11.7 In view of the aforesaid reasoning, the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the secured creditors and Financial Institutions, for contending that the Court must go only for literal construction of statutory provisions and that when the meaning of the words of the statute is clear, the Court should not look to the purpose underlying the statutory provisions, are not relevant because the Apex Court itself has laid down in the case of the State of Bombay v. Pandurang V. Chaphalkar (supra) and Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (supra) that while applying the legal fiction the Courts have to ascertain for what purpose the statutory fiction is created, and thereafter, within that field, the fiction is required to be taken to its logical conclusion. The purpose of creating a legal fiction in sub-section (6) of Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act is to give the workmen of the undertaking, which is illegally closed, all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking was not closed down.
" In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the Court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created; [refer Ex Parte Walton, In re Levy, (1881) 17 Ch D 746, p 756, State of Trav-Co v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory, Quilon, AIR 1953 SC 333, pp 342, 343, State of Bombay v Pandurang Vinayak, AIR 1953 SC 244, p 246], and after ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction, [refer East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. V. Finsbury Borough Council, (1951) 2 All ER 587, (HL) p 599; State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak, supra p 246; CIT, Delhi v S Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352, p 355; Chief Inspector of Mines v Karam Chand Thaper, AIR 1961 SC 838, p 845]. But in so construing the fiction it is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created.
That statement of law in respect of a statutory fiction is
being consistently followed by this Court. Reference in
this connection may be made to the case of State
Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak From the facts of that
case it shall appear that Bombay Building (Control on
Erection) Ordinance, 1948 which was applicable to
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certain areas mentioned in the schedule to it, was
extended by a notification to all the areas in the
province in respect of buildings intended to be used for
the purposes of cinemas. The Ordinance was repealed
and replaced by an Act which again extended to areas
mentioned in the schedule with power under sub-
section (3) of Section 1 to extend its operation to other
areas. This Court held that the deemed clause
in Section 15 of the Act read with Section 25 of the
Bombay General Clauses Act has to be given full
effect and the expression 'enactment' in the Act will
cover the word 'Ordinance' occurring in the
notification which had been issued. In that connection
it was said:
"12. The definition of mine shows that it is applicable to mines and it further
includes the premises and machinery situated in or adjacent to a mine and used
for crushing, processing, treating and transporting etc. Suffice it to say that
once the mine and machinery in the question are situated in the same locality,
it falls within the ambit of 'mine' under the Adhiniyam of 1949. Section 2(1)(j)
of Mines Act also makes it clear that any premises in or adjacent to and
belonging to mine will fall within the ambit of 'mine'. This is trite law that
expression 'mine' used in explanation (b) to Part B of Section 3 creates a legal
fiction. While interpreting the legal fiction, the court is required to ascertain
for what purpose the fiction is created [See: State of Bombay Vs. Pandurang
Vinayak and Others, AIR 1953 SC 244). In explanation (b) while defining
'mine' the expression ' means and includes' has been used which has to be
considered as exhaustive. In other words, the definition will embrace only
WA-202-2012 & connected matters
In view of the aforesaid reasoning, the authorities cited by learned counsel for the secured creditors and financial institutions, for contending that the court must go,.only for literal construction of statutory provisions and that when the meaning of the words of the statute is clear, the court should not look to the purpose underlying the statutory provisions, are not relevant because the apex court itself has laid down in the case of the State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak Chaphalhar [1953] SCR 773 and Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661; 6 STC 446 (SC), that while applying the legal fiction the courts have to ascertain for what purpose the statutory fiction is created, and thereafter, within that field, the fiction is required to be taken to its logical conclusion. The purpose of creating a legal fiction in sub-section (6) of section workmen the right to get priority under sections 529 and 529A of the Act in respect of their claim for unpaid wages during the period of illegal closure.
[1] State of Bombay vs. Pandurang
Vinayak and others1 (Para 5)
[2] American Home Products
Corporation vs. Mac Laboratories Ltd
and Anr.2 (Paras 56, 57 and 66)
In the light of the said judgments, he contended that since section 36
in terms state that an award has to be executed as if it is a decree and
wherever the words "as if it were a decree" are occurring in Order XXI,
1 AIR 1953 SC 244
2 AIR 1986 SC 137
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it has to be treated as a decree and therefore it would be appealable as
a decree under section 13(1). It was contended that the present order
is in the nature of Order under Order XXI Rule 103 which even
otherwise states that appeal is provided. In our view ratio of the
judgments on which reliance is placed are not applicable to the facts of
the present case.