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Documents citing Bhuboni Sahu vs The King on 17 February, 1949

Convict vs The State Of Tripura on 31 March, 2026

Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in Section 30. The same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu case has been cited with approval."
Tripura High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 0 - T A Goud - Full Document

Adambhai Sulemanbhai Ajmeri vs State Of Gujarat on 16 May, 2014

In Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, 76 Ind App 147 at p.155: (AIR 1949 PC 257 at p.260) the Privy Council has expressed the same view. Sir John Beaumont who spoke for the Board, observed that, "a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of "evidence" contained in S. 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities. S. 30, however, provides that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence."
Supreme Court - Daily Orders Cites 115 - Cited by 0 - V G Gowda - Full Document

Shri Indrajit Deb And Ors. vs State Of Tripura on 16 January, 1995

In this regard Supreme Court relied upon as many as 10 previous Superme Court decisions in Harish Uppal v. Union of India, , Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan , Chonampara Chellappan v. State of Kerala, , Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, AIR 1949 PC 257 ((1949) 50 Cri LJ 872); Shrishail Nageshi Para v. State of Maharashtra, ; Brij Bhushan Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1946 PC 38 (1946) 47 Cri LJ 336; Abdul Sattar v. Union Territory Chandigarh, 1985 Supp SCC 599 (1986 Cri LJ 1072); Md. Husain Umar Kochra v. K. S. Dalipsinghji , and S. N. Mukharjce v. Union of India ; Ram Sarup v. Union of India, .
Gauhati High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Md. Azad Parvez vs Narcotic Control Bureau And State Of ... on 10 August, 2006

54. From examination of the statement of Satya Pradhan, Hamid Riaz Ahmed Siddeique and Sitaram Majhi and after considering submissions of the learned Advocate of the respective parties, we are of clear opinion that those statements cannot be considered to be voluntary and in such a background, in our considered view, having regard to the ratio of decisions of Bhubani Sahu (supra) and Kashmira Singh (supra), it would be proper for any Court of Law before acting on such statement to seek a minimum corroboration regarding the material part of such statement and without such minimum corroboration, it would not be safe and legally proper to record an order of conviction on such statement alone.
Calcutta High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra on 5 September, 2000

In Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (76 IA 147), the Privy Council after noticing Section 133 and illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act observed that whilst it is not illegal to act on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, it is a rule of prudence so universally followed as to amount almost to a rule of law that it is unsafe to act on the evidence of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material respects so as to implicate the accused; and further that the evidence of one accomplice cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of another accomplice. The rule of prudence was based on the interpretation of the phrase "corroborated in material particulars" in illustration (b). Delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, Sir John Beaumont observed that the danger of acting on accomplice evidence is not merely that the accomplice is on his own admission a man of bad character who took part in the offence and afterwards to save himself betrayed his former associates, and who has placed himself in a position in which he can hardly fail to have a strong bias in favour of the prosecution; the real danger is that he is telling a story which in its general outline is true, and it is easy for him to work into the story matter which is untrue. He may implicate ten people in an offence and the story may be true in all its details as to eight of them but untrue as to the other two whose names may have been introduced because they are enemies of the approver. The only real safeguard therefore against the risk of condemning the innocent with the guilty lies in insisting on independent evidence which in some measure implicates each accused.
Supreme Court of India Cites 54 - Cited by 209 - Full Document
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