Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 10 (1.64 seconds)

Akbarbhai Kesarbhai Sipai vs Mohanbhai Ambabhai Patel Since Decd. ... on 12 July, 2019

"Section 65, Evidence Act sets out the cases in which secondary evidence is admissible. It was argued that this falls under Clause (e) "when the original is a public document within the meaning of Section 74" because Section 74 states that the following are public documents, namely, "(2) public records kept in British India of private documents". The argument is not well founded. Section 65 applies only when the original is a public document. It would, for example, be absurd to contend that a private sale deed or mortgage can be proved by the production of a certified copy obtained from the Sub-Registrar's office and nothing more. "(Emphasis supplied) 108.4 In Subudhi Padhan v. Raghu Bhuvan, AIR 1962 Ori 40,, a learned single Judge of the Orissa High Court, held that marking of a certified copy of a registered mortgage deed which is admissible as , secondary evidence does not dispense with the proof of actual execution. He observed:
Gujarat High Court Cites 193 - Cited by 2 - J B Pardiwala - Full Document

The Church Of Our Lady Of Immaculate ... vs The State Of Mysore And Anr. on 22 August, 1975

In Subudhi Padhan v. Raghu Bhuvan the decision in AIR 1935 Pat 167 (FB), was followed and it was held that the statements of boundaries in documents of title between third parties were not admissible under Section 32(3) of the Evidence Act as such admission cannot be said to be necessarily against the proprietary interests of the person making it. It was further held that it could be admissible only if it is shown that at the time it was made it was contrary to the interests of the maker and at the time it was said to be used it is a statement of a relevant fact.
Karnataka High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Mercy Dharamaraj Bency Grace Ammal M. ... vs M. Gomathy And Ors. on 26 April, 2007

82. It was further contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, cannot be made applicable to the documents, namely, Exhibits B.17 and B.1, as they are not original documents as held in Patel Manilal Chhanganlal v. The Municipal Corporation, Surat and Ors. , Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput v. Shankar Motiram Nale , Subudhi Padhan v. Raghu Bhuvan , Dhirendra Singh and Ors. v. Dhanai and Ors. AIR 1983 ALL 216 and Gadey Venkata Ratnam (Deceased) and Ors. v. Gadey Sitaramayya and Ors. AIR 1950 (1) MLJ 720. With regard to the missing of the last page of the document, namely, Exhibit B.17, containing the schedule of the property, it has been contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the said document cannot be held to be relating to the suit properties. It is the case of the defendants that the Office of the Sub-Registrar, which had given the certified copy of the said documents, had stated that the last page of the document could not be given, as it was torn.

Jagannath Sahu vs Golapi Barik And Anr. on 11 May, 1984

Similarly, in a decision of this court reported in AIR 1962 Orissa 40 (Subudhi Padhan v. Raghu Bhuvan) it was held that even if the certified copy of the suit mortgage deed was admissible in evidence, that would not dispense with the proof of execution of the same. Proof of actual execution is necessary. In the present case, there is absolutely no proof of execution of Exts. H, I and J. Further, the learned lower Appellate Court failed to notice that in Exts. H and I, the express consent of the plaintiff has been taken and noted in the deeds for the transfers made by defendant No. 2. It is well known that such consent of adult coparceners is necessary in order to validate transfers of joint family properties and make them binding on all the coparceners. It is significant to note that Ext. H and Ext. E (the impugned sale deeds) were executed by defendant No. 2 on the same day, i.e. 23-4-65. In Ext H, the express consent of the plaintiff has been obtained, but no such consent has been obtained in respect of Ext. D. If consent of the plaintiff was necessary for the transfer under Ext. H, it is not understood how such consent of the plaintiff was not necessary for transfer of the property under Ext. D. In any case, as already stated, since execution of Exts. H, I and J has not been proved, they must be ruled out of consideration. Ext. G is a plain paper mortgage deed dt. 22-2-58 purported to have been executed by the plaintiffs father and countersigned by the plaintiff. It was produced in court by defendant No. 1 and proved by D. W. 9. It appears that the plaintiff who examined himself as P. W. 1 was not confronted with this document. It is not known whether the valuation of the property under Ext. G was more or less than Rs. 100/-. However, Mr. J. P. Misra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, submitted that the benefit of doubt with regard to nonregistration of the document should go to respondent No. 1 particularly when the document is an old document.
Orissa High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
1