold and not a case of mere slip in description. In the present case, there is nothing to show that anybody understood that what was finally knocked off was property which was only the equity of redemption. On the other hand, no such objection was taken in the present petition, nor was it taken in the grounds of appeal to the High Court on the former occasion. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar informs us that he mentioned it at the time of argument and also when the judgment was delivered by our brothers Spencer and Venkatasubba Rao, JJ., but they made no reference to this point. Their order merely says that the case should go back and the Subordinate Judge should take further evidence on all the objections raised by the petitioners in his petition and affidavits. Nor is the objection taken in the present grounds of appeal.
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

T.S. Ramaswami Ayyangar, Official ... vs M.L.M. Rama Nathan Chettiar on 15 August, 1927

In these circumstances it is not clear that the decision in Thakur Barmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari 21 Ind. Cas. 936 : 41 C. 590 : 18 C.W.N. 313 : 15 M.L.T. 137 : 12 A.L.J 156 : 19 C.L.J. 161 : 26 M.L.J. 89 : 16 Bom. L.R. 156 : (1914) M.W.N. 118 : 41 I.A. 38 (P.C.) has any application to this case. In that case the facts are that the judgment-debtor's property consisted of two parts a 10-annas share subject to encumbrance and a 6 annas share not so subject. The decree-holder's petition attached the 6-annas share subject to encumbrances and a 6-annas share not so subject. The decree-holder's petition attached the 6 annas share subject to encumbrances. It was afterwards suggested that there was a slip in the petition and that what was meant to be attached was the 6-annas share not subject to encumbrances. This suggestion was accepted by the High Court, but the Privy Council held that, whatever might have been meant, the attachment made was only of 6-annas share subject to encumbrances and as this is less than 10 annas share which was subject to encumbrances, the petition on. its face, referred only to a 6-annas share subject to encumbrances and it must be taken that what was sold was only a 6-annas 6hare subject to encumbrances and if it is attempted, at a later stage to change this into a 6-annas share not subject to encumbrances it will amount to a case of changing the identity of the property sold and not a case of mere slip in description. In the present case, there is nothing to show that anybody understood that what was finally knocked off was property which was only the equity of redemption. On the other hand, no such objection was taken in the present petition, nor was it taken in the grounds of appeal to the High Court on the former occasion. Mr. Krishnaswami Iyer informs us that he mentioned it at the time of argument and also when the judgment was delivered by our brothers Spencer and Venkatasubba Rao, JJ., but they made no reference to this point Their order merely says that the case should go back and the Subordinate Judge should take further evidence on all the objections raised by petitioner in his petition and affidavit. Nor is the objection taken in the present grounds of appeal. For these reasons we do not think that there is any substance in the objection that the sale was a nullity. This argument is merely to take advantage of the looseness of the language employed by the decree holder's Vakil and by the Subordinate Judge in the final order accepting the bids. It is not suggested that the prior mortgagee ever consented to sell free of encumbrances and it seems that nobody could have contemplated such a sale.
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Nareshchandra Mitra vs Moll Ataul Huq on 16 December, 1929

We are unable to agree in the interpretation that case has given to the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Thakur Barmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari [1914] 41 Cal. 590, upon which it purports to proceed. In the case before the Judicial Committee, the property that was under attachment and sold was a 6-annas share of a mahal subject to a mortgage, and after the sale the purchaser applied for correction of the certificate of sale by adding the word not" to the description of the property, the result of which would be to pass are unencumbered 6-annas share, an entirely different property from what was attached: and sold. The case is no authority for the proposition that an auction is invalid for want of attachment, even thought the sale proclamation correctly mentioned and described the property which is sold.
Calcutta High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Mahendra Kumar And Ors. vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 17 September, 2000

Ratio is nearer home. In the present case the SDM by its order dated 14.4.1972 ordered that the debtor had only 1/3 share in the property, which only is saleable and directed to put to sale only 1/3 share of Dau Dayal in the said recovery proceedings. After said order which became final, the recovery officer was left with no authority to issue sale proclamation for full house and effectively conduct the sale of whole property. On mistake being pointed out, the only course open was to commence the sale proceedings once again. The order made by recovery officer on 15.1.1991 on discovering that auction had been conducted contrary to order dated 14.4.1972 by the SDO, had directed to set aside the said auction proceedings and hold auction proceedings afresh was correct course as envisaged in Thakoor Barmha's case (supra). The Board of Revenue, without noticing the effect of order made by SDO, has erroneously upturned the order dated 15.1.1991 by treating it to be a case of mere irregularity. It deserves to be corrected. There is no impediment in setting aside the order of Board of Revenue because as a result of setting aside the order of Board of Revenue have the effect of setting aside all subsequent proceedings founded thereon.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Chhatradharilal Gangaram Supedar vs Shyamabai Ramsewaklal Agrawal on 30 April, 1965

25. Order 21, Rule 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that where any property is ordered to be sold by public auction in execution of a decree, the proclamation of sale shall 'specify as faily and accurately as possible the property to be sold'; and under Rule 94 of Order XXI, where the sale has become absolute, the Court shall grant a certificate 'specifying the property sold'. As stated by the Privy Council in Thakur Barmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari, 41 Ind App 38 at p. 43 (PC):
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 32 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Sheodhyan Singh And Ors. vs Mt. Sanichara Kuer And Ors. on 10 October, 1955

In the case of Thakur Barmha (A), referred to above, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had to deal with identity; and not description, and, therefore, their Lordships held that there was no power to sell in judicial proceedings a property different from the property attached. In such a case decree-holders could not turn an authority to sell one property into an, authority to sell another and a different one.
Patna High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 9 - Full Document
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