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Documents citing Ganga Dutt Murarka vs Kartik Chandra Das And Others on 10 February, 1961

M. Muthu (Died) And Four Others vs Arulmigu Sundareswararswamy ... on 12 January, 2001

The High Court relying on the decision in Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das, , held that no case was made out for new tenancy for holding over under Section 116 of the Act, as the appellant obtained status of removability under the Act and there was no contractual tenancy. The Apex Court while considering the abovesaid facts on the basis of scope of Section 116 of the Act, has held as follows:-
Madras High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Bhawanji Lakhamhi & Ors vs Himatlal Jamnadas Dani & Ors on 14 December, 1971

Before the High Court, the main contention of the appellants was that, since a fresh tenancy by holding over was created by the acceptance of rent by the lessors after the determination of the lease by efflux of time, the appellants were entitled to six months' notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy, as the lease originally granted was for a manufacturing purpose, and therefore, the lease created by the holding over was also for same purpose. The High Court was of (the opinion that in view of the decision of this Court in Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das(l) no case was made out for new tenancy by holding over under section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act as the appel- lants had obtained the status of irremovability under the Act, and as there was no contractual tenancy, the tenants were not entitled to any notice. The Court also held that the lease which was granted for erecting a saw mill was not a lease for manufacturing purpose.
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 126 - K K Mathew - Full Document

Daya Singh vs Bhagwan Singh And Sons And Ors. on 29 April, 1976

This decision referred to an authority of the supreme Court in Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das, where it was observed that upon the determination of the lease, it is the duty of the lessee to deliver up possession and if he continues in possession the landlord has a right to eject him forthwith and if he does not and there is neither assent or dessent on his part for continuance of occupation of such person, the later becomes a tenant on sufferance who has no lawful title to the land but holds it merely through the laches of the landlord.
Delhi High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

Kshetriya Sri Gandhi Ashram And Another vs Ajay Kumar And Others on 27 September, 2019

" Learned counsel for the appellants argued that whenever rent is accepted by a landlord from a tenant whose tenancy has been determined, but who continues in possession, a tenancy by holding over is created. The argument was that the assent of the lessor alone and not that of the lessee was material for the purposes of Section 116. We are not inclined to accept this contention. We have already shown that the basis of the, section is a bilateral contract between the erstwhile landlord and the erstwhile tenant If the tenant has the statutory right to remain in possession, and if he pays the rent, that will not normally be referable to an offer for his continuing in possession which can be converted into a contract by acceptance thereof by the landlord. We do not say that the operation of Section 116 is always excluded whatever might be the circumstances under which the tenant pays the rent and the landlord accepts it. We have earlier referred to the observations of this Court in Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das regarding some of the circumstances in which a fresh contract of tenancy may be inferred. We have already held the whole basis of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is that, in case of normal tenancy, a landlord is entitled, where he does not accept the rent after the notice to quit, to file a suit in ejectment and obtain a decree for possession, and so his acceptance of rent is an unequivocal act referable only to his desire to assent to the tenant continuing in possession. That is not so where Rent Act exists; and if the tenant says that landlord accepted the rent not as statutory tenant but only as legal rent indicating his assent to the tenant's continuing in possession, it is for the tenant to establish it. No attempt has been made to establish it in this case and there is no evidence, apart from the acceptance of the rent by the landlord, to indicate even remotely that he desired the appellants to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy. Besides, as we have already indicated, the animus of the tenant in tendering the rent is also material. If he tenders the rent as the rent payable under the statutory tenancy, the landlord cannot, by accepting it as rent, create a tenancy by holding over. In such a case the parties would not be id idem and there will be no consensus.
Allahabad High Court Cites 41 - Cited by 0 - S P Kesarwani - Full Document

