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Documents citing Paras Ram vs Gardner on 21 February, 1877

Raghunandun Pershad And Anr. vs Bhugoo Lall on 5 August, 1889

And in the case of Paras Ram v. Gardner I.L.R. 1 All. 355, Stuart, C.J., observes: "The interruption to the execution of his decree was not occasioned by any fault or laches of his own, but was caused by the illegal intervention of Dabi Das. Paras Ram's procedure, therefore, under his decree, must beheld to have been legally continuous, and he may proceed to its execution." Now, it is clear that in the present case those considerations have no application. It is clear that the decree-holders could, notwithstanding the order in the claim case, have prosecuted their application for execution against the one-third share which was not released then quite as well as they can do so now. Their present application is for the sale of that third share of the property; there was no bar then to their enforcing the execution of the decree, and there has been no subsequent removal of that bar. The reason of the decisions not applying to the present case, they cannot afford any ground for holding that the present application is a continuation of the application of the 11th June 1883.
Calcutta High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 18 - Full Document

Madhabmani Dasi vs Lambert on 10 May, 1910

50, which shows that a second application for execution may be treated as a continuation of the previous application, even though such application was formally dismissed as the result of an order adverse to the decree-holders in a claim case, and the consequent necessity for a suit by him which ultimately succeeded: see also Paras Ram v. Gardner (1877) I.L.R. 1 All. 355. The present case is, from one point of view, much stronger than any to which reference has been made. Here, as soon as the application by the original decree-holder was dismissed, on the ground that her interest had passed by execution sale to Levinia Ashton, she forthwith applied for an order absolute; this remained pending till the disposal of the application for reversal of the sale, and as soon as that application succeeded, and her application for order absolute was dismissed, the original decree-holder again applied for order absolute. The result was that from the 9th September 1908 there has been before the Court, without any interruption, an application for order absolute by either the original decree-holder or by the purchaser of her interest at the execution sale. The Court did not await the result of the application for reversal of the sale, but dismissed the first application, and as soon as the sale was reversed, dismissed the second application by the purchaser, and entertained at the same time an application by the original decree-holder. The only reasonable view we can take of the proceedings under such circumstances, is that the application of the 10th February 1910 was in continuation of the application of the 8th July 1909. which was in substance for revival of the application of the 9th September 1908, which had been dismissed on the 19th December 1908. In this view, no question of limitation arises, and the Court below was clearly in error when it dismissed the application for order absolute as barred by limitation. It is not necessary, however, to rest our decision upon this ground alone, and we shall proceed to examine the second ground urged on behalf of the appellant.
Calcutta High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Madhab Moni Dasi vs Pamela Lambert on 10 May, 1910

See also Paras Ram v. Gardner 1 A. 355. The present case is, from one point of view, much stronger than any to which reference has been made. Here, as soon as the application by the original decree-holder was dismissed on the ground that her interest had passed by execution sale to Livinia Ashtou, she forthwith applied for an order absolute; this remained pending till the disposal of the application for reversal of the sale and as soon as that application succeeded arid her application for order absolute was dismissed, the original decree-holder again applied for order absolute. The result was that from the 9th September, 1908, there has been before the Court, without any interruption, an application for order absolute by either the original decree-holder or by the purchaser of her interest at the execution sale. The Court did not await the result on the application for reversal of the sale, but dismissed the first application, and as soon as the sale was reversed, dismissed the second application by the purchaser, and entertained at the same time an application by the original decree-holder. The only reasonable view we can take of the proceedings, under such circumstances, is that the application of the 10th February, 1910, was in continuation of the application of the 8th July, 1903, which was in substance for revival of the application of the 9th September 1903, which had been dismissed on the 19th December, 1903. In this view, no question of limitation arises, and the Court below was clearly in error when it dismissed the application for order absolute as barred by limitation. It is not necessary, however, to rest our decision upon this ground alone, and we shall proceed to examine the second ground urged on behalf of the appellants.
Calcutta High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

Rahamathulla vs Rasool Bivi And 6 Others on 4 February, 2000

In one of the earliest decisions concerning legal position is reported in Paras Ram v. Gardner, ILR (1) All 355 (FB) consisting of five learned judges. The majority Judgment held thus, "Stuart, C.J The interruption to the execution of his decree was not occasioned by any fault or laches of his own, but was caused by the illegal intervention of Dabi Das. Paras Ram's procedure, therefore, under his decree must be held to have been legally continuous, and he may proceed to its execution."
Madras High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Lakhmi Chand vs Ballam Das on 6 March, 1895

Other Courts, and amongst them a Full Bench of this Court in Paras Ram v. Gardner I.L.R. 1 All. 355, have held that a renewed application for execution is not a fresh application, but a continuance or revival of the previous application which had been interrupted owing to a cause for which the appellant was not responsible. Looking to the terms of the order of the 30th of January 1889, which was passed in this case, I prefer to regard the present application as an application to renew the previous proceeding which was in abeyance owing to the injunction. In this view the decree-holder's application was not in any way barred. I am unable to follow the lower Courts in their opinion that no application was ever made to execute the attached decree of the attaching creditor. Not only was the application of the 3rd of July 1888 an application to execute the attached decree, but the application was granted. It was objected by the learned vakil for the respondent that the application of the 3rd of July 1888 was defective, inasmuch as it did not give all the particulars required by Section 235 of the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to the attached decree. In my opinion the particulars which the application gives were sufficient, and in any case the judgment-debtor, by neglecting to show any cause against the execution when opportunity was given him, has, I hold, lost his right to rely on any objection of this nature. For the above reasons I decree the appeal with costs in all Courts, and, setting aside the orders of the lower Courts, remand the case under the provisions of Section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure with directions to readmit the application under Its original number in the register and proceed to dispose of it according to law.
Allahabad High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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