67. The Appellate Court referred to the judgement rendered in Sunil Poddar Vs. Union Bank of India reported in 2008 (2) SCC 326, and its para 23 as aforesaid.
In the case
of Sunil Poddar and Ors. Vs. Union Bank of India (supra),
Hon'ble Supreme Court has also considered the provision of Rule
13 of Order IX of CPC and held that the legal position under the
amended code is not whether the defendant was actually served
with summons in accordance with the procedure laid down and in
manner prescribed in Order V of Code but,
31. The judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Sunil
Poddar & Ors. vs. Union Bank of India¸ (supra) is clearly
distinguishable from the present case. The said case involved a matter
in which the defendants were originally served with the summons in the
suit and no notice was served on them after the suit was transferred to
the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The ratio of the said judgment is not
attracted in the present case, where no summons were served on
defendant No.3 at all. Moreover, the extracted parts of the judgment
needs to be read in its context, which relates to irregularity in service
and not the case of no service of summons at all.
d. The judgement of the Supreme Court in Sunil Poddar
and Ors. vs. Union Bank of India (supra), relied upon by the
learned counsel for the respondent would not be applicable to
the facts of the present case inasmuch as the decision did not
deal with the amended provisions of the CPC as amended by
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. That apart, in the present
case, neither any order to issue summons nor any summons
were at all issued by the Trial Court itself.
14. The legal propositions as per amended code of CPC has
been discussed in a case titled as Sunil Poddar Vs. Union Bank of
India, cited as AIR 2008 SC 1006, wherein it was observed that,
M. No. : 22/2012 M/s ICICI Bank Ltd. Vs. Bhim Singh Page No. 10 11
"The legal position under the amended code is not
whether the defendant was actually served with the
summons in accordance with the procedure laid down
and in the manner prescribed in Order V of the Code,
but whether
I have given due consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel. Order 9 Rule
13 of CPC stipulates invocation of the jurisdiction of a court on the ground that no summons
were duly served on the defendant and for any other sufficient cause for which the defendant
could not remain present at the time of hearing of the suit. In the present case in hand, the
contention of the petitioner is that the summons was served on a person other than the
petitioner and the same was not intimated to him on the ground that the relation between
the petitioner and his son Babul Hussain was strained because of dispute between the father
Page No.# 6/6
and the son. In order to support the contention of the said strained relation, Title Suit No.
20/2016 filed by the said Babul Hussain against the present petitioner was pressed by Ms.
Choudhury. However, the said submission cannot be accepted inasmuch as the learned court
below on verifying the records came to the conclusion that the petitioner entered appearance
and took time twice for filing written statement which were allowed and further there was
default on the part of the petitioner and as such the suit proceeded ex-parte. If we consider
the ratio as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision of Sunil Poddar and Others Vs.
Union Bank of India reported in (2008) 2 SCC 326,(supra) the defendant once entered
appearance before the court, the plea of non receipt of summons cannot be considered in an
application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC. The grounds for setting aside the ex-parte decree
are not at all sufficient causes. The learned court below rightly exercised its jurisdiction in
dismissing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC.
7. I have given anxious thoughts to the arguments advanced by both sides. These revisions are fixed by stating that the Rent Control Appellate Authority as well as the Rent Controller cum Execution Court have miserably failed to follow the principles of law and in appreciation of facts, in their orders and therefore, this Court has to interfere in the said orders and to set them aside. According to the submissions of the petitioner, the service of notice against the respondent in the R.C.O.P.No.233 of 2008 was correctly held as sufficient service since the notice sent through post to the said address of the respondent in Door No.21, Ramanujar Street, Old Washermenpet, Chennai-21, was returned with an endorsement "intimation delivered" "not claimed" and the endorsement of Court notice through amin was to the effect that there was no proper information regarding the respondent and the petitioner did not identify the respondent and therefore, it could not be served and therefore returned. Similarly, the service of notice in execution proceedings was also addressed to the same address and the endorsement of bailiff would be that no such person and therefore, it was returned to Court and on that basis, publication and affixture were ordered for the hearing 21.07.2009 and after the performance of substituted service, an exparte order of delivery was ordered on 24.07.2009. It was argued by the petitioner's counsel that in the light of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court, the Courts need not set aside the exparte order passed against such persons. The judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2008) 2 CTC 686 in between Sunil Poddar and others Vs. Union Bank of India laid down as follows:-
23. Thus, in view of the law settled in case titled as Sunil
Poddar Vs. Union Bank of India, cited as AIR 2008 SC 1006, when
these two conditions are satisfied, an exparte decree cannot be
set aside as it is duly established on record that the
petitioners/defendants were duly served with the summons of
the suit and there was no irregularity in the service of the
M. No. : 19/2013 Titech Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Tirumula Tirupati Devasthanams 17/19
18
summons. Thus, the protection sought on the basis of
knowledge on 01072012 and seeking limitation of 30 days
from such date is not available as the period of limitation of 30
days from the date when the petitioners had knowledge of the
decree was available only in the circumstances where the
summons or notice was not duly served upon the
petitioners/defendants, in view of the provisions of Article 123 of
the Limitation Act. The petitioners' case is not that the summons
were not served upon them to seek protection of limitation from
the date of knowledge of the decree.