Fatesinh Jesinh Parmar vs State Of Gujarat on 28 January, 2003
In Ramashraya v. State of M. P., AIR 2001 SC 1129, the appellants contended that the offence, if at all committed by the appellants, will not come within the definition of "murder", but only "culpable homicide" looking to the nature of injuries and the sudden quarrel took place without any premeditation. It was, therefore, contended that at the highest the appellants were liable to be punished under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. The Apex Court held that "from the nature of the injuries and the origin and genesis of the incident, it would be spelt out that all the ingredients of the offence of murder defined under Section 300 I.P.C. were made out and it was not possible to bring the offence within any of the five exceptions of Section 300 I.P.C. Therefore, Section 304 I.P.C. cannot be invoked."