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Documents citing Niharendu Dutt Majumdar And Ors. vs Emperor on 10 July, 1939

Binod Rao vs Minocher Rustom Masani on 10 February, 1976

These guidelines must be so interpreted as to refer not to every protest or disapproval but only to such a protest or disapproval as would affect the internal security or the public safety or the maintenance of public order. The protest and disapproval contained in the said resolution is an exercise of the right of dissent. The law recognizes the right of dissent within permissible limits. This right has been judicially recognized by the Federal Court in Niharendv, Butt Majumdar v. The King Emperor, at pp. 48-51; by the Supreme Court in Kedw Naih Singh v. State of Bihar, at pp. 805-8; and by Division Bench judgments of our High Court in Anmt Janardhm v. M.A. Deshmuhh, at p. 273; and in JV.P. Nathwawi v. Commissioner of Police. It is also not the policy of the Government to stifle all dissent. The Government's policy in this behalf is shown by the opening paragraphs of the said guidelines dated June 26, 1975 and August 5, 1975 issued to the Press. It is also indicated by the fact that under the Prevention of Publication of Objectionable Matter Ordinance, 1975, which prohibits the publication of "any objectionable matter" as defined by Section 3 of that Ordinance, by Explanation I to the said Section 3 "comments expressing disapprobation or criticism of any law or of any policy or administrative action of the Government with a view to obtain its alteration or redress by lawful means" are not to be deemed to be objectionable. The expression "colourable exercise" is one well understood in law. It really means purported exercise.
Bombay High Court Cites 89 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Kedar Nath Singh vs State Of Bihar on 20 January, 1962

He referred to the judgment of the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar's case (2) 802 and to the judgment of the Privy Council to the contrary in King Emperor v. Sada Shiv Narayan (1). After having pointed out the divergency of opinion between the Federal Court of India and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the learned Judge made the following observations in order to explaim why the term "sedition" was not specifically mentioned in Art. 19(2) of the Constitution:
Supreme Court of India Cites 33 - Cited by 194 - B P Sinha - Full Document

Urdu Daily Newspaper "Pratap" vs The Crown on 5 April, 1949

25. Before we conclude, we desire to state that these proceedings clearly bring home to as that the official mind still moves in old groove of suspicion and distrust. The change in the situation in the country and the new atop do not appear in the least to have brought about any change in the outlook of the executive and the old vain susceptibilities still linger in their mind. Oar newly won freedom has not broadened their vision and they are still prone to stifle legitimate comments and oriticisms. The outpourings of aggrieved persons who pray for redress instead of being appeased are sought to be smothered with the handy weapon of the law of sedition. We do feel that the law of sedition in our country should no longer be left in the nebulous state in which it is by reason of the judicial deoisiona based on the true but nevertheless narrow prinoiple of construction. It is desirable that the safeguards let in by the Federal Court in its judgment in Niharendu Butt Mujumdar's case A. I. R. (29) 1942 P. 0. 22 : 43 Or. L. J. G04 should be incorporated in oar law of sedition and our Press Act, for these very proceedings clearly demonstrate, to our mind, that people still require protection against the EJxeoutive Government even though it is our National Government.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - S R Das - Full Document

In Re: C.V. Rajagopalachari vs Unknown on 13 July, 1949

4. After deep consideration, I agree with the learned Crown Prosecutor's view that the intention or motive in publishing the matters in such pamphlets is immaterial in the case of such prosecutions under Section 18, provided the matter is published intentionally and tends directly or indirectly to bring into hatred or contempt the Government of the day. Sedition is a major offence, and has to be proved strictly; and there are well known decisions like Niharendu Dutt v. Emperor, 1942 P. L. J. 47 : (A. I. R. (29) 1942 F. C. 22), governing the question as to what constitutes "sedition," and I may freely admit that, if this were a prosecution for sedition, the evidence on record may be inadequate to convict the appellant. But the matter before me now is different. In my opinion, in prosecutions under Section 18, Press (Emergency Powers) Act, the prosecution need only prove that a document other than a newspaper has been intentionally made and published and that it contains either published news or comments on published news or any matter described in Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act without obtaining the necessary permission of the Magistrate under Section 16. Sub-section (1) (d) of Section 4 does not mention anything about the intention or motive in publishing such words etc., but simply says that the document in question should contain words, signs or visible representations which tend directly or indirectly to bring into hatred or contempt the government established by law, etc. In other words, it is the effect of the contents of the document, the objective aspect, that is covered by Section 4 (1) (d) and not the intention or motive or the subjective aspect, or the mens rea in uttering or publishing those words, which would be material for a prosecution for sedition under Section 121-A, Penal Code. It is significant that Section 4 (1) (d) omits all the provisos found in Section 124A.
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union vs Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply ... on 8 December, 1955

A similar view was also, we think, taken by the Federal Court in appeals to it under Section 205, Government of India Act, 1935. Under that section an appeal lay to the Federal Court if the High Court certified that the case involved a substantial question of law relating, inter alia, to the interpretation of the Act, and in -- 'Niharendu Dutt v. Emperor', 1942 FC 22 (AIR V 29) (B) the Court held that once a certificate had been given by the High Court the appellant was entitled with the leave of the Court to raise any point in his own defence.
Allahabad High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Emperor vs Afaq Husain Jauhar on 20 November, 1940

If we apply the test laid down by the learned Judges in those two Bombay cases, it would be very difficult to say where a place ends and an area begins. It is obvious that a line would have to be drawn somewhere and for my part I shall find it very difficult to draw such aline. Nor is the matter of much practical importance: for example, if an area may be said to contain 150 places, the Magistrate could pass 150 orders in identical terms and the result would be exactly the same. In our opinion, the order is a definite order and it does not contravene the provisions of Section 144.
Allahabad High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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