In Talcher Municipality v. Talcher
Regulated Market Committee [(2004) 6 SCC
178] this Court held: (SCC p. 181, para 14)
"14. The power to regulate buying and
selling of agricultural produce must be
interpreted in the context in which the same
has been used. Each person, whoever is
engaged in buying and selling of the
agricultural produce in the market shall be
subject to the regulation for which the same
has been enacted. The expression
'regulation' is a term which is capable of
being interpreted broadly. It may in a given
case amount to prohibition.
69 The IBC has made a provision for ineligibility under Section 29A which
operates during the course of the CIRP. A similar provision is engrafted in
Section 35(1)(f) which forms a part of the liquidation provisions contained in
Chapter III as well. In the context of the statutory linkage provided by the
provisions of Section 230 of the Act of 2013 with Chapter III of the IBC, where a
scheme is proposed of a company which is in liquidation under the IBC, it would
be far-fetched to hold that the ineligibilities which attach under Section 35(1)(f)
read with Section 29A would not apply when Section 230 is sought to be invoked.
principles [referring to the principle of harmonious construction] have also been applied in resolving a conflict
between two different Acts” and providing the following examples – “Jogendra Lal Saha v. State of Bihar, 1991
Supp (2) SCC 654 (Sections 82 and 83 of the Forest Act, 1927 are special provisions which prevail over the
provisions in the Sale of Goods Act ); Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar Jaggi, (2001) 8 SCC 289 (Section 64 of
NDPS Act will prevail over section 307 CrPC 1974 as it is a special provision in a Special Act which is also later);
P.V. Hemlatha v. Kattam Kandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda, (2002) 5 SCC 548 (conflict between section 23 of
the Travancore Cochin High Court Act and section 98(3) Civil Procedure Code resolved by holding the latter to
be special law); Talchar Municipality v. Talcher Regulated Market Committee, (2004) 6 SCC 178 (Section
4(4) of the Orissa Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1956 was held to prevail over section 295 of the Orissa
Municipalities Act, 1950 as the former was a special provision and also started with a non-obstante clause); and
Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc, (2005) 2 SCC 145 (Letters Patent and rules made under it
constitute special law for the High Court concerned and are not displaced by the general provisions of the Civil
Procedure Code)”
59
PART D
Such an interpretation would result in defeating the provisions of the IBC and
must be eschewed.
21. The principles laid in various decisions of the Supreme Court cited above are quite explicit. TRAI Act is a special law, which will govern, and it overtakes general law, i.e., Arbitration Act, 1996. Also, TRAI Act, being the later Act (TDSAT was constituted by the Amending Act of 2000) has precedence over the earlier Act which is the Arbitration Act, 1996. The principle of generalia specialibus non derogant has been referred to in a judgment of Supreme Court in Talcher Municipality v. Talcher Regulated Market Committee and Anr. (2004) 6 SCC 178. Consent cannot confer jurisdiction when there is none. Dominant public interest requires that all disputes in telecom sector which includes broadcasting and cable TV should be within the exclusive jurisdiction of TDSAT. In these circumstances, public policy demands that jurisdiction of Tribunal like TDSAT should be exclusive and arbitration agreement not to have any applicability.
The special statute, therefore, shall prevail over the general statute
having regard to the maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant [See
Talcher Municipality Vs. Talcher Regulated Mkt. Committee & Anr.,
[(2004) 6 SCC 178].
4.1 Learned
counsel also relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in
Talcher Municipality v. Talcher Regulated Market Committee and Anr.
[(2004) 6 SCC 178], wherein the Municipality had
constructed a market in exercise of its power under section 295 of
the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950, and the Market Committee had sent a
requisition stating that as agricultural produces were being bought
and sold in that market, municipality was liable to transfer the
market to the Market Committee. The Apex Court made following
pertinent observations: