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Bhaskar Swain And Sanatan Khatei And ... vs Commissioner Of Consolidation And Ors. on 15 May, 1992

5. Whenever the question of exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court arises in the context of setting up of a special tribunal under a statute to adjudicate certain types of disputes, the law is wall settled that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court shall be taken to be excluded only to the extent it is specifically included either by express words or by implication within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Conversely the tribunal so set up would have exclusive jurisdiction only to decide the questions specicaily entrusted to its care but would have no exclusive jurisdiction to decide what is usually known as preliminary, or collateral or jurisdictional facts, the decision on which it is necessary to assume jurisdiction to decide the special disputes entrusted to it unless the legislature itself excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court also to decide such preliminary, or collateral, or jurisdictional facts. Hence every tribunal has the inherent authority to decide two sets of facts ; the first being the preliminary, or collateral, or jurisdictional facts, shortly put, the primary facts, which it must decide so as to enable itself to assume the authority to act as the tribunal ; and the second being, once it decides the primary facts in the affirmative, to decide the second set of facts relating to the special dispute for the decision of which it has been constituted. The jurisdiction to decide the secondary set of facts is exclusive to itself and to that extent the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded to decide such facts, but the decision of the Tribunal on the first set of facts is usually not conclusive and is open to be challenged before the Civil Court unless the legislature itself has also sealed such quastions from its cognizance. The law on the question was explicitly discussed in I.L.R. 1965 Cuttack 539 (Beharilal Neparam v. Urdhaba Charan Sahu and Ors.) where reliance was placed on (1988) 21 O. B. D. 313 (Queen v. Commissioner for Special Purposes of Income-tax) and on a passage from I. L. R. 1958 Cuttack 417 (Benudhar Dalai v. State of Orissa) to the effect :
Orissa High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Satyasiva Sundar Nayak vs Secretary on 13 May, 2019

Orissa High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 0 - A K Rath - Full Document

Bhima Jally And Ors. vs Nata Jally And Ors. on 23 June, 1976

9. Admittedly in a proceeding under Section 5 (i) of the Act, the leases of plaintiff No. 1 (Exts. 2 to 5) have been set aside. The Estate Abolition Collector found that the leases had been created after 1st day of January, 1946. Under that provision, a lease was liable to be set aside if it is made or created at any time after the first day of January, 1946, or if the same is made with the object of defeating any object of the Act or obtaining higher compensation thereunder, in Benudhar Dalai's case, (AIR 1958 Orissa 197), it has been held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine the finding as regards the date of the lease and that jurisdiction would not be ousted by Section 39 of the Act. The decision under Section 5 (i) of the Act is, therefore, open to challenge in so far as it is based upon a finding that the leases were subsequent to 1-1-1946.
Orissa High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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