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Documents citing S. Cenniappa Mudaliar, Madurai vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras on 30 April, 1964

Jambukumar vs Uzhaikkuam Makkal Nala on 2 August, 2010

In Chenniappa Mudaliar V. C.I.T. Madras 1964 2 Mad LJ 157: (AIR 1965 Mad 62) a Full Bench of this Court has held, while dealing with a matter which arose under the Income-tax Act, that the dismissal of a case for default can in no sense amount to an adjudication on its merits quite unlike a case of ex parte decision, where there is an adjudication on the merits and that the former cannot operate as res judicata while the latter would. We are therefore unable to accept the contention of Thiru Kumuaraswami that the order in Exhibit B.7 would operate as res judicata to the suit instituted by the plaintiff."
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 0 - M Jaichandren - Full Document

Commissioner Of Income Tax vs N.Sasikala on 21 December, 2022

49. This Court in S.Senniappa Mudaliar Vs. The Government of Madras, (1965) ILR 2 Mad 397 applied Section 105(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and held that “a finding which affects only a _______________ https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page No. 23 of 33 T.C.A.No.739 of 2008 portion of the data on which the order of assessment is based, has to be viewed as interlocutory in character and the principles laid down in Maharajah Moheshur Singh v. The Bengal Government (1859) 7 M.I.A. 283, will apply”. It was further held that “an order in such circumstances though appealable under the statute, was interlocutory in character, forming only a stage in the process of making the final assessment.
Madras High Court Cites 39 - Cited by 0 - S Vaidyanathan - Full Document

N. Abdul Subhan Saheb & Sons vs Mysore Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, ... on 2 November, 1964

12. Our view in this regard finds support from a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in S. Chenniappa Mudaliar, Madurai v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras ([1964] 53 I.T.R. 323; (1964) 2 M.L.J. 157). Therein, their Lordships were considering the vires of rule 24 of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946, which provides for dismissal of appeal by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for default. Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the rule in question is ultra vires of section 33(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The aforementioned rule 24 is similar to the impugned regulation 8(2).
Karnataka High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 10 - K S Hegde - Full Document

Thiru K.A. Bari, Proprietor, Hotel ... vs The State Of Tamil Nadu, Represented By ... on 26 March, 1970

The learned Judges in that case followed the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in S. Chenniappa Mudaliar, Madurai v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1964) 2 M.L.J. 157 : (1964) 2 I.T.J. 148 : (1964) 53 I.T.R. 323, which, as already said, had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar . An unreported decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. No. 14.16 of 1965 is also to the same effect. In that case Regulation 9(1) of the Regulation framed by the Appellate Tribunal in exercise of the power conferred under Section 3(4) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act was held to be ultra vires of Section 21(4) of the said Act. There also there was a provision for setting aside the order for dismissal for default at the instance of the appellant on satisfying the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance.
Madras High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

The Commissioner, Hindu Religious And ... vs V. Krishnaswami And Anr. on 7 March, 1974

13. Thiru Kumaraswami would however contend that even if Ex. B-7 does not operate as res judicata it would nevertheless debar the plaintiff from instituting the present action by reason of the provisions contained in Order 9, Rule 9, Civil P.C. His contention is that inasmuch as the plaintiff failed to aropear before the Deputy Commissioner on the hearing day while the objector to the petition was present, the plaintiff, in view of the salutary principle of law laid down in Order 9, Rule 9, Civil P.C., is precluded from bringing a fresh action in respect of the same matter and that as long as the order passed under Ex. B-7 did not stand set aside the plaintiff will have no right to file a fresh action in respect of the same relief. Even with regard to this contention we are unable to agree with Thiru Kumaraswami. Though the Deputy Commissioner had dismissed the application of the plaintiff -- Ex. B-6, by his order Ex. B-7, the said order does not seem to have been acted upon at all. No steps had been taken by the Deputy Commissioner to wrest the management of the temple from the plaintiff and entrust it in the hands of persons appointed by the Board. Even the objector who would not consent to the plaintiff getting an order in his favour declaring him to be the hereditary trustee of the temple does not appear to have taken any action to enforce the order passed in Ex. B-7. From the records filed as exhibits in the case it is seen that the plaintiff has continued to function as the trustee of the temple and managed its affairs all along. As a matter of fact, the Board itself has called for contribution from the plaintiff in respect of the suit temple even subseauent to the order under Ex. B-7. This is manifested by the demand notice Ex. A-10 dated 17-5-1958, and the reminder notice Exhibit A-11 dated 6-8-1959. Over and above all these things it is seen that when the plaintiff came forward with his application O.A. 59 of 1960 before the Deputy Commissioner the Board did not take the stand-that by reason of the former order under Ex. B-7, rejecting the claim of the plaintiff to function as the hereditary trustee of the temple he was not entitled to seek a fresh declaration from the Deputy Commissioner. Even so, the Commissioner also in the appeal preferred before him did not consider the question as to whether the former decision against the plaintiff disentitled him from seeking for a similar relief in his favour. This defence viz., that Ex. B-7 stood in the way of the plaintiff seeking a fresh declaration in his favour was raised for the first time only when the first defendant filed his written statement in the suit filed by the plaintiff. Even as in the case of res Judicata a defence in respect of an action under Order 9, Rule 9, Civil P.C., is not an inexhorable or inflexible defence in the sense that such a defence can be invoked as an answer to a claim made by a Party in an action at any stage of the proceedings and that the invoking of such a defence cannot be trammelled by any other rule of law. Of necessity the application of such doctrines of defence must have relevancy to the conduct of parties and cannot be worked out in vacuum. Inasmuch as the Deputy Commissioner and the first defendant had failed to treat Ex. B-7, as a bar to the subsequent action instituted by the plaintiff, it must be held that they had waived such a defence and it they had so waived, it will not be open to them to raise that objection at a later stage, i.e.. when the plaintiff came forward with the suit.
Madras High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

L. Sundaram And Ravichandran vs Lakshmanan (Died), L. Sadagopal, ... on 31 October, 2002

In CHENNIAPPA MUDALIAR VS. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS a Full Bench of this Court has held, while dealing with a matter which arose under the Income-tax Act that, "the dismissal of a case for default can in no sense amount to an adjudication on its merits, quite unlike a case of ex parte decision, where there is an adjudication on merits and that the former cannot operate as res judicata, while the latter would."
Madras High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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