32. Keeping in view the decision of the Apex Court of India in K. Nandakumar's case 1996 ACJ 555 (SC); as also the fact that there was no provision like Section 163-A of the Act in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, none of the aforesaid decisions has any relevance in the context of present appeal.
12. In the matter of interpretation of Section 92A of the old Act, various High Courts have taken contrary views. Madras High Court in K. Nandakumar v. Managing Director, Thanthai Periyar Transport Corporation Ltd.. 1992 Acc CJ 1095 (Mad) was dealing with a case where a bus and a motor cycle collided and due to negligence on the part of the motor cyclist, he sustained injuries. Madras High Court took the view that a person can make a claim for compensation against another only when the other person is at fault and not when he alone is at fault.
With respect, I cannot agree with the said decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which in my view is contrary to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nandakumar's case, supra,
As already stated I am in respectful agreement with the decision of my brother Justice Venkataraman in Tarabai's case, supra, his Lordship has interpreted Section 140 in the spirit in which the same has been enacted and it has to be interpreted as such to ensure that the protection given by the provision is not nullified by the backward looking interpretation canvassed by the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company which will only serve to defeat the provision rather than to fulfill its aim and such an interpretation will nullify the benevolent provision by reading it with a non-benevolent eye and with a mind not tuned to the purpose and philosophy of the legislation without being informed of the true goals sought to be achieved. What the legislature has given, the Court cannot deprive of, by way of an exercise in interpretation. Even if two views are possible, the view which renders the provision plausible is to be accepted and when the option is between opting for a view, the view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependents on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by him by way of business activity there is hardly any choice.
That view was successfully assailed in appeal before the Supreme Court in K. Nandakumar v. Managing Director, Thanthai Periyar Trans. Corporation Ltd., . The court held that the provisions of subsection (4) of Section 92-A made it clear that payment of compensation on no fault basis could not be rejected even if the person making claim was himself responsible for such death or permanent disablement. Sub-section (4) of Section 92-A reads as under:
In K. Nandakumar v. Managing Director, Thanthai Periyar Transport Corporation Ltd. , a Division Bench of the Madras High Court took the view that even for purposes of Section 92A of the old Act it was necessary for the claimant to prove that he was not in any manner responsible for the accident. In cases where the injured or dead was himself responsible for the accident, payment of compensation on 'no fault basis' was not permissible even under the provisions of Section 92A of the old Act. The Court in the process dissented from the contrary view taken by the other Courts in the country including High Courts of Orissa, Bombay, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh.
25. From what has been discussed above, the observations made in Nandakumar (supra), by the Apex Court and the law laid down therein, it becomes abundantly clear that the decision of the Apex Court in Minu B. Merita (supra), wherein the Apex Court had held that in the absence of proof of fault on the part of the owner or the driver of the vehicle, no claim for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, could be entertained, was rendered before Section 92A was introduced into the statute and that after the introduction of Section 92A, particularly, in view of what Sub-section (4) of Section 92A stated, a claim under Section 92A, on the principle of no-fault, could be made even by a person, whose own wrongful act, neglect or default, had formed the cause of the accident. In short, a claim for compensation under Section 92 A was maintainable as long as the victim is shown to have suffered death or permanent disablement and it was immaterial, in such a case, whether it was the victim's own wrongful act, neglect or default, which had caused the said accident. To put it differently, a claim for compensation, on the basis of no-fault under Section 92A, was maintainable even if the victim had suffered death or permanent disablement on account of his own wrongful act, neglect or default.
30. For what has been discussed above, the observations made in Nandakumar (supra) by the Apex Court and the law laid down therein, it becomes abundantly clear that the decision of the Apex Court in Minu B. Mehta (supra), wherein the Apex Court had held that in the absence of proof of fault on the part of the owner or the driver of the vehicle, no claim for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, could be entertained, was rendered before Section 92A was introduced into the statute and that after the introduction of Section 92A, particularly, in view of what Sub-section (4) of Section 92A stated, a claim under Section 92A, on the principle of no-fault, could be made even by a person, whose own wrongful act, neglect or default, had formed the cause of the accident. In short, a claim for compensation under Section 92A was maintainable as long as the victim is shown to have suffered death or permanent disablement and it was immaterial, in such a case, whether it was the victim's own wrongful act, neglect or default, which had caused the said accident. To put it differently, a claim for compensation, on the basis of no-fault under Section 92-A, was maintainable even if the victim had suffered death or permanent disablement on account of his own wrongful, act, neglect or default.