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Documents citing Dr. Dwaraka Bai vs Professor Nainan Mathews on 28 January, 1953

Swapna Ghosh vs Sadananda Ghosh And Anr. on 22 July, 1988

3. Before I proceed further to consider as to whether the grounds alleged by the wife for the dissolution of the marriage have been proved and the decree for dissolution passed by the trial court should be confirmed. I would like to note that. Section 17 apart, there are several other provisions in this Century-old Divorce Act of 1869 which are not only manifestly anachronistic, but have rendered themselves patently open to Constitutional challenge. To start with, under Section 10 of the Act, while the husband is entitled to a dissolution on the ground of the wife's adultery, the wife is not so entitled unless she proves that the husband's adultery is incestuous or is coupled with cruelty or bigamy or desertion. If the husband is entitled to dissolution on the ground of adultery simpliciter on the part of the wife, but the wife is not so entitled unless some other matrimonial fault is also found to be super-added, then it is difficult to understand as to why this provision shall not be held to be discriminatory on the ground of sex alone and thus to be ultra vires Article 15 of the Constitution countermanding any discrimination on such ground. The only reported decision that comes to my mind in defence for this provision is the one of Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., of the Madras High Court, sitting singly, in Dwarka Bai v. Nainan , where the learned Judge thought that since the husband even by committing adultery "does not bear a child as a result of such adultery and make it child of his wife to be maintained by the wife", the wife by committing adultery "may bear a child as a result of such adultery and the husband will have to treat it as his legitimate child and will be liable to maintain that child under Section 488, Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act", and that "this very difference in the result of the adultery may form some ground" of justification for this differentiation.
Calcutta High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Dr. H.T. Vira Reddi vs Kistamma on 12 January, 1968

In this case non-access to the wife before she left is spoken to by the husband. Such evidence is admissible, but should be considered with caution, and , as pointed out by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in Dr. Dwarka Bai v. Nainan Mathew, , with a lynx eye. As corroboration of such evidence is practically impossible and indeed not required, the surrounding circumstances, an overall picture and the conduct of the parties do act as legal accessories to weigh such uncorroborated testimony, Even in cases where adultery or any other matrimonial offence is alleged, the offence complained of should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Undoubtedly, a matrimonial proceeding is an ordinary civil proceeding. But as it involves the disruption of a marital tie, law imposes a stricter degree of scrutiny of the evidence, if uncorroborated. Such corroboration is demanded as a rule of precaution and prudence so that a well instructed mind may be able, after bringing to bear its own observations and experiences of life, to 1udge from the pros and cons of each particular case, whether the sole ipse dixit renders possible the theory set out. The words of Sinha, J., in , may be usefully quoted:
Madras High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

H.T. Vira Reddi vs Kistamma on 12 January, 1968

It is no doubt imperative for the Courts to foster and protect the marital tie as it is a matter concerning society at large and is of grave public importance. A fortiori it is so, when a matter arises whether the husband should be deemed to have access to the wife at the crucial time such that the resultant child may be legitimised instead of bastardised. In this case non-access to the wife before she left is spoken to by the husband. Such evidence is admissible, but should be considered with caution, and as pointed out by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in Dr. Dworaka Bai v. Prof. Nainan , with a lynx eye. As corroboration of such evidence is practically impossible and indeed not required, the surrounding circumstances, an overal picture and the conduct of the parties do act as legal accessories to weigh such uncorroborated testimony. Even in cases where adultery or any other matrimonial offence is alleged, the offence complained of should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Undoubtedly, matrimonial proceeding is an ordinary civil proceeding.. But as it involves the disruption of marital tie, law imposes a stricter degree of scrutiny of the evidence, if uncorroborated. Such corroboration is demanded as a rule of precaution and prudence so that a well instructed mind may be able, after bringing to bear its own observations and experiences of life, to judge from the pros and cons of each particular case, whether the sole ipsi dixit renders possible the theory set out.
Madras High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 11 - Full Document
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