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Documents citing Nirman Bahadur vs Fateh Bahadur Singh And Ors. on 25 July, 1929

Gopal Das And Anr. vs Sri Thakurji And Ors. on 3 October, 1935

To the same effect is the decision of this Court re-ported as Nirman Bahadur v. Fateh Bahadur 1929 52 All 178, and of the Patna High Court in Janak Kishori Kuar v. Babu Debi Prasad Singh 1917 2 PLJ 370. It is a fact that in the litigation of 1895 Bindeshri Bahu claimed to be entitled to the properties left by Parshotam Das as an absolute owner of the same and was thus putting forward a title that was peculiar to her and not in common with the other reversioners. She cannot therefore be said to have been litigating in a representative capacity in the suit of 1895. On the other hand it is argued on behalf of the defendant-respondents that the compromise entered into by Bindeshri Bahu was a bona fide settlement of a disputed claim and it was binding not only on Bindeshri Bahu but all the reversioners of Parshotam. It is said that the plea put forward by Bindeshri Bahu in her written statement in the suit of 1895 that she was the absolute owner of the properties left by Parshotam Das was in consequence of a will executed by Parshotam Das on 9th December 1883, by which he devised absolute proprietary interest in favour of Bindeshri Bahu. It is therefore contended that Bindeshri Bahu was perfectly justified in not only claiming the property as an absolute owner but also by virtue of the compromise taking the property reserved for her as an absolute owner. The argument is that, notwithstanding the fact that Bindeshri Bahu was claiming the properties as an absolute owner by virtue of the alleged will of Parshotam Das, she represented Pashotam's estate in the litigation of 1895.
Allahabad High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 64 - Full Document

Hukum Tej Pratap Singh vs Collector Of Etah In Charge Of Estates Of ... on 20 March, 1950

32. The word 'Aulad' being the plural of the Persian word 'Walad' literally means 'sons'. In. the popular sense, however, it has come to mean 'issues', including sons and daughters, and its derivations such as 'la-walad' or 'be aulad' mean 'issueless' or 'childless' and not merely 'sonless'. This was pointed out in -- 'Nirman Bahadur v. Pateh Bahadur', AIR 1929 All 963 at p. 969 (E); -- 'Mst.
Allahabad High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Bishan Dayal vs Lakshmi Narain And Ors. on 12 August, 1966

Learned counsel for the appellant does not. and indeed cannot, question the correctness of the law as given in Mulla's Hindu Law. His contention, however, is that this is not a case of that kind He has submitted that the estoppel against Mst. Jagrani Kunwar was something personal to her and the decree in suit No. 348 of 1918 having been passed on that estoppel it cannot bind the reversioner. He has cited four decisions in support of his contention The first is Nirman Bahadur v Fateh Bahadur. ILR 52 All 178 AIR 1929 All 963 in that case the widow Mst Manraj Kunwari had entered into an agreement in the previous litigation admitting therein that her husband had died in a state of jointness with the result that she could only have the right of maintenance The contention on behalf of the reversioners was that the widow by virtue of the agreement ceased to have the capacity to represent the estate and, therefore, a decree passed in the suit would not bind the reversioners. This argument was accepted by a Bench of this Court Mukherji. J. observed as follows:
Allahabad High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Mulam Chand Chhoteylall Modi vs Kanchhendilall Bhaiyalal And Ors. on 29 March, 1957

13. The question then is whether it is necessary for the plaintiff to pray for cancellation of the Farkatnama and the deed for partition. There is no doubt that a father has under the Hindu Law an absolute right to divide the family property at any moment during his life, and if he does so, the effect in law is not only a separation of the father from the sons, but a separation of the sons inter se. The consent of the sons is not necessary for the exorcise of this power : Kandasami v. Doraisami Ayyar, ILR 2 Mad 317 at p. 321 (K); Nirman Bahadur v. Fateh Bahadur, ILR 52 All 178 : (AIR 1929 All 963) (L).
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Smt. Rattan Devi vs Jagadhar Mal And Ors. on 4 February, 1955

4. Counsel submits that there was a partition between Mahadeo Parshad and his two sons and his wife which was as a result of the filing of the suit which was started on 30-10-1942 and which result-ed in a decree dated 4-5-1943. Under Hindu Law a partition could be effeteed by the father during his lifetime: see paragraph 323 of Mulla's Hindu Law at page 422 where it is stated that for such a parti-tion the consent of the sons is not necessary: see also -- 'Nirman Bahadur v. Fateh Bahadur', AIR 1929 All 963 (A).
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

N. Krishna Reddy And Ors. vs N. Sharadabai And Ors. on 5 February, 2002

48); Venkateshwara Pattar v. Mankayanmal (1933) 69 MLJ 410; Nirman v. Fateh Bahadur (1930) 52 Allahabad 178, are some of the decisions on the point. It, therefore, emerges that it is permissible in law for a father in a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, to effect partition between himself and his sons with or without their consent. Once the consent of the sons is immaterial, it axiomatically follows that such a partition can be effected even vis-a-vis a minor. It is not in dispute that Mitakshara law governs the family of the parties to the suit. Therefore, the partition between Swender Rao and the DW1 was permissible in law.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 6 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Kaliammal And Ors. vs Sundarammal And Ors. on 23 February, 1948

In a case similar to this, Nirman Bahadur v. Fateh Bahadur (1939) I.L.R. 52 All. 178, Mukerji, J., went to the length of holding that in entering into such a compromise she was not representing the estate. The learned Judge says, Where, by way of compromise, the widow says that her husband died joint with the opposite-parties and, therefore, she is not entitled to possession and is entitled only to a maintenance, it cannot be said that the widow ' represented the estate ' and a compromise honestly arrived at by her would bind the reversioners. The reason is very simple. The moment the widow says that her husband died joint, she disclaims all title to represent her husband's estate for on her own admission there is no estate to represent.
Madras High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 6 - Full Document
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