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Documents citing Rangasami Gounden vs Nachiappa Gounden on 16 December, 1918

Akkava Ramchandrappa Yadav vs Sayadkhan Muthekhan Mulgund on 7 January, 1927

29. The solution to the question submitted to us will, in my judgment, be found in the Privy Council decision of Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72, s.c. 21 Bom. L.R. 640. After summarising at p. 84 the two main grounds on which an alienation by a Hindu widow may be upheld, and after dealing next with the question of estoppel which, in that particular case, their Lordships held did not arise as the plaintiff never consented to the deed, nor was his claim traced through any consenting party, their Lordships dealt with yet a fourth branch under which transactions may be upheld. Put shortly that branch amounts to an election by a reversioner to treat the transaction as good. Their Lordships point out at pp. 86-87 that that can be done either after the reversion has fallen into possession, or alternatively it may be done even before that time. Thus they say :-
Bombay High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Rama Iyer And Ors. vs Narayanaswami Iyer And Ors. on 15 October, 1925

In Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden 50 Ind. Cas. 498 : 46 I.A. 72 : 42 M. 523 : 36 M.L.J. 493 : 17 A.L.J. 536 : 29 O.L.J. 539 : 21 Bom. L.R. 640 : 23 C.W.N. 777 : (1819) M.W.N. 262 : 28 M.L.T. 5 : 10 L.W. 105 : 1 U.P.L.R.(P.C.) 66 (P.C.). Lord Dunedin describes it as an effacement which opens the estate of the deceased husband to his next heirs at that date. In the present case, as the intermediate heirs consist of not only the widow but also the daughters, in order to effectuate a surrender in favour of daughters' sons, there must be an effacement of the widow and the daughters. The renunciation must be of all the properties.
Madras High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Pokhar Singh vs Mt. Dulari Kunwar on 11 February, 1930

49. The second proposition dealt with alienation for necessity, with which we are not concerned. Now the argument of the plaintiffs based on this and similar rulings is that the agreement of 1st May 1898 is invalid because Mt. Sundar Kunwar did not surrender the whole of her life interest, but retained it in one-fifth of the estate. We consider that the rule in Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden P.C.A. No. 132 of 1927, decided on 11th June 1929, does not apply to the present case for two reasons.
Allahabad High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Manmatha Nath Sett vs Gobindalall Sett And Ors. on 5 January, 1938

At that time, he did not know whether he would ever be such a reversioner in fact as would give him a practical interest to quarrel with the alienations : Gounden's case? (supra). On the other hand, both the plaintiff and his brothers not only accepted the benefits of the decree made in 1895, but relied upon it to defeat the claims of their nephew Satish. The partition agreement made between them in 1900 dealt separately with that part of the property of Sujendra which he did not obtain under the decree. In that part of the property Satish shared, but he got no share of the property obtained as a result of the decree of 1895. Estoppel is defined in Section 115, Evidence Act, as follows:
Calcutta High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Yeshvanta Bin Bala Gaekwad vs Antu Bin Navaji Salunke on 24 January, 1934

The only ground which he gives for this view is that the inclusion of the alienation of the whole estate in the second proposition at p. 84 in Rangasami's case is opposed to any such assumption. The second proposition, however, deals with the case of alienation of the whole or part of the widow's estate when it is for consideration and to be supported on the ground of necessity. The case of surrender to the next reversioner would not come under the second proposition at all. I agree, therefore, that the decision of Mr. Justice Baker should be confirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Ramaswami Reddi And Ors. vs E. Rajagopalachariar on 1 May, 1925

I am only looking on and I see that you sell the property to the alienee or mortgage the property for consideration;" but the very object of getting the consent of the reversioner is not only to appraise him of the fact that a transaction is taking place, but to make him consent to the transaction, on the ground that such circumstances do exist as would make the transaction binding on him. Otherwise the consent of the reversioner would be meaningless and no alienees would take the trouble to get the consent of the reversioner simply as a witness of the transaction and nothing more. I do not rest my judgment in this ease on the question of estoppel. It may. be said in this case that the reversioners having joined in effecting a sale of the property along with the limited owner, they cannot afterwards question the validity of their own act. What representations were made at the time, and what representations were believed in by the alienees at the time, have not been proved in the case. The transactions were more than 30 years before the date of the suit, and it would not be easy to get evidence as to what transpired at the time. I prefer to rest my judgment on the principle enunciated in Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiyappa Gounden [1919] 42 Mad. 523 that, where reversioners consent to a transaction by a limited owner, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, their consent is prima facie evidence or presumptive evidence of the existence of circumstances which would be sufficient to constitute necessity under the Hindu Law and which would be sufficient to bind the reversion. In the result, I allow this appeal with costs. I set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the District Munsif with costs in this Court and in the lower appellate Court.
Madras High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Kunja Behari Basu vs Rasik Lal Sen And Ors. on 14 August, 1934

8. An examination of the principles and the cases does not support any of these propositions. In the first place it is not correct to say that an alienation by a Hindu widow can be binding on the reversions only in the three cases specified by Mr. Roy, nor can the only effect of consent of the presumptive reversioner be to raise a presumption of legal necessity. An important distinction must be made between the case where the actual reversioner, i.e., he who becomes entitled to the estate on the death of the widow, is or is not the reversioner who gave his consent at the time of the questioned sale or thereafter. If he was not the reversioner who gave his consent it is quite true that the alienation would be effective against him only in the three cases specified by Mr. Roy. But if he was, the case has to be decided on a different principle altogether. It is the principle of election which is indicated in the judgment of Lord Dunedin in Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden, 1918 PC 196, cited by Mr. Roy in support of his contention. An alienation by Hindu widow is not void but voidable.
Calcutta High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Mummareddi Nagi Reddi And Others vs Pitti Durairaja Naidu And Others on 8 May, 1951

This was explained by the Judicial Committee as an extension of the principle of surrender in Rangasami Goundaan v. Nachiappa Goundan(1) "The surrender, once exercised", observed their Lordships, "in favour of the nearest reversioner or rever- sioners, the estate became his or theirs, and it was an obvious extension of the doctrine to hold that inasmuch as he or they were in title to convey to a third party, it came to the same thing if the conveyance was made by the widow with his or their consent.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 17 - B K Mukherjea - Full Document
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