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Documents citing Natabar Parida Bisnu Charan Parida ... vs State Of Orissa on 16 April, 1975

Keshav Dev And Ors. vs The State Of Rajasthan on 19 May, 2005

"7. The necessity to amend the proviso arose because in some heinous cases of extraordinary complexity, it was not possible for the police to complete the investigation within sixty days and the accused had to be released on bail on the expiry of 60 days of detention authorised by the Magistrate. The Supreme Court in , Natabar Parida v. State of Orissa, remarked : 'if it is not possible to complete the investigation within a period of 60 days, then even in serious and ghastly types of crimes the accused will be entitled to be released on bail. Such law may be a "paradise for the criminals", but surely it would not be so, as it is sometimes supposed to be, because of the Courts. It would be so under the command of the Legislature."
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 50 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Krishnaswami Naidu And Anr. vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 22 April, 1976

9. The Second contention is that if a Sessions Judge, acting as a Special Judge under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, is not to be treated a Magistrate for purposes of remand, it will have the effect of nullifying Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. under Section 167(2), if a Magistrate not having jurisdiction to try a case against an accused or commit him for trial has initially remanded the accused to custody far a term not exceeding fifteen days and it then transpires that further detention is unnecessary, then the accused has to be forwarded to a Magistrate having jurisdiction over the case registered against the accused for further action. The question asked is, what is to happen to an accused charged under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, remanded for an initial term of detention of fifteen days by a Magistrate if his further detention is considered unnecessary. No doubt, the situation is problematic, but it is an irremediable one as things now stand. When the Criminal Law Amendment Act makes the Sessions Judge a Special Judge, he can exercise the powers of remaiad granted to Courts only under Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. and cannot go further and exercise the powers of remand conferred on a Magistrate under Section 167 Cr.P.C. Unlike Section 306 which contemplates a Court, Section 167 makes references only to a Magistrate. The status of a Special Judge vis-a-vis the provisions of the Cri P.C. and the starting point for the exercise of the powers of remand by a Court under Section 309, Cr.P.C. have been clearly laid down in the Supreme Court decisions in Major E.C. Barsay v. State of Bombay and Natabar Panda v. State of Orissa. referred to in my order dated 19-4-1976.
Madras High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Dalam Chand Baid vs Union Of India And Others on 18 December, 1981

In Natabar Parida v. State of Orissa, , already referred to, the Supreme Court noted the change effected by the re-enactment of S. 309 in place of S. 344 of the Code of 1898, to point out that under the old Code various High Courts had taken the view that the power under S. 344 could be exercised during investigation and this view had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in A. Lakshmanrao v. Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Parvatipuram, , and Gauri Shankar v. State of Bihar, . The Court then noted that the language of the re-enacted section only permitted a remand after the Magistrate had taken cognizance and further observations were made concerning the effect of S. 167 as amended. The Court noted that the power to remand an accused person in custody had specifically to be conferred by statute. It was said :-
Delhi High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Noormohd vs State on 26 April, 1978

The Rajasthan decision in Prem Raj has expressly dissented from Heeraman as being not in conformity with the Supreme Court ruling in Natabar Parida v. State of Orissa, supra. The flaw in the reasoning of Allahabad decisions is that the learned judges hold that an application is necessary and unless he makes an application the accused's detention does not automatically become illegal" and the accused "cannot be allowed to walk out of the jail". If the accused does not apply for bail he cannot be released. If he applies for bail release is refused on the ground that on the submission of the charge-sheet section 167(2) has ceased to aply and only bail on merits" can be given. In either case he is condemned to spend his days in prison even before his guilt is determined at the trial. This reasoning is against the plain words of the section. Once the legislature has decided that the risk of release is worth taking, release has to be ordered by the judges.
Delhi High Court Cites 51 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

The Senior Intelligence Officer, ... vs M.K.S. Abu Bucker on 5 April, 1989

26. This conclusion next takes us to the consideration of the observation of the Supreme Court in Natabar Parida v. State of Orissa , that the power of remand is not inherent in the Court. This question does not appear to pose any difficulty or even arise, for in the said case, the Supreme Court has observed that the Code knows only of two custodies, police custody or judicial custody, as it was a case of prosecution on the basis of a police report. The observation of the Supreme Court may not affect this decision, once the provisions of Section 104(1)(2) of the Customs Act are put in the place of Section 167(1) of the Code, when the power of remand automatically is derived from the provisions of Section 167(2) in the background of Section 4(2) of the Code.
Madras High Court Cites 39 - Cited by 3 - Full Document
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