In Rajendran Vs. The Inspector General of Registration, Chennai and two others ((2012)-3 Law Weekly 606), this Court has held that the essential requirement for exercising suo-motu power under Section 47-A(6) of the Act is the subjective satisfaction of the authority viz., the third respondent on the basis of the orders passed by the original authority viz., The Deputy Collector stamps.
14. Further, this Court in RAJENDRAN VS. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION AND OTHERS [2012 (3) CTC 589] has categorically held that the Inspector General of Registration shall not enhance the value of the property when an appeal is made by the purchaser. In the absence of any appeal or reference from the Registration Department, the third respondent ought not to have enhanced the market value determined by the District Collector / District Revenue Officer. As a quasi judicial authority, he is supposed to test the correctness of the determination of the market value made by the District Collector. His powers to fix higher market value is under Section 47-A(6) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
In the judgment reported in 2012 (3) CTC 589 (Rajendran Vs. The Inspector General of Registration, Chennai, and two others), this Court has held that while exercising suo-motu power under Section 47-A(6) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the Statute mandates, consideration of the records, in terms of the objective, specifically incorporated in the Section and that the authority should arrive at a subjective satisfaction, as to whether, the order passed under sub-sections (2) & (3) of Section 47-A of the Act, is prejudicial to the interest of Revenue and he must record the reasons for arriving at the satisfaction.
11.Further, as held by this Court RAJENDRAN VS. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION AND OTHERS [2012 (3) CTC 589] the appellate authority has no power to enhance the market value of the property on an appeal preferred by the presentant of the document. He can do so when the appeal is filed by Government. When the statute does not confer such a power, the appellate authority shall restrict himself with scrutinising the correctness of the order and shall not exceed his jurisdiction. Therefore, it can be inferred that the order passed by the first respondents stand vitiated for violation of Rules 7 and 11-A of the Rules and also for violation of principles of natural justice for want of notice of inspection. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to set aside the order passed by the first respondent.
10. Further, as held by this Court RAJENDRAN VS. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION AND OTHERS [2012 (3) CTC 589] the appellate authority has no power to enhance the market value of the property on an appeal preferred by the presentant of the document. He can do so when the appeal is filed by Government. When the statute does not confer such a power, the appellate authority shall restrict himself with scrutinising the correctness of the order and shall not exceed his jurisdiction. Therefore, it can be inferred that the order passed by the first respondents stand vitiated for violation of Rules 7 and 11-A of the Rules and also for violation of principles of natural justice for want of notice of inspection. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to set aside the order passed by the first respondent.
10. Further, as held by this Court RAJENDRAN VS. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION AND OTHERS [2012 (3) CTC 589] the appellate authority has no power to enhance the market value of the property on an appeal preferred by the presentant of the document. He can do so when the appeal is filed by Government. When the statute does not confer such a power, the appellate authority shall restrict himself with scrutinising the correctness of the order and shall not exceed his jurisdiction. Therefore, it can be inferred that the order passed by the first respondents stand vitiated for violation of Rules 7 and 11-A of the Rules and also for violation of principles of natural justice for want of notice of inspection. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to set aside the order passed by the first respondent.
10. Further, as held by this Court RAJENDRAN VS. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION AND OTHERS [2012 (3) CTC 589] the appellate authority has no power to enhance the market value of the property on an appeal preferred by the presentant of the document. He can do so when the appeal is filed by Government. When the statute does not confer such a power, the appellate authority shall restrict himself with scrutinising the correctness of the order and shall not exceed his jurisdiction. Therefore, it can be inferred that the order passed by the first respondents stand vitiated for violation of Rules 7 and 11-A of the Rules and also for violation of principles of natural justice for want of notice of inspection. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to set aside the order passed by the first respondent.
14. This Court, in its judgment in RAJENDRAN VS. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION AND OTHERS [2012 (3) CTC 589] has held that while deciding the appeal preferred by the presentant, unlike the suo motu revision under Section 47-A(6) of the Indian Stamp Act, the appellate authority is not empowered to enhance the market value of the property and he can only decide on the correctness of the order passed by the District Collector or District Revenue Officer. Therefore, it is clearly seen that the order passed by the first respondent is in total violation of Rules 6, 7 and 11-A of the above said rules and in excess of powers conferred under Section 47-A(5) of the Indian Stamp Act. In such circumstances, I have no hesitation to set aside the impugned order passed by the first respondent.
14. This Court, in its judgment in RAJENDRAN VS. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION AND OTHERS [2012 (3) CTC 589] has held that while deciding the appeal preferred by the presentant, unlike the suo motu revision under Section 47-A(6) of the Indian Stamp Act, the appellate authority is not empowered to enhance the market value of the property and he can only decide on the correctness of the order passed by the District Collector or District Revenue Officer. Therefore, it is clearly seen that the order passed by the first respondent is in total violation of Rules 6, 7 and 11-A of the above said rules and in excess of powers conferred under Section 47-A(5) of the Indian Stamp Act. In such circumstances, I have no hesitation to set aside the impugned order passed by the first respondent.