For the foregoing reasons the Division Bench in Tulsidas Khemji's case did not really consider what activities would constitute works concerning a major port.
(15) In Tulsidas Khimji v. Jeejeebhoy the" Bombay High Court had to consider if the different branches or departments of a company were different industrial establishments or one establishment so that the seniority of the clerks working in each of them was to be treated separately for each department or in common for all the departments. The following tests were suggested by their Lordships for determinging title question. Firstly, whether the recruitment of the clerks of the lour different departments was made as an integrated class or was the recruitment made on the basis of a category of clerks belonging to each department as a class separately. Are the four departments functionally integrated or by reason of the conditions of the transferability or seniority among the clerical cadre, can the four departments be treated as forming a single integrated establishment? It was found that the recruitment for each department was made separately and was governed by the requirements of that department alone, the recruitment was not made on the basis that all the recruited clerks belonged to one single category of clerks belonging to the four departments. Though there was a common head-office in charge of all the different departments, this fact did not institute the clerks employed in the different departments into a single category for the whole of the business of the four departments taken to gether. For, each department had its own separate clerical staff. It the recruitment of the clerks was depaitment wise then their seniority also was department wise and there was no transferability as a rule excepting stray cases of clerks between different departments Each department was, therefore.held to constitute a separate industrial establishment for the purpose of section 25-G. In the present case interchangeability or transferability obtains only among the Grade B typists inter se, but not between Grade B typists and Grade A typists. It may be said, therefore, that it is only the Grade B typists inter se who are functionally integrated and formed one category of workmen while Grade A typists formed a separate category of workmen.
5. The difficulty in the way of granting the relief sought on this Chamber Summons lies in the very nature and form of a petition for the grant of probate as well as of the affidavit in support of the caveat. Rule 710 advisedly does not say that the petition for a testamentary grant is to be regarded as a plaint, or that the affidavit filed in support of the caveat is to be regarded as a written statement, though it does in terms, lay down that the "petitioner shall be the plaintiff and the caveater shall be the defendant." It has been laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in this case of Tulsidas Khimji v. Jeejeebhoy that a petition is not a plaint and I am bound by that view in preference to the view expressed by Mody J. sitting as a single Judge in the case of Consolidated Foods Corpn. v. Brandon & Co. . Mr. Mehta has drawn my attention to the affidavit filed in support of the caveat in the present case. It no doubt contains denials of statements made in several of the paragraphs of the petition for probate but in my opinion, there can be no doubt that such an affidavit is not intended in be an affidavit in reply to the petition. It is, as its very liable signifies an affidavit which is intended to support the caveat and in such an affidavit it is not really necessary to deny the statements in the petition in the manner in which a written statement denies the averments in a plaint. In that respect Rule 708 affords very valuable guidance in so far as it lays down in the clearest possible terms what an affidavit in support of the caveat should contain. The said Rule states that such affidavit must state the right and interest of the caveator and "the grounds of the objections to the application." In stating the interest of the caveator and the ground so objection to the application for probate it would not be necessary to have denials or the nature of denials in a written statement, nor would it be necessary to set out in any detail the prospective case of the caveator. As Mr. Daji has rightly pointed out, once a caveat as well as an affidavit in support of the caveat are filed, it is for the petitioner-plaintiff to make out a case which would satisfy the conscience of the Court, and the inquiry in such a testamentary suit would, therefore, not be strictly limited to the grounds of the objections raised by the caveator. If one bears in mind the very nature of the affidavit in support of the caveat as indicated by me above, it would be quite clear that there would be no scope for invoking the machinery by way of further and better particulars in regard to such an affidavit. It is precisely in order to meet such a situation that the concluding sentence of R. 710 places a limitation in so far as it provides that the procedure in a testamentary suit is "as nearly as may be" to be in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In the case of Tulsidas Khimji v. Jeejeebhoy, reported in (1961) Vol. I, L.L.J. page 42, the Division Bench of this Court has laid down that the activity of the firm carrying business of clearing and shipping was concerning a Major Port and, therefore, the Central Government was the appropriate Government.
In Tulsidas Khimji's case (2)
the question was whether four Departments of a business
establishment in the city of Bombay were distinct industrial
establishments within s. 25G and it was held that as there
was no functional integrality between them, they should be
held to be different establishments, notwithstanding they
were located in the same place. And in this cage the
branches are located in different places and there is also a
lack of functional integrality. We are of opinion that each
branch is a separate industrial establishment.
On this finding it follows that the dispute of the
respondents is an industrial dispute as defined in s. 2(k)
as that has been raised by the majority of the workmen of
the Ambals branch, which is an industrial establishment.
But as the establishment has been closed and the closure it-
self is not impugned as bad on the ground that it
(1) [1960] 1. S.C.R. 703.
Now it is not disputed that the dispute between the company and the worker is an industrial dispute. The only question therefore is whether it is an industrial dispute concerning the major port. The
word "concerning" according to the WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY means "relating to, regarding, respecting about - an affair that concerns one ......." It is, therefore a word of wide
amplitude and prima-facie, any industrial dispute affecting or connected with the major port would fall within the said definition. This is the interpretation contended on behalf of the company. The
learned counsel for the company put heavy reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Tulsidas Khimji v. Jeejeebhoy, reported in 1961-I-LLJ-42. In the said ruling it was
observed that so far as the activities of the godown department were concerned it was admitted that 25 per cent of the space in the godown was utilized for storing the goods for clearing and shipping. In view of all
these circumstances, it could not be said that the activities of the godown department had no relation to major port. On critical perusal of the said ruling, it is obvious that the ratio laid down in the said ruling aptly fits to the
present case. It was urged on behalf of the worker that he was one of the five workers who were assigned the office work at the office in Bombay and had absolutely no concern with the business activities of the company relating to the major port. However, in my considered view, it cannot
lie in the mouth of the petitioner that he had no concern with the business activities of the company in relation with the Mumbai Port Trust, because the very establishment had come into being for the business as manning agent as well as ship management and consultancy and allied services since the year 1981 and, therefore, the work of the employee had definitely attracted nexus with the activity of the business activity of the company which had direct bearing with the activities of the major port. In my view, therefore, enacting Section 2(a) the intention of the Legislature appears to make the Central Government the appropriate ] Government in relation to industrial dispute concerning works in major ports. In the absence of any elaboration in the Industrial Disputes Act, the Central Government would be an appropriate Government for our purpose when the dispute is between the management and the worker employed in works considered as incidental to or connected with operations in the major port.
(iii) A single concern of a single proprietor may have different departments. Each department may constitute a separate industrial establishment for the purpose of Section 25-G, unless functional integrality has been found to exist between the different departments. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Firm Tulsidas Khimji v. Jeejeebhoy , dealt with this question and observed that the different departments of the business firm in that case could not be regarded as constituting a single industrial establishment for the purpose of Section 25-G, but were distinct and complete units carrying on different lines of business and there was no functional integrality existing between them and that there was no unity of employment and conditions of service between the different departments.