553 and to the decision by Edge C. J. in Queen-Empress v. Girdhari Lal (1886) I. L. R. 8 All. 653. For my own part, however, I am, with very great respect unable to follow the Allahabad High Court in these decisions.
6. With all respect for the learned Judges who decided those cases, we are not prepared to accept the rule of law laid down by them, that it would not amount to forgery under the Indian Penal Code, if the intention with which a false document was made was to conceal a fraud which had been previously committed. If the intention with which a false document was made was to conceal a fraudulent or dishonest act which had been previously committed, we fail to see how that intention could be other than an intention to commit fraud; and if the intention was to commit fraud, the making of a false document with that intention will come within. the definition of forgery in Section 463 of the Indian Penal Code. Nor does Section 464 stand in the way of the view we have taken; for though to constitute forgery a person must make a false document,, as defined in Section 464, a person makes a false document "who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes a document, or a part of a document, etc.," so that, if there is either dishonesty or fraud in the making or altering of a document falsely, the case would come under Section 464.
In construing Sections 24 and 25, Indian Penal Code, we are of opinion that the primary, and not the more remote intention of the accused must be looked at.--See the observations of Edge, C.J. in Queen-Empress v. Girdhari Lal I.L.R. 8 All. 653.
In Queen-Empress v. Bdbu Lal (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 509 (F.B.) the real point for consideration which was discussed at great length in the principal judgments of that case, was whether Section 27 of the Evidence Act governs Section 26 only or Section 25 as well as Section 26. The majority of the judges held that Section 27 controls Section 25 also, although Brodhurst, J., and Straight, C.J., held very different views regarding the extent to which the statement actually made could be admitted in evidence.
In the case of -- 'Queen-Empress v. Sri Lal', 17 All 166 CB), a Division Bench of this Court held that a chabutra which was neither a place to which the public had a right of access nor a place to which the public were ever permitted to have access was not, though it adjoined a public road, a 'public place' within the meaning of Section 13.
In Empress v. Girdhari i, c. p. l, e. 174, a weaker case than this, a son who had quarrelled with his father and appropriated to his own use part of the family property against the will of bia father, who waa manager of the property, was held to have been rightly convicted for theft.