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Ram Dulare And Anr. vs Smt. Batul Bibi on 26 September, 1975

7. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that in any case the whole house need not have been sold when only Rs. 500 were required for the Gaya Shradh. The rule regarding the sale of a part of a property, commensurate with the sum required for the legal necessity has no application to cases where the property cannot be alienated in parts (see Ravaneshwar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh, (1911) ILR 38 Cal 721; affirmed by the Privy Council in Ravneshwar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh, ILR 43 Cal 417 = (AIR 1915 PC 57). There is no plea that the house could be sold in parts and the necessty satisfied by the sale of the portion. In the absence of the relevant plea, it appears that the appellants knew that the house could not be sold in parts and the sale could have been made either of the whole house or not at all. In the instant case, two out of the three necessities mentioned namely, Gaya Shradh and maintenance of the widow were sufficient to justify the alienation. The fact that repair of houses also required raising of money was an additional consideration, which added weight to the necessity of sale. I thus find that the sale deed dated 25-10-1921 was valid and the courts below rightly upheld the same.
Allahabad High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Dinesh Chandra Roy Chowdhury vs Biraj Kamini Dasee on 16 May, 1911

It is useful to remember in this connection that Hindu wills, as a rule, should be interpreted by Hindu law alone, without any mixture of laws or ideas derived from any foreign source, Bhyah Singh v. Bhyah Ugur Singh (1870) 13 Moo. I.A. 373, 390 : 5 B.L.R. 293 technical rules of English law, altogether foreign to Hindu Jaw and ideas, ought not to be applied in the construction of Hindu gifts and wills. Now the term "kindred," as pointed out in the Oxford Dictionary (Vol. V, page 702), though ordinarily employed to indicate relationship by blood or descent, is occasionally, though perhaps not very correctly from the point of view of the technicalities of English Jurisprudence, used to indicate relationship by marriage, and reference is made to a passage from Green (Short History, B III, Section 7, 148), in which the learned writer states: " A secret match with the King's sister raised him to kindred with the throne." It is not necessary, however, to rely upon what may, perhaps, be deemed a somewhat loose use of the expression kindred. But the same remark can hardly be applied to the definition of the term "next-of-kin" in the Administrator-General's Act, 1874. where it is made to include a widower as well as a widow. We are, however, on more solid ground when we bear in mind the conception of the marriage relationship as understood by Hindu jurists, and hold that a wife may be deemed as standing in the relation of kindred to her husband. In Chapter XI, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the Dayabhaya, Jimutavahana observes as follows:
Calcutta High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Kattayani Debi vs Port Canning And Land Improvement Co. on 9 March, 1914

Our attention has been invited specially to the passage in the power-of-attorney which authorises the agent to accept kabuliats or counter parts of mourasi leases granted by the Company-to raiyats and it has been argued that in view of the well-known distinction between mourasi and muharari leases Munrunjun Singh v. Leelanand Singh 3 W.R. 84 the agent must thus be deemed to have been authorised to grant only mourasi or hereditary leases and not muharari leases, that is, leases by which rent is fixed in perpetuity. The appellant has, on the other hand, contend; ed with considerable plausibility that the term mourasi' has been used in the power-of-attorney, as it is familiarly used in popular language, as equivalent to mourasi and muharari,' and that the agent was intended to be vested with authority to grant maurasi and muharari leases, specially in view of the well-known fact that, for purposes of reclamation mourasi and muharari leases are ordinarily granted to lessees who have to bear the burden, wholly or partially, of the costs of reclamation. Reference has also been made to the terms of a lease granted to the representative of one of the original grantees on the 25th April 1908 after the land had been partitioned amongst the lessees. This, lease is described in its commencement as a mourasi pattah and the concluding paragraph states that, under the conditions previously mentioned, a muharari pattah is granted to the lessees named. An examination of the terms of the lease, however, shows plainly that what is granted is a mourasi and mukarari pattah. It has been argued with some force on behalf of the appellant that in so far as this Company at any rate were concerned the term mourasi" was used by them as equivalent to mourasi and muharari".
Calcutta High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Secretary Of State For India In Council vs Annada Mohan Roy And Ors. on 17 June, 1921

23. The Settlement Reports are, it is argued, not evidence, and reliance is placed upon the decision in Garuradhwoja Prasad v. Superundhwaja Prasad 23 A. 37 at pp. 48, 49: 10 M. L. J. 267 : 5 C. W. N. 33 : 27 I. A. 238 : 2 Bom. L. R. 831 : 7 Sar. P. C. J. 724 (P.C.). As regards Mr. Beveridge's history of the District of Bakarganj, it was not referred to in the lower Court, and its use here is objected to on this ground. The mere fact that the book was not referred to, might not be, of itself, a good objection. If, how ever, the book was used to establish the existence of fasts which the appellant had no opportunity of meeting and which he desired to rebut, the admission of the book now might involve a remand. Accordingly, the claim to refer to this history was not pressed. As regards the Settlement Report", it is to be observed that the appellants' map (AA) was prepared (according to the evidence) on reference to Mr. Jack's Calendar. The case to which reference has been made 'does not support the exclusion of the reports here referred to and we think that they are evidence. If evidence, the appellant desires to make use of them. As stated, the respondent does claim the support of other evidence, but even if he did not the question whether the map is sufficient must depend on the facts of the particular case. Here they are peculiar in that the whole case is bound up in the decision of the eastern boundary of the estate and that eastern boundary is a river the position of which was one of the purposes of Rennell's map to locate.
Calcutta High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ananto Mohini vs Khalli Sahu And Ors. on 8 September, 1953

It appears from that decision that the Privy Council have accepted as a good principle of law the observations of the High Court in this connection. It was a case in which there was a vast impartible property to which one Tikaithi Durga Kumari succeeded as the mother-heir of her son in 1863. Durga Kumari borrowed between the years 1870 to 1871 a sum exceeding one lakh and sixty thousand rupees and alienated most substantial portion of the estate, the remaining property being comparatively of insignificant value. She died on 15-5-1907. In the year 1908, the person brought a suit for setting aside those alienations, on the ground that the alienations not being for legal necessity, cannot bind the reversion. It was found in that case that no doubt there was litigation and money must have been spent over it; but at the same time the annual income of the estate was of a considerable amount.
Orissa High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Sahdeo Narain Deo And Ors. vs Kusum Kumari on 26 March, 1918

His previous deposition Exhibit 12-A was not, however, put to Chandi Prasad, and it is quite clear from the nature of the case, which is reported as Ravaneshwar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh 12 Ind. Cas. 931 : 38 C. 721, that it was not necessary for Chandi Prasad for the purpose of that case to go further back than Mit Narain. There is nothing in his deposition to show that he did not know the genealogy prior to Mit Narain. A large number of the defence witnesses were cross-examined about this adoption, Nos. 47, 56, 57, 63, 71, 72, 75 to 78 and 79. Two of these are related, or connected, with Chakai, viz., Nos. 78 and 79. They all support the factum of the adoption and there is no evidence on the other side. We concur, therefore, with the Subordinate Judge in holding that this adoption has been proved.
Patna High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 4 - Full Document
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