29. Only a person, who is considered / construed to be Lawful / legal tenant, can deal with the concerned property. After the expiry of Lease, which is admitted in the present case and when there is no tenancy agreement or an existing tenancy between the parties and more particularly, even the disposal of the civil suit in one way or other, may not heighten the case of the Appellants, for the simple reason it is not a mandatory one for the grant of licence and before that there is no vested right on the part of the concerned to take the consent of the Landlord. Looking at from any point of view and also this Court by looking into the ingredients of Rule 150 of Petroleum Rules and also taking note of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court between Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and Another V. N.R.Vairamani and Another reported in (2004) 8 Supreme Court Cases 579 at Special Page 586, cited on behalf of the Appellants comes to an irresistible conclusion that it is not for the Appellants / Petitioners to approach the Writ Court and file the present Writ Appeal because of the reason that the Writ Court is not the proper forum of adjudication of disputed factual and legal questions / controversies concerning to parties. In any event, in the instant case, the Appellate as well as the Original Authorities had rejected the claim of the Appellants / Writ Petitioners and to grant a licence, undoubtedly, the consent of concerned landlord is very much essential and the same cannot be dispensed in any manner. Looking at from any angle, the view taken by the Learned Single Judge in dismissing the Writ Petition is free from any legal flaw. Resultantly, the Writ Appeal fails.
11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of
difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing
reliance on a decision is not proper. This extract is taken from Bharat Petroleum
Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani, (2004) 8 SCC 579 at page 585
33. The learned Judge while deciding the said judgment had also taken note of the judgment in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. N.R.Vairamani reported in (2004) 8 Supreme Court Cases 579 and distinguished the said judgment and it is the sheet anchor for the respondents 1 and 2 to sustain their claim as to the availability of alternative remedy to the petitioners herein in the form of a suit for eviction/ejectment.
It is well settled that words in a judgement should not be treated as
if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new
circumstances.' One must not construe a judgment as if it were an Act of
Parliament. (Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani, (2004) 8
SCC 579). Courts should not place reliance on decisions without
discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of
the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are
neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a Statute, and
that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the
context in which they appear to have been stated. To interpret words,
phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges
to embark into a lengthy discussion, but the discussion is meant to explain
and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret
judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes. (London Graving Dock Co.
48. This Court in Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani, (2004) 8
SCC 579, emphasized that the Courts should not
place reliance on decisions without discussing as
to how the factual situation fits in with the fact
situation of the decision on which the reliance is
placed. It was further observed that the judgments
of Courts are not to be construed as statutes and
the observations must be read in the context in
which they appear to have been stated. The Court
went on to say that circumstantial applicability,
one additional or different fact may make a work
of difference between conclusions in two cases."
75.Therefore, to ask the 1st respondent to vacate the property
without giving the 1st respondent any remedy under the provisions
of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 would amount to
bye passing the law and depriving the 1st respondent of the legal
remedy available to it as per the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Bharat petroleum Corporation Ltd versus
N.R.Vairamani (2004) 8 SCC 579.