Smt. Saroj Mamdani vs State Of Maharashtra And 3 Ors. on 25 September, 1998
In Smt. Madhurika C. Merchant v. R.S. Dilipsinghji and Ors. 1985 Cr.L.J. 538, a Division Bench of this Court at para 12 and 13 has observed as under:
Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 4 of 4 (0.30 seconds)Suresh Vadilal Vyas vs The Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 16 January, 1997
We have already indicated above that Shri Verma had proceeded only on a short casual leave from Monday, the 18th March to Friday, the 22nd March, 1996 and looking to the dates mentioned in para 19 of the affidavit of Shri Verma which we have reproduced in para 9 above, it is not possible for us to hold that any of the exceptional circumstances mentioned in Madhurika Merchant's case existed in the present case so as to permit Shri Sikandar Khan to consider and reject the representation made by the detenu.
Khadadad Habib Memon vs R.C. Iyer And Others on 1 July, 1988
With this factual background it is now necessary to examine the submission of Shri Irani that the representation of the detenu should have been considered only by Shri Iyer and no one else. It is not possible to accept the submission of the learned counsel. A situation cannot be overlooked where the officer, to whom the powers have been delegated by the State Government under S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act may not be available to consider the representation for various reasons, like death, retirement, illness, or having gone abroad for Government duty. In all these situations the mere fact that the detaining authority is not available for considering the representation would not automatically vitiate the order. The State Government can always delegate the powers under S. 3 to another officer and that officer can discharge all the functions of the detaining authority. Any other view of the matter would lead to an absurd situation that on the death or retirement of the detaining authority all the orders of detention passed by that officer would automatically come to an end. Such construction would not advance the intention of the legislature and would lead to absurdity and therefore cannot be accepted. The Division Bench of this Court took an identical view in the decision reported in 1985 Cri LJ 538, Smt. Madhurika C. Merchant v. K. S. Dilipsinghji. Shri Irani submitted that in that case the situation was identical and the order of detention was set aside on the ground that the representation was not considered by the detaining authority but by another officer. The submission is not correct. In that case Shri K. S. Dilipsinghji was the detaining authority and the representation of the detenu was forwarded to Shri Dilipsinghji. Instead of considering the representation. Dilipsinghji placed the papers before Shri V. N. Rao, who was another detaining authority empowered by the Central Government under S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. Authority of Dilipsinghji did not come to an end and in that situation the Division Bench held that representation could not have been determined by Shri Rao because that amounts to abdication of duty by Dilipsinghji. The facts in the present case are entirely different. The return filed by Shri Kelkar clearly reflects that on transfer Iyer ceased to be an officer empowered under S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and in his place Hmingliana was appointed. The expression "is his place" in the return leaves no manner of doubt that the authorisation of Iyer came to an end and fresh authorisation was conferred on Hmingliana in substitution of authorisation of Iyer. It is therefore obvious that Iyer could not have examined the representation and determined the same and it was only Hmingliana whom could have done so. In our judgment the examination of the representation and determination by Hmingliana suffers from no infirmity and the grievance of the detenu on this count is entirely ill-founded. In our judgment, on this ground the order of detention could be disturbed.
Ramesh Chhaganlal Sagar An Indian ... vs The State Of Maharashtra Through The ... on 4 September, 2002
14. So far as retraction statement of the detenu
and Chandrakant C. Rathod are concerned, the detaining
authority has further stated in the said affidavit that
they were considered but it was found that they were
not of vital nature which would have affected the
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority one
way or the other because the detaining authority was
very much aware about the defence of the detenu in
respect of the offence alleged against him. In this
regard Mr. Maqsood Khan relied upon the judgment of
this Court reported in 1985 Cri. L.J. 538 Smt.
Madhurika C. Merchant vs. K. S. Dilipsinghji and
others and particularly paragraph 12 of the said
judgment, the same reads as under :
1