Homi D. Mistry vs Shree Nafisul Hussan on 16 November, 1956
40. Now it is abundantly clear that under Article 141 of the Constitution any law declared by the Supreme Court, shall be binding on all Courts within the territories of India. The question is whether there is any declaration of law to be found in this order. There is only a statement of admitted facts and the sequitur that on these admitted facts Article 22(2) must be applied. But, altogether apart from that there is a decision of the Supreme Court itself reported in The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh [1953] S.C.R. 254. and in that judgment the learned Judges have had reason to refer to this petition. Before discussing that case, it is necessary to set out certain points. The first is that the Speaker is not the authority that issued the warrant. The warrant was issued by the High Court of Parliament namely the House of the Legislative Assembly and the signature to the warrant was appended by the Speaker entirely in his administrative capacity. I am entirely of the opinion that the manner in which the facts were admitted indicated that the warrant was looked at as if it was, issued by the executive and not by a judicial authority. The warrant exh. K is signed by the Speaker in pursuance of the 'Resolution of the House, and therefore in my opinion clearly the authority issuing the warrant was the House and not the Speaker. It is perfectly true and rightly pointed out by Mr. Palkhivala that the body of the petition does indicate the allegation that it was in pursuance of certain contempt proceedings that the warrant was issued, but, those statements were not made the basis of the judgment, but certain admitted facts as regards the period of detention and non-production before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours. Therefore if the Order which amounts to a judgment is to be binding it would be binding, as I have pointed out above, under Article 141 as laying down the law.