Mahanta Bhagaban Das, Shebait Of ... vs Bisweswar Nath Shaha And Ors. on 6 May, 1926
4. The next argument of the appellant is to the effect that as the plaintiffs had allowed themselves to be represented in the sherista of defendant No. 1 through Bishu and Kanai, it was not open to them to allege that they are not bound by the decree and the sale to which I have referred. Reliance has been placed in support of this argument upon the principle contained in Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. That principle, however, relates to a case where one stands by and acquiesces in something that is being done by another, and if in consequence of such acquiescence some injury is caused to some third party, it is provided by that section that it is not open to the person so acquiescing to say that what was done by that other person was not authorized by him. Reference has been made to certain decisions of this Court as supporting this contention of the appellant. The case which is most relied upon for the purposes of this contention is that of Ali Mahamud v. Aftabuddin Bhuya 34 Ind. Cas. 251 : 20 C.W.N. 355, It will be seen that in that case there was a finding by the Subordinate Judge to the effect that a certain tenant and his heir had "allowed" another person to represent them as tenants in the sherista of the landlord. In the present case it cannot be said for a moment that the plaintiff or Giridhari the transferee ever allowed their vendors to represent them in the sherista of the landlord. Suits for rent were being instituted against the said vendors in spite of the fact of the said transfer and decretal amounts were being deposited by the transferee when the decrees were obtained. There is no question of acquiescence or of allowing somebody else to represent the transferee in the sherista, of the landlord in the present case.