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Documents citing Wuntakal Yalpi Chenabasavana Gowd vs Rao Bahadur Y. Mahabaleshwarappa And ... on 15 April, 1954

Hafizullah vs Inder Kumar Jain on 1 February, 2017

It is further contended by Shri Hafizulla that the original lease was granted for ten years. After expiry of this period the possession of the defendant becomes illegal and unauthorized. Inder Kumar Jain has purchased only a small share of property from Smt. Sona Bi, therefore, his possession on entire property cannot be treated as valid possession. He has relied upon case law Wuntakal Yalpi Chenabasavana Gowd Vs. Rao Bahadur Y. Mahabaleshwarappa and another, AIR 1954 SC 337 (Vol. 41, C.N 31).
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 30 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Suryabhan Dhundaji Bawane vs Bhulabai Chandrabhan Bawane And Ors. on 10 August, 2006

10. The ruling in Chenabasavana v. Mahabaleshwarappa (supra) shows that the father Shri Nagana of appellant before the Hon'ble Apex Court had entered into a lease deed for a period of 12 years at a rental of Rs. 500/- per year and thereafter in 1934, he instituted a suit as guardian of his minor son to recover sum of Rs. 500/- as rent from lessee. It thereafter appears that said father thereafter obtained loan in 1935 by executing a deed of mortgage by conditional sale in respect of half share of disputed land in favour of defendant No. 2 to secure an advance of Rs. 3,000/-. He thereafter sold his half share to the mortgagee. The purchaser did not get possession and in 1944, he sold the property to plaintiff. The plaintiff thereafter filed a suit against appellant before the Hon'ble Apex Court as defendant No. 1 for recovery of a demarcated half share of disputed property. The defence raised on behalf of defendant No. 1 was that suit of plaintiff was time barred as he was never in possession of property and that defendant No. 1 had acquired good title by adverse possession. The District Judge answered these issues in favour of defendant No. 1 and dismissed the suit. When the matter went to High Court, the High Court reversed the judgment and thereafter the matter came up before the Hon'ble Apex Court the arguments before the Hon'ble Apex Court were that to defeat the claim of plaintiff, it was necessary for the defendant to prove that he held the property adversely to his co-owner for statutory period. The findings in this respect recorded by the Hon'ble Apex Court from paragraph 7 onward are important. The Hon'ble Apex Court found that the acts and conduct of father Nagana in connection with lease deed of 1926 and subsequent granting of receipts in terms thereof pointed out something more than mere non participation in enjoyment or profits of the property or absence of objection to the exclusive enjoyment thereof by Paramma on behalf of infant (defendant No. 1) i.e. appellant before Apex Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that in granting lease on behalf of infant, the father definitely asserted exclusive title of his son to the property and by implication denied his own rights as a co-owner thereto. It further found that once it is held that the possession of a co-sharer has become adverse to the other co-sharer as a result of ouster, the mere assertion of his joint title by the dispossessed co-sharer would not interrupt the running of adverse possession. Such dispossessed co-share must actually and effectively break up the exclusive possession of his co-sharer by re-entry upon the property or by resuming possession. These observations are used by the learned Counsel for the appellant to contend that mere assertion of title by deceased Chandrabhan would be sufficient to justify conclusion that present appellant was not in adverse possession. It is to be noticed that only instance pointed out by present appellant is of 1971 when he obtained loan from Land Development Bank by producing a forged record of right. As already observed above, this does not constitute ouster of deceased Chandrabhan and the appellant has not shown anything else to support his contention that Chandrabhan was ousted at any point of time. On the contrary, perusal of judgments reveal that in his evidence before the Court, for the first time appellant deposed that he had paid the price of share of Chandrabhan and therefore, he is owner of that Vi share also. The trial Court has considered this evidence and trial Court had found that defendant No. 1 was only relying upon notice at Exh. 55 to contend ouster. The trial Court has further found that Land Development Bank did not disburse complete loan to appellant and only amount of Rs. 4,000/- was paid o him while remaining amount of Rs. 4,000/- was not paid. The Bank had issued notice to appellant and called for his explanation as to why he produced false document. The appellant admittedly did not reply to that notice of Bank and copy of record of rights, on the basis of which he received a loan, did not bear government seal. The trial Court also found that the stand before it was that defendant was exclusive owner while in written statement, he also pleaded perfection of title by adverse possession. It found that a party claiming adverse, possession has to first admit the title of other side. The appellate Court has also considered the evidence in this respect and has concurred with the findings reached by the trial Court.
Bombay High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 0 - B P Dharmadhikari - Full Document

Shri Shahabuddin vs State Of U.P And Ors. on 1 April, 2005

12. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. Valmiki Mehta, Senior Counsel placed reliance on the statutory provisions of Section 27 of the Limitation Act and the decision of the Apex Court of entitled Wuntakai Yalpi Chenabasavana Gowd v. Rao Bahadur Y. Mahabaleshwarappa to urge that once a person is in physical possession, unless and until there is specific interruption of such adverse possession, a mere act or wish of the actual owner has no relevance.
Delhi High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 7 - G Mittal - Full Document

Shambhu Prasad Singh vs Mst. Phool Kumari & Ors on 24 March, 1971

He must actually and effectively break up the exclusive possession of his co-sharer by re- entry upon the property or by resuming possession in such a manner as it was possible to do. (see Wuntakal Yalpi Chanabasavana Gowd v. Y. Mahabaleshwarappa(4)). The mere fact that a dispossessed co-sharer comes and stays for a few days as a guest is not sufficient to interrupt the exclusiveness or the continuity of adverse possession ,so as not to extinguish the rights of the dispossessed co-sharer.
Supreme Court of India Cites 8 - Cited by 53 - J M Shelat - Full Document

Kedar Nath Gupta & Ors vs Most.Sheojhari Kuer & Ors on 1 December, 2010

In a case of Wuntakal Yalpi Chenabasavana Gowd Vs. Rao Bahadur Y. Mahabaleshwarappa and another AIR 1954 SC 337 the four judges bench of the Hon'ble Supreme court held that "Once it is held that the possession of a co-sharer has become adverse to the other co-sharer as a result of ouster, the mere assertion of his joint title by the dispossessed co-sharer will not interrupt the running of adverse possession. He must actually and effectively break-up the exclusively possession of his co-sharer by re-entering upon the property or by resuming possession in such manner as it is possible to do. A mere mental act on the part of the person dispossessed unaccompanied by any change of possession cannot affect the continuity of adverse possession".
Patna High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - M Sahoo - Full Document
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