In fact, the more important ruling of the Privy Council, namely the one in Mt. Bhagwati v. Ram Kali (AIR 1939 PC 133) was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges. If the learned Judges, however, thought that the provisions of the Bombay Court-Fees Act, 1959 (contained in Art. 15 in Schedule I which required one half of the advalorem Court fee payable on the compensation to be paid at the stage of application for reference) necessitated the communication of reasons, so that the party could decide what to claim in the reference application, the case becomes wholly distinguishable. In fact, at one stage (see para 22) the learned Judges refer to the Court-fee aspect as one of the 'compelling factors' for the view they are taking regarding the first part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2). The Bombay decision has to be understood in the light of the pecular provision in the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959.
6. Accepting the above decision of the Privy Council and some other cases, the learned Judges held that where the right to receive compensation for property acquired under land acquisition proceedings depended on the title to the property acquired, and the dispute as to title is raised by the parties and is decided by the Land Acquisition Judge after contest, this decision as to title operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties. But in the same case the learned Judges have further observed that facts are necessary to establish in order to succeed in the plea of res judicata, and at page 164 (of Ind App): (at p. 136 of AIR) of the report they say:
3201 : 43 M.L.J. 78 : A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80 and in Bhagwati v. Ram Kali ( 1939) 661, A. 145 : (1939) 2 M.L.J. 98, As we pointed out already, the only reason given by the Full Bench in Rajagopala Chettiar v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras (1934) 66 M.L.J. 43 : I.L.R. 57 Mad. 271 : A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 103 (2) for coming to the conclusion that the order passed by the District Judge Under Section 84 (2) of Madras Act II of 1927 was not a decree was the consideration that Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to a decree only when the order was passed in a suit and not in an application. It is that conclusion which Was held to be not authoritative by the later Full Bench.
movable and immovable property so
that after his death there may not be
any dispute among his
heirs/executors. I thte testator has
purchased one storey house pucca
built up within its boundary(three
storey) No. 710 Siauted in Nai Basti,
Katra Neel, Delhi City, Ward II which
has been purchased with my own
resources, vide Auction Certificate
dated 18.05.1928, issued by the Court
of Sheikh Abdul Majid, Subjudge, 1st
class Delhi in a Civil Suit No. 300 of
1925 and Revision Partition No. 468 of
1927 Mst. Bhagwati Vs. Kali Charan
etc., in connection with Auction of
House dated 21.02.1928 confirmed by
the court mentioned above on
05.05.1928 and constructed it. I am
exclusive owner and in possession
thereof.
In our opinion, this argument is untenable and was negatived by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bhagwati v. Ram Kali (66 IA 145) cited above, in clear and emphatic terms. In that case, in a regular suit which concerned the rest of the property the plea of res judicata was upheld by reason of the decision in the land acquisition case which concerned another part of the property which had been acquired and for which compensation was payable. The quotation already cited earlier from this decision brings out that point clearly. The test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases.
In view of that decision which was affirmed by the Judicial Committee in Bhagwati v. Ram Kali (1939) 2 M.L.J. 98 : L.R. 66 I.A. 145 : I.L.R. 1939 All. 460 (P.C.), there can be no doubt that the decision of the District Judge must be taken as a decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction, and as it finally decided the question of the title to the land in the land acquisition proceedings it is not open to the appellant to question it here. The appellant had full opportunity to contest the first respondent's title to the land before the District Judge in the case before him under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. If he wished to maintain his claim to the compensation money the proper course was to adduce evidence to prove that the sale was void and therefore the first respondent had obtained no title to the land, but instead of doing this he stood aside and allowed his brother to establish unchallenged the right which he claimed.