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S.V.R.B.K.R. Gopalan vs The Estates Abolition Tribunal And Anr. on 13 October, 1959

The decision was rendered prior to the amendment of the Madras Estates Land Act in 1934, which introduced Section 20-A. That the principle of the cases which we have cited above would hold good even after the amendment is made clear by the the decision in Ramaswami Gounder v. Ramaswami Gounder (1942) 2 M.L.J. 595 : I.L.R. (1943) Mad. 331. It was held in the latter case, that, where the proprietary rights of the landholders of an estate in the tank-beds were unaffected by custom, the ryots of the village would have no interest in the land apart from the right to use the water therein for the purpose of cultivating their holdings, and that the landholder would be entitled to cultivate such parts of the bed of the tank as become exposed when the water receded in the dry season, provided that the cultivation did not prevent the water spreading when the rains came. The result of the decision is that it would be open to the proprietor to cultivate the tank-bed in cases where there was no customary right in the ryots prohibiting such cultivation, and that the right of the latter was only a right to secure the proper maintenance on the part of the landholder of the tanks so as to afford the accustomed supply of water for their holding. Therefore, when at the date of commencement of the Estates Land Act an irrigation tank in the estate existed, the tank-bed would continue as a tank-bed thereafter, notwithstanding the cultivation thereof by the landholder. Such cultivation is allowed by reason of the right of the proprietor over the property (without prejudice to the rights if any of the ryots), and not because that the land gets converted into a ryoti or private land thereby. The existence of a proprietary right in the tank, which enabled the landholder to cultivate tank-bed lands, is by itself of no importance for the purpose of determining the scope of the Statutory rights which will be claimed under Section 13 of Act XXVI of 1948. Prior to 1934 what was a tank-bed on the date Act I of 1908 came into force continued as a tank-bed land. Section 20-A of the Estates Land Act, which was introduced into the main Act by Madras Act VIII of 1935, provided for the conversion of the tank-bed among other communal lands into ryoti lands. That section, so far as it is necessary for the present case, runs:
Madras High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

A.M. Shamsudeen And Ors. vs The Dist. Judge And Ors. on 5 March, 1990

The test to be applied has been considered fully in a recent decision, Ramaswami Goundan v. Muthu Velappa Gounder 1923 (44) M.L.J. 1 which was followed in Venkatarama Aiyar v. Janab v. Hamid Sultan Maracayar 1923 (44) M.L.J. 161 and there is no necessity to add anything to that statement of the law, except that no distinction can be drawn between the interpretation of an Act, which was then in question and that of the scheme before us. There is accordingly first the consideration that a the procedure to be followed in the Court's exercise of the power conferred by the Scheme is not specified therein, the applicability of its ordinary judicial procedure must be presumed and also, as follows from National Telephone Company Ltd. v. Postmaster General 1913 A.C. 546 of the law relating to appeals from its ordinary decisions....
Madras High Court Cites 38 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

T.V.K. Kamaraja Pandiya Naicker vs The Secretary Of State For India In ... on 20 December, 1934

41 : 23 M.L.J. 591 and Ramaswami Goundan v. Muthu Velappa Gounder (1922) I.L.R. 46 Mad. 536 : 44 M.L.J. 1 a statute may-attach finality to particular orders, in the sense of precluding further appeal to the statutory authorities; whether it was intended to go further and oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts as well, will depend not upon words of that kind but upon the general scheme of the particular legislation. In the present case Section 228 undoubtedly contemplates the existence of a remedy in the Civil Court and there is no reason why such remedy should be restricted to cases not falling under Section 86.
Madras High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

T.V.K. Kamaraja Pandiya Naicker vs Secretary Of State on 20 December, 1934

1119 : 23 M.L.J. 531 : 12 M L T 469 : (1912) M W N 1162 and Ramaswami Goundan v. Muthu Velappa Gounder 46 M 536 : 71 Ind. Cas. 1039 : A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 192 : 44 M.L.J. 1 : 16 L W 648 : (1923) M W N 133 a statute may attach finality to particular orders, in the sense of precluding further appeal to the statutory authorities; whether it was intended to go further and oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts as well, will depend not upon words of that kind but upon the general scheme of the particular legislation. In the present case Section 228 undoubtedly contemplates the existence of a remedy in the Civil Court and there is no reason why such remedy should be restricted to cases not falling under Section 86.
Madras High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 17 - Full Document

V.P. Krishnan vs Payankalath Narayanan Nayar on 21 January, 1938

2. A preliminary objection has been taken by Mr. Govinda Menon that this order is not liable to be revised under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, on the ground that no question of jurisdiction is involved in the case. It seems to us that the lower Court acted illegally in declining to exercise its jurisdiction by refusing to further proceed with the execution and order sale in pursuance of the attachment. Both the lower Courts fell into error in thinking that by virtue of Section 46 once the registration of the tarwad is effected, the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the execution. The petitioner was not questioning the finality of the order of registration. The question is whether in spite of registration the creditor in pursuance of the attachment is not entitled to bring the property to sale. Where a Court taking a wrong view of the law assumes jurisdiction or declines to exercise jurisdiction, it will be a matter for interference under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. Vide Ramaswami Goundan v. Muthu Velappa Gounder (1922) 44 M.L.J. 1 : I.L.R. 46 Mad. 536 .
Madras High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

The Pazhaverkadu Venkataswamy vs S.Paul (Died) on 14 June, 2024

“The test to be applied has been considered fully in a recent decision, Ramaswami Goundan v. Muthu Velappa Goundan, which was followed in Venkatarama Iyer v. Janab V. Hamid Sultan Maracayar, and there is no necessity to add anything to that statement of the law, except that no distinction can be drawn between the interpretation of an Act, which was then in question and that of the scheme before us. There is accordingly first the consideration that, as the procedure, to be followed in the Court's exercise of the power conferred by the scheme, is not specified therein, the applicability both of its ordinary and judicial procedure must be presumed and also, as follows from National Telephone Co., Ltd., v. Post-Master- General, of the law relating to appeals from its ordinary decisions.
Madras High Court Cites 38 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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