Popular Estate Management Ltd vs Gunjan Paints Ltd on 20 April, 2022

This Court declined the prayer to reconsider Ganga Dutt Murarka's case (supra) and held that acceptance by landlord from the tenant, after the contractual tenancy had expired, of amounts equivalent to rent or amounts which was fixed as standard rent did not amount to acceptance of rent from a lessee within the meaning of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. The present is not a case of acceptance of amounts equivalent to rent or amounts fixed as standard rent but acceptance of increased rent. It was also obsered that (SCC p. 394, para 13) "We do not say that the operation of Section 116 is always excluded whatever be the circumstances under which the tenant pays the rent and the landlord accepts it."
Gujarat High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 0 - A G Uraizee - Full Document

Padam Chand Garg vs Atar Singh Rikshawala on 20 August, 1971

6. The general observations made in the above case lay down that the nature of the possession of a tenant subsequent to the date of determination will depend upon the facts of each case. The nature of the possession of the tenant in the aforesaid case was that of a statutory tenant and what their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down was that while the tenancy stood determined, the tenant could not be ejected on account of the protection granted to him under the statute of the State.
Allahabad High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Deep Chand vs Babu Ram on 21 May, 1976

In Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das, (supra) the court considered the position of a statutory tenant who was granted protection from eviction by the provisions of some statutory law. In the case of a statutory tenant of this character mere acceptance of amount equivalent to rent by a landlord from the tenant in possession after expiry of the lease cannot be regarded as evidence of creation of a new tenancy by holding over because such a landlord has no option but to accept the rent because he knows that the tenant has acquired a statutory tenancy and has a right to continue in possession until evicted in accordance with the condition of tenancy. These observations, however, are inapplicable to the present case, firstly because the status of the appellant is not that of a statutory tenant. The suit out of which the present appeal arises was filed at a time when the provisions of U. P. Act III of 1947 did not apply to this building and even though the provisions of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 were extended to the Notified Area in which the disputed shop lies, no protection against the eviction was extended or enured to the appellant except to the limited extent provided by Sections 39 and 40 of the Act. In other words by the force of Sections 39 and 40 of the Act the tenant could save himself from eviction only if he made deposit of amounts required by Section 39 within time laid down under that provision. If he fails to make deposits within such time, then he is not protected from eviction. The result, therefore, clearly is that the appellant does not become statutory tenant because from the fact that the provisions of the Act are exended to the Notified Area in question, his rights and liabilities must be governed by the law prevailing at the time of institution of the suit out of which this appeal arises.
Allahabad High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

M/S. Luxmi Pharmaceutical Works vs Sri Rajat Barua & Ors on 11 March, 2020

In support of his contention the learned Advocate for the respondent refers to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ganga Dutta Murarka vs. Kartik Chandra Das & Ors. reported in AIR 1978 SC 1518. In the said report, it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that where a contractual tenancy to which the rent control legislation applied, had expired by efflux of time or by determination of notice to quit and the tenant continued in possession of the premises, acceptance of rent from the tenant by the landlord after the expiration or determination of the contractual tenancy will not afford ground for holding that the landlord had assented to a new contractual tenancy. According to the learned Advocate for the respondent, Exhibit-9 speaks of arrear rent and rental dues, it does not speak of any subsequent or future rent. In fact, it was an acceptance of mesne profit and question of creation of new tenancy does not arise in favour of the appellant or Pankaj Sur, the proprietor of the appellant concern.
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side) Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - B Chaudhuri - Full Document

Prabhakar S/O Govindrao Hambarde And ... vs Shriram Sansthan, Takarkheda Sambhu ... on 9 August, 2019

Similar view has been taken in Ganga Dutt Murarka (supra). Though the learned counsel for the petitioners sought to refer to the provisions of Sections 6 and 8 of the said Act, in absence of any such plea with regard to creation of fresh tenancy having not been raised, that stand cannot be accepted. On that count no ::: Uploaded on - 28/08/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2020 13:46:00 ::: 40-A-J-WP-6363-18 9/9 notice of termination of tenancy was required to be issued to the legal heirs and they were liable to be evicted under Section 120 of the said Act by following the summary procedure.
Bombay High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - A S Chandurkar - Full Document
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