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State Of Kerala vs Thomas Cherian And Ors. on 11 August, 1982

This decision also does not preclude the court from looking into the corroborating evidence in considering the reliability of the evidence of the approver. As held in the decision in Major E. G. Bar-say v. State of Bombay . It is open to the court to look into the corroborative evidence to consider the question of reliability of the approver's evidence and then to consider whether there is corroboration in material particulars of the prosecution case.
Kerala High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

M.Kanagasabapathy vs The Special Officer on 12 October, 2007

In fact the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision, apart from stating that the same has no statutory force also held that such bye-laws of the society are similar in nature to the Articles of Association of a company incorporated under the Companies Act and therefore, it has no force of law. Similarly, comparison was also made with the Standing Orders under the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, where again, it was held that though such Standing Orders are binding on the employer and employee of an industry, they do not have the force of law. Therefore, when it is well settled that bye-laws of the co-operative society have no force of law, the same cannot stand the scrutiny when it comes to the question of applicability of Act 43 of 1981. We are therefore, of the firm view that Act 43 of 1981 being a special enactment specifically enacted to deal with the payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension pending enquiry, which act being earlier in point of time as compared to the Act 30 of 1983 which should be construed as a general enactment in the present context, Act 43 of 1981 alone would prevail.

M. Kanagasabapathy vs The Special Officer, The Appellate ... on 12 October, 2007

In fact the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision, apart from stating that the same has no statutory force also held that such bye-laws of the society are similar in nature to the Articles of Association of a company incorporated under the Companies Act and therefore, it has no force of law. Similarly, comparison was also made with the Standing Orders under the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, where again, it was held that though such Standing Orders are binding on the employer and employee of an industry, they do not have the force of law. Therefore, when it is well settled that bye-laws of the co-operative society have no force of law, the same cannot stand the scrutiny when it comes to the question of applicability of Act 43 of 1981. We are therefore, of the firm view that Act 43 of 1981 being a special enactment specifically Page 2678 enacted to deal with the payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension pending enquiry, which act being earlier in point of time as compared to the Act 30 of 1983 which should be construed as a general enactment in the present context, Act 43 of 1981 alone would prevail.

M. Balakrishna Reddy vs Director, Cbi, New Delhi on 14 March, 2008

In Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay this Court held that if an order is issued in the name of the President and is duly authenticated in the manner prescribed in Article 77(2), there is an irrebuttable presumption that the order is made by the President. Whereby the order does not comply with the provisions of Article 77(2), it is open to the party to question the validity of the order on the ground that it was not an order made by the President and to prove that it was not made by the Central Government. Where the evidence establishes that the Dy. Secretary on behalf of the Central Government made the order a delegate, the order cannot be questioned. Therefore, it is necessary to show whether decision of the Government is according to Business Rules".
Supreme Court of India Cites 51 - Cited by 28 - C K Thakker - Full Document

Dr. Saleem Ur Rehman vs State Of Jk & Ors. on 7 May, 2018

"9.The offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120- A is a distinct offence introduced for the first time in 1913 in Chapter V-A of the Penal Code. The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co- conspirators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end of which every collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them must be interested. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences may be committed by some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to be in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may be sometimes misfire or overshooting by some of the conspirators. Even if some steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the knowledge of the others it will not affect the culpability of those others when they are associated with the object of the conspiracy. The significance of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A is brought out pithily by this Court in Major E.G.Barsay v. State of Bombay (1962) 2 SCR 195 thus:
Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench Cites 57 - Cited by 0 - A Magrey - Full Document

Therefore vs P.Ponnusamy on 4 August, 2021

(i) In Major EG Barsay v. State of Bombay reported in 1961 SCC Online SC 30 = AIR 1961 SC 1762, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the evidence of the approver and the corroborative pieces of evidence need not be considered in two different compartments. The reliability of an approver’s evidence, though not exclusively would depend upon the corroboration by unimpeachable evidence. The relevant observations are extracted below.
Madras High Court Cites 169 - Cited by 0 - M S Ramesh - Full Document

A. Thajudeen (A3) vs State Rep. By The Ad.S.P on 18 December, 2009

The offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120A is a distinct offence introduced for the first time in 1913 in Chapter VA of the Penal Code. The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end of which every collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them must be interested. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences, may be committed by some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to be in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may be sometimes misfire or over-shooting by some of the conspiratOrs. Even if some steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the knowledge of the others it will not affect the culpability of those others when they are associated with the object of the conspiracy. The significance of criminal conspiracy under Section 120A is brought out pithily by this Court in Major B. G. Darsay v. The State of Bombay (1961CriLJ828) thus:
Madras High Court Cites 86 - Cited by 0 - P Sridevan - Full Document
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