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Documents citing Jayeshkumar G. Vyas And Ors. vs Vijay Housing Development And Anr. on 21 December, 1993

Paman Bhobhrajmal Navlani vs Deputy Municipal Commissioner And Ors. on 7 August, 1997

It was then contended that hearing was absolutely necessary before taking any action even under Section 231 of the said Act. It was contended that no order could be made to throw the petitioners out without giving them hearing. If hearings were given, they could have contended that they were given permission to occupy these places and put up other defences. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Court in Hasmukhbhai Dhanjibhai Zaveri v. R. Parthsarthy reported in (1971) XII GLR 128; J.G. Vyas v. Vijay Housing Development reported in 1994(1) XXXV(l) GLR 377 and Dalwadi Laljibhai Gatorbhai v. Stale of Gujarat reported in 1995(1) GLH 1 : 1995(2) GLR 974 in support of his contention that hearing was required to be given before removing the cabins of the petitioners. It was, however, submitted that the impugned notice was not based on Section 230 or 231 and had proceeded on the basis of the scheme framed by the Baroda Municipal Corporation pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court. It was also contended that affidavits cannot spell out what was not there in the notice and since it was not mentioned in the impugned notices that they were issued under the provisions of Section 231(1) of the Act, the fact that the Corporation now states so in the affidavit, cannot make them as notices issued under the provisions of Section 231 of the Act.
Gujarat High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Yogeshbhai D. Sheth vs Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation on 13 September, 1996

18. Considering the averments made in both these applications and the submissions advanced by the learned Advocates appearing for the occupiers as well as the society, it clearly transpires that an attempt is being made to make the dispute as a disputed question of fact to be decided by a Civil Court on the basis of the evidence that may be led before it and to see that till the decision thereon, the occupiers can merrily continue their business at the cost of public nuisance, safety and inconvenience. Normally, the Court should not and would not object to the grant of amendment to the plaint and production of additional evidence as it is the right of the party to pray for the same. However, while granting such prayers the Court has to consider the question as to the bona fides of the party making it and the other attendant circumstances. As stated above, in the suit, the occupiers have come forward with a case that they have not been served with the notice under Section 260(1) and Section 260(2) and till the said issue is concluded, in view of the decision of this Court in Jayeshkumar G. Vyas (supra), the present attempt is made to produce additional evidence and to amend the plaint with a contention that they were not aware about the revised plan submitted by the society and were also not aware about the notes prepared from the inspection file of the Corporation after the revised plan was rejected and the approval granted by the Commissioner to the proposal of the Town Planning Officer for regularisation. It is difficult to believe that the society had not given access to the revised plan to the occupiers. The fact that the society is simultaneously fighting for the common cause of its members would suggest that the interest of the society as well as the occupiers is common and they are fighting for the common cause. It is to be noted that the occupiers have not made any attempt to have inspection of the plan from the Corporation office before they purchased the properties. Instances have been given in the application for additional evidence showing that the Corporation had given permissions to the other buildings having negative plinth, having no parking areas and the complexes converting the parking space and negative plinth into basement shops, during the same period when the present complex was being constructed and when the present suits were filed. However, no such grievance was made when Ex. 5 was heard. It was only at the appellate stage that the occupiers have come forward with these two applications with the sole object to prolong the litigation. It is well settled that a decision given at an earlier stage of the suit is binding to the parties at later stages of the same suit and, therefore, when an application for injunction is decided, the same cannot be made redundant by granting the applications as prayed for in the present appeals to suit the purpose of the appellants.
Gujarat High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Empire Construction And Hotel Co. Ltd. vs Municipal Corporation Of The City Of ... on 28 June, 1995

9. The concept of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not warrant claiming of a right against application of a valid law on the ground that it was not applied in certain cases. The Rules and Bye-laws as they stand do not create any discrimination and not enforcing the statutory provisions under Section 260 of the said Act simultaneously against all the errants cannot create any immunity in favour of anyone who has committed breach of Rules and Bye-laws and therefore, can lawfully be proceeded against under Section 260 of the said Act. The contention that the petitioner is singled out can be raised by anyone against whom the process of taking action under the law is first started, and, if accepted, would render it impossible to exercise the power statutorily conferred on the authority. Mandamus would lie against an officer or authority to enforce performance of duty and not for perpetuating inaction and non-exercise of statuory powers. For obvious reason the petitioner would not seek mandamus for taking similar action against others, for, it will remove the very foundation of inaction of the officials on which the petitioner seeks to thrive. The mandamus can be sought for directing a public authority to abstain from violating the law or for compelling it to set right its violation of the law. It would not lie to restrain the statutory authority from discharging its statutory functions. As observed in J.G. Vyas v. Vijay Housing Development reported in 1994 (1) XXXV (1) GLR 377 if the officers have, by connivance, not taken action for some time against some unauthorised construction, that would not debar the statutory authority from exercising its power. There is no decision of the Municipal Commissioner that other similar defaulters will not be proceeded against and no right accrues in favour of the petitioner of not being proceeded against for its defaults. Even if there may be some inaction in not proceeding against others for violation of the provision, Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not confer on any person a right to which he is not entitled under a valid law. To permit invoking the writ jurisdiction of the Court for allowing continuance of breach of law would be a retrograde step which cannot be justified on a spacious plea of equality based on the reasoning that if the authorities have not proceeded against some others for violation of the law, the petitioner also cannot be proceeded against. Therefore, there is no conflict in the exercise of power by the Municipal Commissioner by passing the impugned order under Section 260 of the said Act and any right to equality to which the petitioner is entitled under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Gujarat High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Surat Municipal Corporation vs Babubhai Zaverbhai Patel on 11 January, 2007

In the matter of J.G.Vyas and Ors. v. Vijay Housing Development and Anr. 1994 [1] GLR 377, this Court has held that the demolition of a structure entails serious consequences on the rights of the owners and occupiers and may affect livelihood if any vocation is carried out in such place. It would, therefore, be obvious that before making any demolition order, a hearing is required to be given to the persons concerned. The Court further observed that from the provisions of the Sections 260 and 478 of the Act, no intention of the Parliament can be culled out to exclude the rule of hearing. Section 254 in its true spirit provides that every person who intends to do a particular act shall give notice to the Commissioner in the form prescribed in by-laws containing all such informations as may be required to be furnished under the by-laws. Such permission may be granted by the authority; in case it is found that the permission is being violated and constructions are being raised contrary to the sanctioned plans, then, Section 260, in the opinion of this Court, would cover the field. Section 260 of the Act reads as under:
Gujarat High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - R S Garg - Full Document
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