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Documents citing S. Maruthai And Another vs Gokuldoss Dharam Doss And Four Others on 5 November, 1999

Francis vs K.Madhavan Nair on 20 November, 2017

● In order that Madhavan Nair could avail the benefit of protection of his possession in equity, which finds statutory protection in Sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, he must have either performed his part of contract or must have at least conveyed his willingness to perform the same. In other words, there is a need for him to plead and prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract, more akin to Sec. 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This, Madhavan Nair has not done at anytime. Indeed, this aspect weighed with the District Munsiff when he dismissed O.S.415/1996 under Ext.A-19 judgment that Madhavan Nair had filed seeking a decree of prohibitory https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ 12 injunction against Harihara Iyer. Unfortunately, the Courts below have not only overlooked it, but have also treated Madhavan Nair's possession of suit properties as absolute, as if it was founded on title. Reliance was placed on the authorities in Mohan Lal (deceased) through his Lrs & Others Vs Mira Abdul Gaffar & another [AIR 1996 SC 910], Ranchhoddas Chhaganlal Vs Devaji Supdu Dorik & Others [(1977)3 SCC 584, S. Maruthai & another Vs Gokuldoss Dharam Doss & four others [1999(III) CTC 724] ● Since Madhanvan Nair had entered possession pursuant to an agreement of sale, he is not even entitled to claim adverse possession either against his transferor or against anyone who claim under the latter.
Madras High Court Cites 40 - Cited by 1 - N Seshasayee - Full Document

Pappammal (Died) vs Sarojini on 29 November, 2010

32. The term willingness used in Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is nothing different from the term willingness and readiness used in Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act. The argument that the absence of word ready before the word willing in Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act makes all the difference between the quantum of proof required under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act when compared to Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act was not accepted by this court and the same stood rejected in the decision reported in 1999-3-CTC-724 [S.Maruthai and another Vs. Gokuldoss Dharam Doss and four others]. The relevant paragraph is stated hereunder:-
Madras High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 3 - A Jagadeesan - Full Document

Soosai Michael Peter vs Balathasar on 21 February, 2011

7. Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that admittedly, the agreement of sale was dated 1.3.1996 and as per the endorsement, Ex.A2 dated 19.10.1996, the sale deed has to be completed within two months from the date of passing of final decree and final decree was passed on 23.7.2002 and the plaintiff was informed orally by the appellant even in the year 2002 and the respondent/plaintiff only wanted his money back and the respondent was also not having sufficient means to pay the balance sale consideration and that is evident by the suit filed by State Bank of India in O.S.No.112 of 1992 for recovery of loan amount and the respondent did not repay the loan amount and also filed a counter in the execution petition which was marked as Ex.B12 wherein he has stated specifically that he has no means to pay the loan amount and that would prove that in the year 2004, he was not having sufficient amount to repay the loan and therefore, it cannot be contended that the respondent had means to pay the amount and was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the respondent was not ready as he was not having the means to pay the amount and hence, he is not entitled to get specific performance of the agreement of sale. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the conduct of the respondent would also disentitle him from claiming any right in the suit property and he has instigated various persons to file claim petitions in the execution application filed by the bank in O.S.No.112 of 1992 as evidenced by Exs.B11 and B15 and he also instigated his brother to file O.S.No.783 of 1982 to declare the decree passed in O.S.Nos.84 of 1975 and 74 of 1976 as null and void as evidenced by Ex.B13 and that suit was allowed to be dismissed and all these facts would prove that the respondent is a person, who is not honest and will go to any extent to prevent the execution of the decree passed against him and therefore, the respondent is not entitled to the specific performance as the specific performance is purely a discretionary relief. He also relied upon the judgments in PONNAMMAL v. T.BALASUBRAMANIAM ((2009) 1 MLJ 379), RAMALINGAM, G. v. T.VIJAYARANGAM (2007 (1) CTC 243) and MARUTHAI,S. v. GOKULDOSS DHARAM DOSSS (1999 (III) CTC 724) for the proposition that the party seeking specific performance must show his continuous readiness and willingness from the date of execution till the date of filing of the suit.
Madras High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - R S Ramanathan - Full Document
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