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Documents citing Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961

The Special Tahsildar (L.A.), B.H.E.L. vs M.G. Sampathkumar And Anr. on 20 December, 1993

Looking at the leading decisions of the Supreme Court in Ramlal v. Reva Coalfields Limited , and in State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality , mentioned above, the principle appears to be that the connotation "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and ordinarily delay in preferring appeal should be condoned, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party.
Madras High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Collector Of Central Excise vs Shree Durga Glass (P) Limited on 28 July, 1986

18. Referring to the judgment of the Orissa High Court relied upon by Shri Haksar, Shri Tripathi pointed out that this judgment had been delivered in 1960. Stress had been laid in the judgment on the fact that the appellant had waited till the 56th day to send his appeal. Subsequently the Supreme Court, in its decision in the case of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. and in another case had held that delay within the period of limitation did not have to be explained. Therefore the above decision of the Orissa High Court should not stand in the way of the delay being condoned.
Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Delhi Cites 18 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Shivamma (Dead) By Lrs vs Karnataka Housing Board on 12 September, 2025

In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. it was laid down that in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not necessary that the applicant/appellant has to explain whole of the period between the date of the judgment till the date of filing the appeal. It is sufficient that the applicant/appellant would explain the delay caused in the period between the last of the dates of limitation and the date on which the appeal/application is actually filed.” (Emphasis supplied)
Supreme Court of India Cites 68 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

S. Pakkiaraj vs S.N. Kulasekaran on 14 September, 1993

6C. It is with reference to this delay of 159 days (that is, the period between 14.8.1987 and 19.4.1988, amounting to 249 days abovesaid 90 days) Ratnam, J. observed that the petitioner cannot be permitted to approach this Court for condonation of the said delay and the abovesaid Division Bench concurred with the said view. It is clear from the expression used, viz. "cannot be permitted", that it is not possible at all to condone the said delay under Section 5 of the Act since part of the said delay is due to the fact that copy application itself was filed after the abovesaid 90 days. No doubt there is no time limit as such for making an application for obtaining copy of the judgment and decree appealed against. But, if such an application is made after the prescribed period of limitation of 90 days, the whole period beginning from the date of the judgment and decree till the date of filing of the copy application would be certainly taken as forming part of the whole delay in filing the appeal or revision, as the case may be. But, that portion of the said delay upto the abovesaid 90th day from the date of the judgment and decree, cannot be excused at all under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This conclusion is only the necessary consequence of interpretation put by the Supreme Court in relation to the expression within such period' found in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Limited .
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

K.M. Sharma vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 1 April, 2003

"The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condensation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See : Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd. ; Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari ; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi ; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan ; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condensation of the delay.
Delhi High Court Cites 26 - Cited by 2 - B D Ahmed - Full Document

Special Land Acquisition Officer vs Lilavatiben Kodar Ranchhod And Ors. on 19 July, 2001

In Ramlal & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1962 (2) SCR 762, it was laid down that in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not necessary that the applicant/appellant has to explain whole of the period between the date of the judgment till the date of filing the appeal. It is sufficient that the applicant/appellant would explain the delay caused by the period between the last of the dates of limitation and the date on which the appeal/application is actually filed.
Gujarat High Court Cites 27 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Srd Management Company, New Delhi vs Dcit, Circle-22(2), New Delhi on 7 August, 2023

As laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361, 364, in the case of Sitaram Ramchandra v. M.N. Nagrashana AIR 1960 SC 260, 265, 266 and in the case of Mrs. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi AIR 1978 SC 537, the appellant has to show sufficient cause for not filing the appeal on the last Date of the limitation and must explain the delay made thereafter day by day till the actual date of the filing of the appeal. In other words, the whole of the delay must be explained.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Delhi Cites 8 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

M/S Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd. vs Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai And 2 ... on 7 January, 2022

In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361] this Court while interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, laid down the following proposition: (AIR pp. 363-64, para 7) "7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice."
Telangana High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 2 - P N Rao - Full Document
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