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The State Of Orissa vs Minaketan Patnaik on 12 December, 1952

19. The second question of law is undoubtedly not of so much importance as the first one. But its significance also should not be minimised. It is well known that criminal cases depend primarily on oral evidence and in subordinate Courts there is a tendency to contradict witnesses by their so-called previous oral statements proved through the mouth of other witnesses without first giving them an opportunity of explaining the same. Section 145, Evidence Act in terms, refers only to previous written statements and there is a difference of view, see -- 'Mt. Misri v. Emperor', AIR 1934 Sind 100 (Z12) and -- 'Mutawandas v. Emperor', AIR 1939 Nag 13 (213), as to whether the principles of Section 145, Evidence Act, should be applied to the previous oral statement of a witness also. In the present case this question assumes some importance because one of the reasons for my learned brother disbelieving Purushottam (P. W. 1) was his previous oral statement as proved by Bhoramal (P. W. 3) to he following effect:

Ramratan And Others vs The State Of Rajasthan on 13 September, 1961

The first question therefore that arises in the appeal is whether the statement of Roopram to the effect that Jawanaram told him immediately after the incident, when he came out of his shop that the appellants and two others were responsible for the murder of Bhimsen and the injuries to Lekhram and himself, is admissible, either under s. 6 or under s. 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. We (lo riot think it necessary to consider whether this statement of Roopram is admissible under s. 6 of the Evidence Act and shall confine ourselves to the question. whether it can be admitted under s. 157 as corroboration of Jawanaram's state- ment. Learned counsclfor the appellants in this connection relies on Mt. Misri v. Emperor (1), and Nazar Singh v. The State (2) which support him and lay down that unless the witness to be corroborated says in his statement in court that be, had told certain things immediately after the incident to another person, that other person cannot give evidence and say that the witness bad told him certain things immediately after the incident. The argument is that the corroboration that is envisaged by s. 157 is of the statement of the witness in court that he had told certain things to the person corroborating the witness's statement, and if the witness did not say in court that he had told certain things to that person, that person cannot state that the witness had told him certain things immediately after the incident and (1) A.I.R. 1934 Sind 100, (2) A.I.R. 1931 Pepsu 66.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 32 - K N Wanchoo - Full Document
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